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AN INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTITUDES
OF PRINCIPALS AND SUPERINTENDENTS IN FLORIDA
TOWARD MERIT PAY

by

Albert W. Helms

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Education in
the Department of Educational Services at
the University of Central Florida

August 1985

Major Professor: Authur Olson

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by

Albert W. Helms

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study was to determine the attitudes of superintendents and principals in the state of Florida toward the issue of merit pay.

The evaluation instrument used for the collection of data was a questionnaire that was developed and validated by Rometo in 1961. For this study, the instrument consisted of 34 statements and four questions related to merit pay.

During the 1983-84 school year, the instrument was mailed to a total of 1,990 educators in the state of Florida. Included in the sample were all 67 district superintendents and 1,923 selected principals. Usable returns were obtained from 47 superintendents and 1,262 principals.

The responses were tabulated and analyzed by a computer which was programmed to evaluate responses for each of the 34 statements in terms of eight demographic variables. These variables were used as a basis for testing eight hypotheses. The data was analyzed by the use of the chi-square test for significant relationships and the Cochran's Q test for related observations to opinion responses.

The following summary includes some of the findings of this research study:

An application of the chi-square test produced 36 significant chi-squares for the 34 attitude statements.

Over 58% of the principals and superintendents were of the opinion that with adequate salaries, merit pay would be unnecessary.

Almost 85% of the administrators were in agreement with the statement that high salaries for outstanding teacher performance are justifiable.

Over 81% of the administrators indicated that merit pay should be subsidized by the state.

Administrators were in agreement (66.1%) with the statement that a teacher should be eligible for a merit increment as soon as outstanding teaching has been demonstrated.

Over 68% of the administrators were of the opinion that teachers should have the opportunity to assist in planning and administering merit pay in their respective systems.

The overwhelming majority of educators indicated that the principal should participate in the evaluation of teaching performance. The position of supervisor was the second choice and fellow teachers was third.

The highest ranking criteria for evaluating teaching performance selected by administrators was quality of instruction and pupil test scores. The lowest ranking criteria was community participation and service.

Despite the widespread apprehension surrounding the issue of merit pay, the results of this study suggest that agreement exists among the composite attitudes of principals and superintendents in

the state of Florida with regard to premises relative to merit pay,
policies concerning merit pay, and possible effects of merit pay.

To my parents, Helen and Woody Helms,
who fostered my early quest for learning.

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Education is the result of all that a person encounters throughout life. I am fortunate to have been influenced by people who support and urge me toward higher goals.

The chairman of my committee, Dr. Arthur Olson, has been my teacher and my friend. His guidance in my educational career is as strong as his concern for me as a human being. For his learned advice, I am most grateful. Special acknowledgement is extended to Dr. Linda Malone for her valuable assistance on the statistical treatment of the data in this research study. The writer also wishes to express his gratitude to Dr. Robert Rothberg and Dr. Thomas Harrow, the other members of the committee, for their invaluable assistance and guidance.

The author extends his thanks to his loving wife, Kathy, who I am particularly indebted to for her perennial understanding, confidence, encouragement, and assistance. Finally, to my loving daughter, Erin, who has been by source of inspiration, I am most appreciative.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Perhaps one of the most heated discussions in American education today is related to the merit pay controversy for teachers. The resurgence of interest in this timely issue is evidenced by the multitude of articles appearing in newspapers, magazines and journals; media publicity on radio and television; and from public platforms expressed by concerned citizens, school board members, professional educators, governors, state and federal legislators, and even the President of the United States.

This increased interest has been stimulated by the public's concern over the quality of education rendered in our schools, the demand for higher salaries by teachers, and professional employee shortages in the field of education. Merit pay for teachers appears to be a concept that embraces the fundamental Puritan work ethic: "Workers should be paid on the basis of their skills and performance" (Educational Research Service [ERS], 1983, p. 1).

Incentive pay plans for teachers, including merit pay and master teacher plans, have sparked public support by many Americans as a means to improve the quality of education in the nation's schools. As evidenced by the 1983 Gallup Poll, 61% of the Americans surveyed preferred paying teachers according to the quality of their performance; 31% favored paying teachers according to a standard scale; and

8% expressed no opinion. Fifty-eight % of those surveyed supported a tax increase to help raise the standard of education in the United States (Gallup, 1983).

It is important that renewed national interest in quality education has prompted state and local school districts to investigate possible solutions that will bring lasting improvements in American education. In order to move in a positive and constructive direction, facts and information are needed about the issues of merit pay. In addition to comparing and investigating contemporary incentive pay plans, an equally important issue is determining the opinions and attitudes of select groups who are directly involved with the implementation of a merit pay system. The success or failure of any business venture can often be attributed to the attitude of those responsible for instituting a program. Considering the viable role that attitude can play in any situation, it is apparent that attitudes of personnel directly involved with merit pay warrant an investigation in such a vigorously debated issue.

Statement of the Problem

The purpose of this study was to survey, analyze, and compare the attitudes of principals and superintendents of the state of Florida toward merit pay. As this study was based upon a questionnaire with negative and positive statements concerning merit pay, it provided a quantifiable measurement of general attitudes toward the concept of merit pay.

Null Hypotheses

This study examined the differences in attitudes of principals and superintendents toward merit pay. A null hypotheses was utilized to assume no significant relationship. A level of significance of 0.05 was the criterion used for rejecting the null hypotheses.

The null hypotheses tested in this study were as follows:

1. There is no significant relationship between attitudes of principals and superintendents toward merit pay.

2. There is no significant relationship in attitudes of principals of elementary, middle, junior high, and high schools toward merit pay.

3. There is no significant relationship between years of experience as an educator and attitudes toward merit pay.

4. There is no significant relationship between number of years of experience as a principal and attitudes toward merit pay.

5. There is no significant relationship between number of years of experience as a superintendent and attitudes toward merit pay.

6. There is no significant relationship between age classification of educators and attitudes toward merit pay.

7. There is no significant relationship between sex classification of educators and attitudes toward merit pay.

8. There is no significant relationship between marital status of educators and attitudes toward merit pay.

Significance of the Study

Throughout the educational scene, numerous attempts have been made to hold schools accountable for student achievement. Today, more than ever, every professional educator is faced with the reality of accountability. If indeed accountability is to be measured in terms of teacher effectiveness with emphasis on student achievement, then merit pay surfaces as a prominent alternative for achieving these goals.

Many state legislatures and local school districts are developing models of a merit pay system for the purpose of accountability. Of utmost importance in implementing a merit pay program seems to be a knowledge of the attitudes of those professional educators directly involved with the operation. Without this knowledge, the implementation could be encumbered and ineffective.

The two key facilitators in the pursuance of a merit pay program are the principal and the superintendent. Therefore, a study which would survey the attitudes of the respondents concerning some of the salient issues involved in a merit pay program for teachers seems critical. Some prominent elements highlighted by the literature are: Are there contrasts or similarities of opinions that may be associated with demographic information? Are there common factors relating to those who support and those who oppose a merit pay program? If these groups show a divergence of opinion, are these differences significant?

In attempting to determine these attitudes and their magnitude, this study seemed viable and relevant to the modern educator. At this

point in time, attitudinal studies concerning merit pay in the state of Florida are virtually nonexistent. Therefore, research on this topic is necessary to ensure and help facilitate the implementation of a merit pay program.

Definition of Terms

For the purpose of this study the following definition of terms were utilized:

Attitude refers to a predisposition to respond positively or negatively to certain objects, situations, institutions, concepts, or other persons (Aiken, 1982, p. 260).

Merit Pay refers to a system of compensation which singles out, according to a predetermined procedure, the more effective educator and provides to that educator some form of additional salary (Brooks, 1979, p. 13).

Single Salary Schedule refers to a schedule whereby teachers are paid according to their years of experience and their educational attainment level or number of college credits earned (Lipsky & Bacharach, 1983, p. 1).

Principal refers to the presiding administrative officer of a school.

Superintendent refers to the administrative director of a school district.

Delimitations of the Study

The scope of this study was limited to the public school systems in the state of Florida during the 1983-84 school year for the purpose of determining the attitudes of principals and superintendents toward merit pay.

Assumptions

The "Educational Survey on Merit Pay" is a straight forward device for classifying opinions of administrators. With suitable assurance of confidentiality, it is assumed that most of the responding population described themselves with relative candor.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Introduction

The concept of merit pay has been with school systems more than 60 years. It has been the subject of numerous studies and endless debate. Yet, one of the basic issues seems to have remained the same--"Effective teachers are more valuable to an educational program than ineffective teachers and deserve to be paid more for their services" (ERS, 1979, p. 1).

One of the difficulties in discussing the issue of merit pay is the plight of defining the term itself. The literature contains a number of definitions and terminology. The term merit pay has been used interchangeably with many other terms. Regardless of the words used to describe the concept, the meaning remains similar. Templeton (1972) stated, "In simplest terms merit pay means paying a teacher according to the quality of his (or her) teaching. In practice, however, programs range from vague statements allowing school boards to exceed regular pay schedules under some conditions to programs in which all teachers and administrators are paid according to an evaluation rating" (p. 1).

Davis defines merit pay rating as a ". . . recorded judgment about a teacher which determines, at least in part, the amount of his (or her) salary and may affect the rate of salary progress or

ultimate maximum" (p. 535). The Research Division of the National Education Association (NEA) has applied the phrase "quality-of-service recognition" to merit pay defining it as "any device that adjusts salaries to recognize different levels of teaching performance (1968, p. 3). Therefore, a merit salary schedule is "any salary schedule for classroom teachers, whatever its plan of recognizing position, experience, and preparation may be, if it either authorizes or specifies above the regular schedule to reward teachers who have been judged to be rendering superior service" (Davis, 1957, p. 127).

Merit rating has been defined by the California Teachers Association as the term is used in business and industry. Merit rating "refers to processes very similar to the 'evaluation procedures' used by most school districts" (California Teachers Association, 1976, p. 1).

Whenever merit rating is used as the basis for determining a teacher's pay, the terminology changes to a merit pay plan. The New Jersey Education Association's Research Division composed a definition for merit rating commonly used in business and industry. Merit rating is a systematic method of evaluating employee performance for the following:

1. To help determine promotions, transfers, demotions, dismissals, and salaries;
2. To provide an analysis of strong and weak points so that employees' performance may be improved through a guidance program;

3. To provide the personnel division with a yardstick to measure the effectiveness of testing, recruiting, and inservice training programs. (New Jersey Education Association, 1963, p. 6)

Templeton (1972) noted that merit pay programs may differ widely from one school system to another. However, the NEA Research Division (1973) conducted an analysis of teachers' salaries and found three identifiable types of merit pay plans:

1. Those in which authority to exceed the salary schedule due to superior service is vested in the board of education.
2. Those programs in which superior teachers progress at an accelerated rate on the regular salary schedule, however, these teachers do not usually exceed at any time the salary schedule maximum.
3. Other merit plans contain provisions for exceeding the maximum on the salary schedule by fixed dollar amounts.

(p. 1)

The New York State Teachers Association, in the mid 1950s, identified four types of merit pay plans being used in that state:

1. A formal evaluation procedure with a weighted point scale;
2. A formal evaluation procedure with an unweighted point scale;
3. A formal evaluation procedure with no point scale;
4. A recommendation by the superintendent with no formal evaluation procedure. (Davis, 1957, pp. 535-536)

Stoops, Rafferty, and Johnson (1975) have identified seven forms that merit pay plans have acquired:

1. Super-maximums
2. Accelerated increments
3. Bonus
4. Multiple track
5. Periodic merit evaluation
6. Annual outstanding teacher awards
7. Summer merit teacher projects program. (p. 632)

Johnson supports the notion, that there are many variations in merit pay plans, however, most are similar in three respects. "First, merit is used to determine only a part of the teacher's pay. Second, merit is usually only one factor used to determine salary increments. Third, decisions about a teacher's worth are based on systematic performance appraisals" (Johnson, 1984, p. 12).

Bhaerman (1973), using a different approach, classified merit plans into two categories: old-style and new-style. The old-style traditional merit plan rates teachers according to input factors. These factors may include such criterion as classroom effectiveness, ethical and professional behavior, cooperation, and community participation. The new-style approach rates teachers according to output factors. These output factors are linked with a behavioral approach to education in order to attain certain goals and objectives with students. Teacher pay is determined by student achievement. Simply

defined, a merit pay program is designed to pay individuals differently who are performing similar tasks at different levels of quality.

The output model, paying teachers according to a measurable progress of their students, led to a controversy surrounding performance contracting in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Performance contracts began in Arkansas and Texas in 1960-70. The pay of teachers was dependent upon student achievement. The reactions of teachers were less than favorable and questions arose regarding the reliability of standardized test scores used to measure student achievement. Therefore, many performance contracts failed to meet their stated goals (ERS, 1974).

In 1974, an ERS Research Brief stated that internal performance contracts were attempted in only a small number of school systems and were generally more successful than those involving outside contractors. Also, the monograph noted that "the fanfare that surrounded the entry of educational technology companies into the field of instruction and the disappointment surrounding their generally unspectacular achievements have led many educators and laymen to explore another possible form of performance contracting--the 'internal' contract--a performance contract made between an educational authority and its own teachers" (ERS, 1974, p. 4).

Given the controversy and multitude of definitions and terminology of merit pay and merit pay plans, there have arisen differences in opinion as to what actually constitutes a merit pay plan for teachers. Davis (1957) states that merit pay plans are not salary

increases for professional growth, withholding increments to penalize unsatisfactory service, and providing extra pay for extra duties.

According to Flippo and Munsinger (1975), neither are the terms merit rating and performance rating synonymous. They explain merit rating as a system which emphasizes employee characteristics such as intelligence, ingenuity, and personality, while performance rating is based on employee contributions, such as quantity and quality of work and the responsibilities an employee assumes.

In the same context, differentiated staffing seeks to compensate teachers according to different jobs they perform and the different responsibilities that accompany these jobs. For example, Rand and English (1968) explain a differentiated staffing model used in Temple City, California in the late 1960s. This model consisted of a professional panel that selected teachers on the basis of their experience and qualifications for various positions on a hierarchy ranging from academic assistant to staff teacher, senior teacher, teaching curriculum associate, and teaching research associate. Teachers were assigned and retained in these position categories based on their ability to perform satisfactorily in these capacities.

Stocker (1975), another advocate of differentiated staffing, makes a clear distinction between the intent of differentiated staffing and the intent of merit pay. He insists that salary for teachers is based on measured differences in responsibility while merit pay is based on the quality of performance in situations where teachers have a similar task and the same degree of responsibility.

A search of the literature reveals that the concept of merit pay has acquired varied meanings depending upon how, where, and by whom it is used. According to a 1979 ERS report and a 1983 update, the research found "that school districts across the country use the term 'merit pay' to cover a wide variety of plans and programs for providing extra compensation to deserving teachers" (p. 6). Thus, the term merit pay, difficult and nebulous as it may seem to define, has been resurrected numerous times along the educational scene in the United States, having a long life of controversy and instability.

History of Merit Pay

Merit pay as a method of paying teachers on the basis of their performance is neither a new nor a unique concept to this generation. The origin of rating worker performance dates back to antiquity. Early accounts report that in 200 A.D. the Wei Dynasty in China had a system of rewarding workers according to their merits. In 1869, Sir Francis Galton of England used a normal distribution curve to rate his employees (Stinnett, 1969).

During the early days of this country, colonial America paid a small amount to teachers for their services. However, the amount of reward for teaching was thought to be in the gratification of helping another person. Schools were periodically inspected by special committees consisting of the clergy and prominent citizens. The teacher's pay was commensurate with the degree to which the committee was pleased with the teacher's performance. Obviously, under these circumstances, salary schedules were impossible to uniformly control (Elsbree, 1939).

A search of the literature reveals that the concept of merit pay has acquired varied meanings depending upon how, where, and by whom it is used. According to a 1979 ERS report and a 1983 update, the research found "that school districts across the country use the term 'merit pay' to cover a wide variety of plans and programs for providing extra compensation to deserving teachers" (p. 6). Thus, the term merit pay, difficult and nebulous as it may seem to define, has been resurrected numerous times along the educational scene in the United States, having a long life of controversy and instability.

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In 1789, Benjamin Franklin made an accusation to the trustees of The Academy concerning teacher pay. Franklin wrote a complaint which discussed the inequity of decreasing the pay of an English teacher while increasing his duties and increasing the pay of a Latin teacher while decreasing his duties by one-half (Woody, 1931).

Early in the educational scene teachers were examined by trustees or school committees and paid according to their quality of service. These expectations and rewards were very similar to the merit pay plans of today (Reeder, 1958). T. M. Stinnett (1969) reports that, "By the latter part of the nineteenth century, communities had become too large, curricula too expanded, and teaching methods too complex to permit laymen to evaluate the work of the teacher. By this time professional school administrators were employed by most school districts. This group inherited the task of rating teachers" (p. 172).

The first recorded merit pay plan for teachers in the United States was administered in the Newton, Massachusetts, school system in the early 1900s (Mitchell, 1961). Interest in such plans grew rapidly, however, floundered near the time of World War I when the average salaries of teachers in school systems using merit pay dropped below teachers' salaries in non-merit pay systems. The following is an account of Stegeman's summary of the status of merit pay plans from 1915 through World War I, as quoted by Kidwell:

In 1915, there were approximately three hundred merit programs in operation. However, these evaluation programs tended to be vague and indefinite, with only general and unsystematized

rating. A study conducted shortly after World War I indicated none of these 300 programs were still in operation. It is generally believed that these programs failed because the varied increments for different merit levels of teaching had not been sufficient. The top salaries for superior teachers were approximately the same and the differences in rewarding superior teachers were lost. The average salaries for teachers in the districts with merit programs fell below those of the other districts. (1968, p. 17)

In order to change the disparity in teachers' salaries, the single salary schedule was developed to provide teachers with a stable income based on training and experience only (Rometo, 1961). In 1919, the National Association Commission Series conducted a comprehensive research on teachers' salaries. The commission recommended that a single salary schedule be used with an automatic increment for each year of experience up to a designated maximum.

"Prior to 1920 less than one-half the cities had salary schedules. By 1922-23 however, approximately 65 percent of the city school systems inaugurated a schedule for salary payments to instructional personnel" (Knezevich, 1962, p. 374). During the peak of the 1920s, it was difficult to find a school district which had not developed and utilized a salary schedule for teachers.

The popularity of the single salary schedule continued through the 1930s and World War II. Due to the advent of the war and inflationary factors in 1942, the schools found themselves in a precarious

position. "Many teachers left the schools to serve in the armed forces or to work in better paying jobs directly related to the immediate defense effort. By the end of World War II this situation was further aggravated by the great increase in the number of children of school age" (Van Zwoll, 1964, p. 254).

School districts were faced with numerous shortages of teachers which ultimately led to state boards of education lowering training and experience requirements in an effort to provide teachers for classrooms. By lowering certification requirements many people entered the teaching profession functioning at low levels of competence.

In order to rectify this problem, the 1950s experienced a resurgence of interest in merit pay plans with many states either considering or adopting legislation on merit pay. States stiffened certification requirements, with emphasis on academic preparation. Completion of advanced degrees or graduate work was often rewarded with monetary incentives (Van Zwoll, 1964).

The revival of the idea that teachers should be paid according to merit led to the adoption of a resolution opposing merit pay for determining salaries by the National Education Association in 1956. In 1960, the National Education Association published this statement regarding merit pay:

The National Education Association believes that it is a major responsibility of the teaching profession, as of other professions, to evaluate the quality of its services. To enable educators to meet this responsibility more effectively, the

Association calls for continued research and experimentation to develop means of objective evaluation of the performance of all professional personnel, including identification of (a) factors that determine competence; (b) factors that determine the effectiveness of competent professionals; (c) methods of evaluating effective professional service; and (d) methods of recognizing effective professional service through self-realization, personal status, and salary.

The Association further believes that use of subjective methods of evaluating professional performance for the purpose of setting salaries has deleterious effect on the educational process. Plans which require such subjective judgments (commonly known as merit ratings) should be avoided. American education will be better served by continued progress in developing better means of objective evaluations than by expanded use of subjective ratings. (pp. 59-60)

In 1961, the National Education Association Research Division reported on the number and percentage of school systems in cities over 30,000 population which had a provision permitting superior teachers to exceed the salary schedule maximum. Beginning with the years 1938-39, 20.4% of the reporting systems provided a plan for compensating superior teachers. By 1952-53 the number of reporting systems had declined to 4.0%. From that point, the percentage of merit pay plans gradually increased reaching 8.3% in the years 1960-61 (Davis, 1961).

A follow-up study by Kidwell (1968) reported that approximately one-third of the 140 school systems that reported a merit pay plan for teachers in 1958 were still in existence one decade later.

Data provided by the National Education Association Research Division (1971) indicated that the percentage of school systems with enrollments of 6,000 or more pupils having merit pay provisions reached a peak of 11.3% in 1968-69 but declined to 7.9% by 1971-72. During the period of 1972-73 the decline in school systems having merit salary provisions had fallen to 5.5% (Stieber, 1973).

A study conducted in 1971-72 by the Wichita, Kansas, Unified School District surveyed eight public school systems with enrollments between 50,000 and 77,000 adding six school systems identified by the NEA Research Division in 1970-71 as having some sort of merit pay plans for teachers. None of the 14 systems studied reported having a merit pay plan in operation (Liechti, 1972). According to Elseroad, in 1970 there were no merit pay programs in force in school districts with pupil enrollments over 100,000. State level surveys on merit pay confirm these national trends.

A report by Love in 1970 exemplified the lack of success in state-wide programs:

A study of previous attempts at supporting merit pay on a statewide level reveals much failure. Many state legislatures have at one time or another been interested in merit pay plans, and several have appropriated large sums of money for studies in this area. Ten states in the past twenty-five years or so

have either carried out large scale experiments or studies dealing with merit pay plans, or they are contemplating doing so. Three states actually placed these plans into effect and later abandoned them after they were judged to be impractical. These states were Delaware, Florida, and New York. (p. 25)

In addition, Love reported that in 1969 the Alabama legislature enacted a merit pay program, but repealed it in a subsequent session before it ever went into operation.

The California Teachers Association (1966) found that 81 school systems were using some form of merit pay plans in 1965-66. In a follow-up study, only 48 were reported to be in operation. Of the school systems with merit pay plans in existence in 1963-64, more than one-third had discontinued their plans in 1965-66.

Oates (1966) surveyed Texas school systems and found that all merit programs existed in districts with a student population of 50,000 or less. The percentage of teachers receiving merit pay ranged from 2.4% to 35.0%.

In 1972-73, a survey was conducted by Farthing, Hughes, and Dorn on the status of merit pay programs in Oregon. Of the 47 school systems reporting plans of merit pay, only 23.4% had a merit pay plan in operation and 53.2% had no alternative pay plans for teachers.

The Governor's Education Study Committee in Louisiana compiled an extensive report in 1975 studying teachers' salaries. The committee recommended that no state-wide merit pay program be adopted for

Louisiana teachers. However, a recommendation was made to encourage individual systems to operate their own merit pay plans.

Moreover, merit pay plans in the 1960s and 1970s have fallen frequently on hard times due to subjective evaluations, administrative , personnel problems, and/or lack of funds. The 1980s are experiencing a renewed interest in merit pay and master teacher plans sparked by the President, several national reports, and legislation in Tennessee, California, and Florida (Tursman, 1983).

In a recent report of the National Commission on Excellence in Education, the commission discussed the unprecedented attention being paid to the quality, or lack of quality, of education presented in the public school system today. One of the essential messages from the commission is that "mediocrity, not excellence, is the norm in American education" (Goldberg & Harvey, 1983, p. 15).

As a consequence of this mediocrity, the commission observed that the following results threaten to overwhelm the educational foundations of American society:

On 19 international assessments of student achievement, U.S. students never ranked first or second; in fact, when compared only with students from other industrialized nations, U.S. students ranked in last place seven times.

Some 23 million American adults are functionally illiterate.

About 13 percent of U.S. teenagers (and up to 40 percent of minority adolescents) are functionally illiterate.

From 1963 to 1980 a virtually unbroken decline took place in average scores on the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT).

Similarly, a dramatic decline took place in the number of students who demonstrate superior achievement on the SAT.

Between 1975 and 1980 the number of remedial mathematics courses offered in four-year public colleges increased by 72 percent.

Only about one-fourth of the recent recruits to the Armed Services were able to read at the ninth-grade level, the minimum necessary to follow safety instructions. (p. 15)

The commission made broad recommendations addressing the problems discerned in American education. Regarding teaching, "the commission concluded that too few academically able students are attracted to teaching; that teacher preparation programs need substantial improvement; that the professional working life of teachers is, on the whole, unacceptable; and that a serious shortage of teachers exists in key fields" (p. 16).

The commission's recommendation on teaching includes seven proposals. Of these seven proposals, only three are pertinent to merit pay for teachers:

Salaries for the teaching profession should be increased and should be professionally competitive, market-sensitive, and performance-based. Salary, promotion, tenure, and retention decisions should be tied to an effective evaluation system that includes peer review so that superior teachers can be

rewarded, average ones encouraged, and poor ones either improved or terminated.

School boards, administrators, and teachers should cooperate to develop career ladders for teachers that distinguish among the beginning instructor, the experienced teacher, and the master teacher.

Master teachers should be involved in designing teacher preparation programs and in supervising teachers during their probationary years. (p. 17)

Merit Pay Plans

Responding to the commission's recommendations that schools strongly consider a system of merit pay for teachers, state legislatures and school districts have begun to implement merit pay programs.

According to a 1982 survey conducted by the Southern Regional Educational Board task force, only three states were involved in acknowledging superior teachers. However, none of these included a financial incentive pay plan. The following year three prominent organizations of state educational and political leaders analyzed the need for a comprehensive study of plans to recognize outstanding teachers. The 1983 report of the task force recommended that "financial incentives should be established to reward outstanding teachers to facilitate recruitment and retention of highly talented and motivated individuals for the teaching profession" (Walton, 1983, p. 1). That same year the National Governors' Association supported

resolutions aimed toward the establishment of career ladders for teachers accentuating the ability to attract and retain quality teachers. At the 1983 annual meeting of the Education Commission of the States, discussions emphasized the importance of merit pay and incentive plans for teachers.

State Plans

State legislatures and boards of education have begun to focus attention on the issue of merit pay. In 1983, ERS surveyed each of the state departments of education and the state associations of school administrators in an effort to compile a comprehensive overview of the status of incentive and merit pay plans at the state level. Presented below are the findings of the ERS report with regard to state activities related to merit pay, master teacher plans, or other forms of financial incentives.

Alabama. Alabama reported no state level plan for instituting merit pay or incentive pay to teachers nor were any plans or proposals for adoption given.

Alaska. A bill had been brought before the Alaska state legislature and considered during the current session. If enacted, it would mandate the use of performance and merit as partial criteria of individual salary increases in future negotiated contracts of teachers.

Arizona. Arizona reported no state level plan for awarding merit pay to teachers. However, a joint legislative committee was in the process of discussing the issue.

Arkansas. The Arkansas General Assembly failed to pass a master teacher bill in the last session. A proposal related to merit pay is anticipated for introduction in the next session.

California. The California legislature signed into law a Mentor Teacher Program which was implemented during the 1983-84 school year. The plan was designed "to encourage teachers currently employed in the public school system to continue to pursue excellence within their profession, to provide incentives to teachers of demonstrated ability and expertise to remain in the public school system, and to restore the teaching profession to its position of primary importance within the structure of the state educational system" (California Senate Bill No. 813, 1983).

The program makes provision for \$4,000 in extra pay for each mentor teacher. School districts have the authority to choose up to five % of its instructional personnel as mentor teachers. Funding for the program is provided solely by the state.

To qualify for the position of mentor teacher, teacher applicants "must be credentialed classroom teachers with permanent status; have substantial recent experience with classroom instruction; demonstrate exemplary teaching ability, as indicated by, among other things, effective communication skills, subject matter knowledge, and mastery of a range of teaching strategies necessary to meet the needs of pupils in different context" (California Senate Bill No. 813, 1983).

The mentor teacher selection committee is composed of classroom teachers elected by other classroom teachers and school administrators

appointed by the district board of education. Classroom teachers must comprise the majority of the selection committee. The nomination process also consists of input from parents, students, and the community. The school board is responsible for making the final selection of nominees.

Mentor teachers are excluded from the evaluation of other teachers and are exempted from additional administrative or pupil service duties. A minimum of 60% of a mentor teaching assignment is to be spent instructing pupils. Additional responsibilities include staff development for other teachers, curriculum development, and assistance to new teachers as a major emphasis.

Colorado. Colorado reported no state level plan existed for awarding merit pay to teachers. Governor Richard Lamm, in his report "Campaign for Quality: An Education Agenda for the Eighties," proposed nine items of utmost importance to be discussed by the educational leaders in the state. Teacher compensation, including merit pay, was one of the issues designated. Currently, the Colorado State Board of Education assigned a task force to study merit pay and master teacher plans. The task force was responsible for making suggestions for use at both the state and local levels.

Connecticut. Connecticut reported no state level plan for instituting merit pay for teachers. However, the incoming Commissioner of Education had indicated an interest in the issue.

Delaware. Delaware reported no merit pay plan for teachers in existence and no legislative proposals pending.

District of Columbia. The District of Columbia's school system has been required by the U.S. Congress fiscal 1984 appropriations bill to study the feasibility of a merit pay plan for teachers.

Florida. In July 1983, the Florida legislature passed a bill enacting a merit compensation program for teachers. The plan was designed "to increase the performance of public school students and to provide economic incentives to attract and retain qualified instructional personnel" (Florida Senate Bill No. 38-B, 1983). The initial program consisted of two tiers: The Florida Meritorious Instructional Personnel Program (MIPP) and the District Quality Instruction Incentives Program (QIIP).

In 1984 the Florida legislature amended section number 231.533 of the Florida Meritorious Instructional Personnel Program to establish the State Master Teacher Program. The purpose of the program is to recognize superior ability among Florida's instructional personnel and to provide an economic incentive to such personnel to continue in public school instruction. A person may participate in the program as an associate master teacher or as a master teacher; participation is on a voluntary basis (1984 Supplement to Florida Statutes 1983).

The qualifications for an associate master teacher are: (1) Document four years' teaching experience, two of which must be in the state of Florida, and hold a professional service contract or a continuing contract; (2) Document a superior score on the appropriate subject area examination or document completion of a master's degree in-field when a subject area examination has not been developed in an

appropriate field; (3) Document superior performance on two evaluations directed by the principal and/or principal designee, additional performance points may be awarded by the principal and reviewed by the State Department of Education.

Documentation of the above criteria is forwarded to the Commissioner of Education for approval or disapproval. On approval, the associate master teacher designation lasts for a term of three years, contingent upon successful performance of assigned responsibilities. An annual award of \$3,000 is distributed in two payments of \$1,500 each in June and September. The associate master teacher designation is transferable among school districts in the state and may be renewed upon satisfactory demonstration of the above criteria.

The qualifications for a master teacher include the same criteria for an associate master teacher with the exception of: (1) Document seven years' teaching experience, five of which must be in the state of Florida, and hold a professional service contract or a continuing contract; (2) Document at least three years experience as an associate master teacher; (3) Document the degree or educational requirements and subject area test results; (4) Document outstanding performance evaluation results, however, the results must exceed those designated for the attainment of the associate master teacher status.

The Florida Master Teacher Program was implemented in the 1984-85 school year. Based on the estimate of 90,655 total instructional personnel in Florida, only an estimated 6,333 (6.9%) awards may actually be made for the 1984-85 school fiscal year.

The second tier of the Florida plan includes the District Quality Instruction Incentives Program. The goals of this program are to increase performance of students and to provide economic incentives to instructional and other approved personnel. Participation in the program is optional by districts. The general requirements of the district QIIP are that a program must: (1) Be designed to meet the two goals; (2) Be free from racial or other prohibited discriminations; (3) Provide for voluntary participation by eligible personnel; (4) Be for no more than one year in duration; (5) Award at least half of the allocated funds in the category of meritorious schools; (6) Provide for prescribed distribution of all funds allocated to the district for the program; (7) Include provisions for recognizing student progress at meritorious schools.

The state requires that 50% of the allocated dollars be utilized for the establishment of a meritorious school program. The remaining allocations can be distributed to individuals based on one or more of the following categories: (1) Outstanding attendance; (2) Employment in critical teacher shortage area; (3) Employment in critical shortage area school; (4) Completion of at least eight semester hours of in-field graduate credit with "B" or better at a standard institution; (5) Superior evaluation results conducted by the principal, using acceptable instruments; (6) Salary incentives for math, science, and computer education personnel for the extended school day and extended school year.

Georgia. No state level plan for merit pay was reported by Georgia, although the issue is currently being studied by the State Board of Education and the Superintendent.

Idaho. Idaho reported no state level plan of merit pay for teachers.

Illinois. Illinois reported no state level plan of merit pay for teachers.

Indiana. Neither a state level plan for merit pay nor formal discussion of the topic was reported by Indiana.

Iowa. Iowa reported no state level plan for merit pay and no anticipation of legislation in the near future.

Kansas. Even though no state level plan for merit pay was reported, the Kansas Legislative Special Committee on Education was assigned to discuss the topic.

Kentucky. Kentucky reported no state level plan for merit pay and no discussion of the issue was contemplated.

Louisiana. Louisiana state officials reported no state level plan for merit pay was in existence and the topic was in the early discussion phase. However, the 1980 Louisiana state legislature enacted a plan called the Louisiana Educational Employees Professional Improvement Program with provisions similar to merit pay plans in other states. This program is not based on the evaluation of teacher performance, but is focused on a teacher acquiring additional education. Participants in this program receive additional salary while accruing points over a five-year period.

Maine. No state level plan for merit pay was reported by Maine.

However, both the governor and the Maine School Superintendents Association had issued an endorsement of the issue.

Maryland. Although Maryland reported no state level plan for merit pay, the Maryland Commission on Quality Teaching had made a recommendation to the State Board of Education. The commission recommended the development of a system of ranks to recognize superior teachers.

Massachusetts. No state level plan or legislation related to merit pay for teachers was reported by Massachusetts.

Michigan. Michigan reported no state level plan for merit pay, nor discussion of any legislative action.

Minnesota. No state level plan for merit pay was reported, but the Minnesota State Board of Education had been designated to study the issue. In addition, an endorsement of merit pay for performance was issued by an education committee of the state legislature.

Missouri. Missouri reported that merit pay was a probable topic of discussion in the next legislative session, however, no state level provision for monetary incentives currently existed.

Montana. Although no state level plan was currently in existence, the State Superintendent of Public Instruction had recommended to the State Board of Education that a study be conducted regarding the issue of merit pay.

Nebraska. No state level plan for merit pay was in operation; and no specific proposals were reported by Nebraska.

Nevada. Nevada reported no state level plan for merit pay and no action relating to the issue was anticipated by the legislature.

New Hampshire. No state level plan for merit pay was in existence in New Hampshire.

New Jersey. No merit pay program at the state level was reported, however, the topic was being considered for study.

New Mexico. Although no state level plan for merit pay was reported, the issue was receiving some serious discussion.

New York. New York reported no state level plan for merit pay, but indicated that a study of the issue was being conducted.

North Carolina. A study on the issue of merit pay and incentive pay had been initiated by the North Carolina Department of Public Instruction. The North Carolina General Assembly failed to pass a bill that would have provided for the development of a five-step classification system of teachers. Therefore, no state level plan was in operation.

North Dakota. North Dakota reported no state level plan for merit pay and no plan for formal discussion on the issue.

Ohio. No state level merit pay plan was reported by Ohio, however, the State Superintendent of Public Instruction had issued a report recommending further study of career ladders for superior teachers.

Oklahoma. Oklahoma reported that master teacher and career teacher programs were only in the discussion phase, with no state level plan in effect.

Oregon. No state level merit or incentive pay program was reported by Oregon.

Pennsylvania. Pennsylvania reported that neither a state level plan nor legislative proposals for merit pay was anticipated.

Rhode Island. No existence of a state level plan for merit pay was reported by Rhode Island.

South Carolina. Neither a state level plan nor any formal legislative activity related to the introduction of merit pay was reported by South Carolina.

South Dakota. Although South Dakota reported no state level plan in existence, the State Board of Education was in the process of studying the issue of merit pay in quality education.

Tennessee. In March 1984, the Tennessee legislature in special session passed Governor Lamar Alexander's educational reform package known as the Comprehensive Education Reform Act (CERA). One of the components of the CERA is the Career Ladder Program.

According to French (1985), this program consists of five steps with incentive pay for the participants. The first step comprises first-year teachers who are licensed for one year as probationary teachers. Upon satisfactory completion of the first year, new teachers receive a \$500 payment above their regular salary and are awarded an Apprentice certificate in the second year.

The second step is the Apprentice certificate which is valid for a three-year period. Teachers receive a proportion incentive after each year of apprenticeship. If satisfactory classroom performance over the three years has been established, the teacher may then proceed to a Career Level I certificate.

Upon entering the third step or Career Level I, a teacher receives \$1,000-per-year incentive. This level certificate is valid for five years and must include at least two years of evaluation. At the conclusion of the five-year validation, a teacher must choose between two options: apply for recertification at Career Level I or apply for certification at Career Level II.

To progress to Career Level II status, the fourth step, the teacher must pass an evaluation with a superior rating during the fifth year of Career Level I. A Career Level II certificate is valid for five years and includes a \$2,000-per-year state supplement and the opportunity of working under an 11-month contract for an extra incentive of \$2,000. During this certification period the teacher is evaluated over a two-year cycle. Based on the outcome of the evaluations, the teacher has two options: apply for recertification at Career Level II or apply for certification at Career Level III. If evaluation criteria are not met for either Career Level, the teacher returns to Career Level I.

The fifth step, Career Level III, is valid for five years and can be continued based on evaluation data. Teachers receive a \$3,000-per-year supplement and the option of working on either an 11-month or a 12-month contract for an additional \$2,000. The evaluation process is the same as indicated in Career Level II.

Texas. In September 1984, Texas implemented a career ladder plan for incentive compensation to teachers who produce quality performance. At the beginning of the school year teachers were boosted to Level I

on the career ladder and by the end of the school year will be eligible to move to Level II. The state has set a ceiling (20% to 25%) on the number of teachers who can advance. As a result of state funds, not all teachers who are qualified to step up will be awarded progression. According to Dronka (1984), Texas educators have expressed a concern about insufficient funding and the lack of a uniform evaluation system. In 1985, the Texas legislature is anticipated to discuss further funding for the incentive program and the development of a standardized evaluation instrument.

Utah. The Utah State Office of Education was in the process of discussing a proposal, "Enhancing the Teaching Profession by Providing Career Ladder and/or Other Incentives." The recommendation is based on a differentiated staffing model which divides a teacher's work into components.

The proposed Utah Career Ladder provides three level of additional teacher responsibility and salary increments for teachers. In Level I, the Apprentice Teacher would work under the supervision of a Teacher Leader and would receive the regular teacher salary. A teacher must spend a minimum of two and a maximum of three years as an Apprentice Teacher before advancing to the next level.

In Level II, the Professional Teacher would be designated responsibilities in addition to teaching. These teachers would be awarded an additional 10% over their regular salary.

Vermont. Neither a state level plan for merit pay nor any legislative activity related to the issue was reported.

Virginia. Governor Charles Robb has assigned a task force to establish guidelines to evaluate recommendations for pilot programs and submit the findings to the State Board of Education. State funds have been appropriated to finance pilot projects to evaluate several plans for teacher performance-based pay.

In speaking to the United States House of Representatives Task Force on Merit Pay, Governor Robb outlined two types of programs. The first, called a Master Teacher/Merit Program is a plan to select and compensate teachers who exhibit excellent performance in the classroom. The second of Robb's proposals is a Performance Evaluation Program that would allow teachers to establish guidelines for evaluations of fellow teachers. The results of the evaluations would be delivered to the local board of education to be used in determining the amount of pay incentive.

According to the 1984 report by the American Association of School Administrators, National Association of Elementary School Principals, and National Association of Secondary School Principals, the Virginia legislature is considering a career ladder plan with four levels: probationary, teacher, senior teacher, and master teacher. The criteria for advancement to senior teacher and master teacher include application, performance assessment, and selective promotion. At each level teachers would have specific responsibilities to fulfill. A goal of the plan is for teachers to spend the majority

of their time in classroom instruction. Opportunity exists for senior and master teachers to have extended working days and extended contracts.

Washington. No state level plan for merit pay was reported by Washington.

West Virginia. Although no state level plan was in existence, the State Board of Education has appointed a subcommittee to study the issue of merit pay. The governor and the Chairman of the House Education Committee anticipate discussion relating to merit pay in the next legislative session.

District Plans

In the 1983 study of merit pay plans for teachers, ERS also surveyed local school districts to provide information in reference to merit pay and incentive pay plans either formerly or currently in use. "Districts responding to the ERS survey were asked to indicate whether input type evaluative criteria (e.g., knowledge of subject, preparation, etc.), student test scores, or results oriented evaluative criteria other than test scores were used in the evaluation and selection process" (ERS, 1983, p. 21).

The concept of merit pay has assumed many varied forms at the district level. There are distinct differences in the criteria used for input, evaluation, and amount of monetary incentives. The following summaries present an overview of various incentive plans for teachers currently in operation by school districts throughout the United States.

Tempe Union High School District: Tempe, Arizona. The purpose of the merit pay program is to create a feeling of esteem among faculty members and to recognize and improve the quality of instruction. Eligibility for the program is based on classroom instruction and management; outstanding contributions to students, department, or school; and, professional involvement.

Teachers are nominated for merit incentives by members of the faculty and administration. The nominations are forwarded by the principal to the superintendent, who determines the final award. Two teachers from each high school are selected to receive a \$1,000 grant to be used for the purchase of classroom materials or equipment and to attend seminars on excellence for the purpose of furthering district staff development.

Los Angeles Unified School District: Los Angeles, California. The Master Teacher Program was implemented during the 1982-83 school year. The purpose of the plan is to identify teachers who exhibit outstanding ability in instructing students. Selection criteria for a master teacher includes training experience, professional growth and activity, human relation skills, experience in grade level or department functions, and leadership potential. Candidates are selected by a committee according to each region or division. Each region or division is allocated a quota of teachers who may receive the title of Master Teacher. Teachers selected as Master Teachers receive a semester supplement of \$504.

Cherry Creek School District: Englewood, Colorado. A merit pay plan was instituted in 1975. Eligibility for the program is based on preparation and knowledge of subject area. Both individual and team evaluations are conducted. The supplement awarded to teachers is based on the teacher's training and experience. In the 1982-83 school year, the amount of the awards ranged from \$1,040 to \$1,247.

Glastonbury Public Schools: Glastonbury, Connecticut. The Glastonbury merit pay program has been in existence since 1967. According to Johnson (1984), this plan permits teachers to progress toward the top of the pay scale at an accelerated pace of more than one step per year. Evaluation is based on input criteria and made by a single evaluator. Teachers may qualify for a double-step award if deemed to be superior and exhibit instructional effectiveness and growth. In addition, teachers must contribute significantly to the school, department, school system, or field of education. The amount of awards during the 1982-83 school year ranged from \$250 to \$2,040 with no monetary limit on the funding available to pay the increments.

Dundee Community Unit School District: Dundee, Illinois. In 1979, the district of Dundee instituted a Senior Status merit pay plan for teachers. Teachers must have at least 16 years of teaching experience and a Master's degree plus 30 credits to be eligible for the program. Every three years stipends are granted to teachers who possess an outstanding level of performance.

Assessment criteria are based on the teacher's self-evaluation of input components in all areas of classroom effectiveness. The Senior

Status Committee, comprised of five administrators and six teachers, make the final choice of awards.

Pentucket Regional School District and School Union Number 53: West Newbury, Massachusetts. A merit pay Master Teacher Scale was inaugurated in 1967 for teachers who have reached the maximum step on the salary schedule and have acquired a Master's degree plus 36 hours of credit. Principals recommend to the superintendent candidates who have demonstrated leadership, teaching effectiveness, professional attitude, understanding of children, ability to work with others, formal training, reliability, and poise. Assessment of the candidates is performed by both an individual and group evaluation. The amount of money each teacher receives relies upon the teacher's placement on the Master Teacher Scale. For the 1982-83 school year, amounts ranged from \$400 to \$2,300.

City of Ladue School District: St. Louis, Missouri. Ladue School District has one of the oldest merit pay systems in the United States. With its inception in 1953, the plan has remained virtually unchanged. According to the American Association of School Administrators (1983), salary schedules are divided into three levels. In 1983, the first salary schedule ranged from \$14,300 to \$14,700; the second schedule reached \$23,200; and the third schedule had a maximum of \$30,000. For the 1982-83 school year the merit awards ranged from \$2,100 to \$4,500. It is possible for teachers to receive more than the maximum salary at the second and third schedules.

When setting salaries for teachers who are new to the district and inexperienced, the district takes into account courses taken, grades received, instructor's recommendations, and out-of-school experiences.

Experienced teachers new to the district are placed on the salary schedule according to professional training and recommendations, observation of classroom performance, number of years of experience, present salary, out-of-school experience, and potential value to the district.

No formal application is necessary in the Ladue merit system since all teachers are placed on the merit salary schedule from the time of employment.

Teacher evaluations for merit increments are based on how effective they are in five areas: teacher-student interaction; relationships with colleagues; contacts with parents and members of the community; contributions to the total school program; and curriculum development and professional improvement.

The evaluation criteria used to determine merit pay were designed by a joint effort of teachers and administrators. Evaluations are performed by principals and assistant principals only.

Westside Community Schools: Omaha, Nebraska. Merit pay has been a part of the Westside Community School District since 1971. All teachers are eligible to receive incentive pay which is negotiated each year. The amount and recipients of award are never published.

Incentive pay for each teacher is determined by the assessment by the principal and a team of central office personnel with final decision by the superintendent. Evaluation criteria is based on quality classroom teaching, leadership, other responsibilities such as curriculum leadership or coaching, professional growth, and total contribution to the school district. Incentive pay is an on-going cumulative payment that continues year after year.

The district has stated that there are two significant factors attributing to the success of the program: the Board of Education is willing to pay the dollars necessary for funding the program; and the nonpublishing of the names of the teachers who receive merit awards as well as the amount of the incentive.

Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools: Charlotte, North Carolina. The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Teacher Career Development Program has evolved into a career ladder model with six levels. The career ladder begins with provisional teacher status with emphasis on classroom instruction and participation in training programs. The next step is the career nominee level which requires participation on task or study committees within the school in addition to those duties performed by provisional teachers. At the third step, the career candidate performs the above duties while assuming added responsibilities related to the overall excellence of teaching. Teachers on these first three levels are probationary until they are eligible for tenure in the fourth year.

Career Level I, II, and III teachers are responsible for assuming "leadership in areas such as serving as mentors for beginning teachers

and participating in program evaluation, staff development, diagnosis and remediation of instructional problems, development of curriculum materials, and the design and implementation of action oriented classroom research" (Schlechty, 1985, p. 5).

The most critical component of the career ladder program is evaluation. Each participant in the program must compile documented evidence of successful performance. This documentation must include an Action-Growth Plan as well as an appropriate time frame for meeting the stated criteria. An advisory assessment team, consisting of the principal, assistant principal for instruction, and a peer teacher, will assist, support, and encourage the teacher.

Evaluations are conducted a number of times by a number of individuals who follow specific criteria over a designated period of time. The observer-evaluator plays an important role in the success of the program. "An observation schedule allows for each provisional teacher to be observed three times by three different observer-evaluators during the second semester of employment. These observations are unannounced but scheduled in consultation with the principal. Second year provisional teachers are observed six times, three times in the fall and three times in the spring. Three of these observations will be announced, and three will be unannounced. Three observer-evaluators conduct two observations each. Career candidates are observed nine times by three different observer-evaluators, six observations in the fall and three in the spring. Three will be announced, six unannounced" (Schlechty, 1985, p. 6). The observer-evaluator must

submit a written report as part of the teacher documentation process. Following the observation, conferences may be scheduled upon request.

Teachers at Career Level I receive a pay incentive of \$2,000 and an additional \$2,000 for each satisfactory evaluation which is conducted every three years. Career Level II can be achieved after three years at Career Level I. Teachers at Career Level II receive \$2,000 more than Career Level I. Career Level III can be achieved after five years at Career Level II. Teachers at Career Level III receive \$2,000 more than Career Level II. Under the present salary schedule, teachers can earn a maximum of \$22,000; under the new plan it will be possible for teachers to earn a maximum of \$39,000 (American Association of School Administrators, National Association of Elementary School Principals, & National Association of Secondary School Principals, 1984).

The career ladder incentive program is designed to increase career earnings of teachers by 50% over a 30-year period. During the 1984-85 school year, teachers who enter the school system must participate in the program. Teachers currently employed have the option not to participate. Currently there are 150 tenured teachers who have entered the program at the career candidate level.

Seiling Public School: Seiling, Oklahoma. In the Seiling Public School District, 38 of the 43 teachers received merit pay awards in 1983. Evaluations are determined exclusively by student test scores. At the beginning and the end of the school year a standardized test is administered to students. If student test scores increase by a

predetermined amount, merit pay is awarded. Included in the plan is a method by which teachers in an entire school receive a pay incentive if the scores of the student population exceed a stated goal as well as student scores in individual classrooms.

Dallas Independent School District: Dallas, Texas. Since the fall of 1982, the District has utilized student achievement test scores to determine the top 25% of the District schools. The primary goal of the program is to ensure that the students at each school perform at their highest possible level of achievement. Part of the rationale of the plan is to eliminate individual competition between teachers and to encourage alliance and collaboration within the schools. Each employee in the selected schools receives a pay incentive.

Once a school has been selected for an award the criteria used for distribution of pay incentives are: successful evaluation, attendance of professional personnel, and attendance of support personnel. The amount of the incentive is based on the number of student contact days present.

Houston Independent School District: Houston, Texas. Houston's Second Mile Plan is based upon specified minimum requirements to be eligible to participate. A teacher must "hold a valid teaching certificate or permit appropriate to the teaching assignment; be assigned to a school or instructional site; be a certified teacher with a bachelor's, master's, or doctoral degree; have an acceptable rating on the most recent evaluation; have five or fewer days of absence during the current school year; have no unexcused absences; and be a

full-time teacher, nurse, or media specialist/librarian" (Say, 1982, pp. 270-271).

According to the 1983 ERS report, teachers may qualify for the merit pay program in six categories. These categories are: (1) teachers willing to teach in a high-priority location with high concentrations of educationally disadvantaged students are eligible for \$2,000 stipends; (2) teachers assigned to subject areas of critical shortage such as mathematics, science, special education, and bilingual are eligible for stipends ranging from \$700 to \$2,000; (3) teachers exhibiting outstanding attendance of five or fewer days absent during the year are eligible to receive stipends ranging from \$50 to \$500; (4) teachers completing college courses in curriculum areas related to their teaching assignment or district inservice are eligible for stipends of \$300 for each six hours of coursework and \$400 if the courses are related to an area of critical shortage; (5) teachers improving student test scores exceeding the predicted achievement are eligible to receive stipends of \$800 and an additional \$400 is awarded to the top 10% of those schools which show the greatest amount of achievement; (6) teachers assigned to unique campus sites for which no test data are available are eligible for the Unique Campus Assignment stipend ranging from \$450 to \$750.

Weber Schools: Ogden, Utah. The Weber School District plan was initiated as a pilot project as part of the Utah Educational Productivity Study. The program was designed to increase teacher salaries by increasing student contact time and by lengthening the school day

and year. Selected teachers are scheduled to teach seven periods with an incentive average of \$5,600. Teachers can also receive an additional \$1,300 bonus based on results of student achievement test scores.

Round Valley School District: Covelo, California. Round Valley has implemented a merit pay program that emphasizes teacher-initiated projects. Projects proposed by teachers can earn 4 of 10 possible merit points. Two and one-half points are given for joint efforts to encourage cooperation among teachers. The final three and one-half points are determined by the principal's evaluation. Amounts of the incentive award range from \$140 to \$2,800 each year (American Association of School Administrators, National Association of Elementary School Principals, & National Association of Secondary School Principals, 1984).

Upper St. Clair Township School District: Upper St. Clair.

Pennsylvania. Teachers designated as curriculum leaders are awarded extended-year contracts. Awards are granted to approximately 5% of the teachers in the district. The criteria for selection are knowledge of subject matter and ability to communicate with fellow teachers based on multiple evaluations. Curriculum Leaders are contracted for an additional 20 days each year and they are compensated an extra 15% of their base salaries. A primary responsibility of Curriculum Leaders is to improve the district's instructional program. This responsibility "is exercised through curriculum evaluation and revision; efforts to stay informed of important developments in the

teachers' fields; assisting principals in planning and conducting inservice activities; observing and assisting teachers who request help; and supervising summer workshops" (American Association of School Administrators, National Association of Elementary School Principals, & National Association of Secondary School Principals, 1984, p. 26).

Pros and Cons of Merit Pay

Most of the contentions for and against merit pay are founded on a set of assumptions. According to Johnson (1984), "the first assumption is that teachers prefer performance-based pay over a standard salary scale. Second, merit pay proposals assume that dissatisfied, unchallenged teachers are a significant part of today's school problems, and that a competitive approach to their work could ultimately improve student learning. Third, merit pay critics challenge these causal links and agree that while competitive pay may be consistent with the tenets of free enterprise, there is no certainty that its use in schools would make teachers happier or schools better" (pp. 10-11).

Opponents and proponents of merit pay for teachers have been debating the issue for over six decades. The literature on merit pay is replete with an abundance of material regarding the pros and cons of merit pay for teachers. Johnson (1984) concisely presents these arguments in favor of and against merit pay. The following summary is an overview of the merit pay debate.

Arguments for Merit Pay

Merit pay is compatible with the doctrine of free enterprise. Individuals outside of the teaching profession are afforded the opportunity for receiving bonuses for their accomplishments. Likewise, teachers should also be allowed to be compensated for their achievements in the classroom. Most school systems which operate under the single salary scale merely reward teachers for post-graduate coursework and length of service, but not for their ability in the classroom. On the other hand, merit pay plans award teachers based on their accomplishments as well as their performance in the classroom.

Merit pay would attract and maintain quality teachers. By acknowledging and compensating superior teachers, merit pay would afford teachers the opportunity to increase their income as well as establish a feeling of worth and esteem. The argument recognizes the lack of competitiveness with teachers' salaries and salaries in other professions. It has been assumed that teachers leave the field because of the lack of recognition and insufficient pay. By rewarding teachers for their accomplishments it increases the likelihood that they will continue in their profession.

Merit pay would encourage teachers to analyze their own work, thereby stimulating quality competition. The opportunity for teachers to gain pay increases would encourage them to be critical of their classroom skills and performance. Competition among teachers would

increase the awareness of quality performance of colleagues receiving merit awards.

Merit pay would help increase the support of education by the American taxpaying public. National surveys continue to report the dissatisfaction of taxpayers toward the lack of quality teaching. The implementation of merit pay would ensure citizens that tax monies used to pay teachers' salaries would be based on performance. Compensating teachers for increased productivity of classroom performance would in turn lead to increased public support.

Arguments against Merit Pay

The research indicates that there is a lack of consensus regarding what constitutes effective teaching. Studies have revealed few correlations between teacher characteristics and effective instruction. Studies of teacher characteristics have shown that only the verbal ability of a teacher is directly related to a student's performance. Likewise, research on instructional techniques have provided few definitive answers. It appears in most cases, teacher effectiveness is dependent upon an administrator's subjective decision.

The measurement system used to evaluate teachers is neither objective nor has it been standardized. This practice in turn, supports the argument that most merit pay evaluation systems are "inherently unreliable and potentially inequitable" (Johnson, 1984, p. 26). Until objective measures of evaluation are instituted the single salary schedule provides teachers with protection against administrative favoritism and patronage.

Merit pay plans would hinder effective supervision and suppress teacher individuality. In order for supervision to be effective, both administrator and teacher must be able to discuss the strengths and weaknesses of a teacher. This type of interaction can only take place in a non-threatening environment. When teachers are judged competitively, professional growth as well as supervision is impeded. This type of competition encourages conformity and in some instances perpetuates mediocrity.

There is evidence to support the argument that the cost of merit pay plans may not be worth the investment. There is no guarantee that increases in teachers' salaries will produce quality instruction. A significant added cost is the amount of money required to train, implement, and monitor the plan by administrators. In addition, the time devoted to administering a merit pay program means less time available for curriculum development or inservice training.

Merit pay plans tend to lower teacher morale and minimize cooperation among colleagues. When teachers are competing for individual merit awards there is less exchange of ideas and materials between teachers to improve the overall effectiveness of instruction within the school. Those teachers not selected for merit pay may become disillusioned, embittered, and distrustful toward fellow teachers and the system itself.

Research does not support the assumption that merit pay will produce quality education. Merit pay merely rewards superior teachers and does not address the issue of improved instruction for

the majority of teachers not selected. "If the problems of the teaching profession are as serious and pervasive as the critics and commission studies conclude, then a systematic, thorough approach to improving teaching is necessary, one that directly addresses the problems of average and poor teachers. Merit pay is not such an approach. Identifying good teaching may be an important element of efforts to improve the profession, but it is insufficient in itself and may prove to be counterproductive" (Johnson, 1984, p. 28).

Views of Merit Pay

A Congressional Task Force was appointed in October 1983 to study merit pay for teachers. The report states that the question facing the United States "is not simply how to implement performance-based pay for educators but how we can lift the standards of instruction in the nation" (Merit Pay Task Force Report, 1983, p. 6). According to Paul Simon, chairman of the study committee, "No one on the task force views merit pay as a single, easy, dramatic answer to the problems of education" (Kappan Staff, 1983, p. 301).

The report states that "merit pay is but one of many pieces in a puzzle. It can be an important piece, but it is neither inexpensive nor easy to achieve, and other pieces of the puzzle must be put into place also. Despite mixed and inconclusive results with performance-based pay in the private sector and in education, we support and encourage experiments with performance-based pay" (Committee on Education and Labor House of Representatives, 1983, p. 6).

The committee recommended that merit pay plans should include the following features:

1. Teachers, administrators, and the community should be involved in the developing of merit pay plans.
2. In developing merit pay programs, special consideration "should be taken to avoid abuses that would grant rewards for reasons other than outstanding teacher performance" (p. 7).
3. Periodic review should be extended to each teacher participating in the merit program. Incentives for teacher self-improvement should be included in each plan.
4. The plan "should be subject to periodic review for refinement, improvement or abandonment" (p. 7).
5. When establishing a merit pay plan, "a school district should recognize the needs and contributions of competent teachers who do not fall into a superior category" (p. 7).

Views of Educators

The 1984 Gallup survey of the attitudes of teachers toward public schools included the issue of merit pay. Teachers in the United States oppose the concept of merit pay by a two to one ratio. They object to the issue on two major points. First, is the major difficulties involved in the evaluation process in determining who should receive merit pay. Second, is the possibility of low teacher morale if a plan is implemented.

In addition, three-fourths of the respondents reported that 33% of the teachers in their own schools were qualified to receive merit pay. If a merit pay plan were implemented, teachers favored evaluation by fellow teachers, administrators, or educators from outside of the school district. Only one-fifth of the teachers supported involvement of students or parents in the selection process.

Teachers reported that selection criteria for merit pay should be based on: "(1) an evaluation by educators, either teachers, or administrators, and (2) an advanced degree or years of experience" (Gallup, 1984, p. 98). Only a small percentage of teachers responded favorably toward the consideration of students' academic achievement, students' evaluations, or parents' opinions.

Views of the Public

The views of the public elicited a major difference to the views of educators. Only half of the respondents to the 1984 Gallup Poll reported having read or heard anything about merit pay programs. Of those who were aware of the merit pay issue, 76% were in favor of it, 19% were opposed, and 5% had no opinion. Of the total sample, 65% approved of merit pay, 22% were opposed, and 13% had no opinion.

Gallup surveys have reported a steady increase in the public's view supporting merit pay. In 1970, 58% of the public favored performance-based pay and 36% favored single salary schedule. By 1983, 61% favored merit pay and 31% favored the single salary schedule.

Views of Teacher Unions

Since their inception, merit or incentive pay plans for teachers have been opposed by both the American Federation of Teachers (AFT) and the National Education Association (NEA). Carl J. Megel, past president of AFT, in an undated pamphlet published by AFT titled "Merit Rating: Educationally Unsound...and Why," stated that "the American Federation of Teachers has vigorously opposed the specious practice for more than 50 years."

Albert Shanker, current president of AFT, in several issues of the New York Times, continued the historical condemnation of merit pay by teacher unions. In column dated January 24, 1983, Shanker declared that "merit pay has failed in the past because the overwhelming majority of teachers viewed it as politics and patronage rather than pedagogy" (p. 11).

Traditionally, NEA has also opposed incentive based pay for quality teaching. In an interview published in Education Week, Bernie Freitag, vice-president of NEA, stated that "merit pay hasn't worked yet. It has been subjected to a lot of political influence and patronage and abuse" (1983, p. 11).

Today, however, both unions have expressed a willingness to discuss the issue of merit pay. During the 1983 annual convention, AFT delegates concluded that some merit pay plans are worth consideration. The resolution stated that merit pay plans must meet three conditions: merit pay must provide higher base salary for all teachers; provide fair and equitable evaluations by administrators;

and consider all aspects of classroom teaching in the rating process. The resolution also included opposition toward the use of student achievement as the sole measure of successful classroom teaching (ERS, 1983).

NEA also specified certain conditions regarding the establishment of merit pay plans. Willard McGuire, past president of NEA, asserts that "NEA will consider any fair and equitable salary proposal...with a clear definition and how it is implemented" (1983, p. 25). Jordan and Borkow (1983) report that the NEA proposals for merit pay plans should include "competitive entry level salaries; career ladder options; adequate evaluation processes; and allowances for adaptations at the local level" (p. 25). According to the Phi Delta Kappan Staff, Mary Hatwood Futrell, current president of NEA, states that "although NEA does not support merit pay, it is willing to work with school officials in developing merit pay plans that would be acceptable to teachers" (1983, p. 301).

Views of Administrator Groups

Positions of administrator groups toward the issue of merit pay were studied in 1983 by Jordan and Borkow. They reported that the American Association of School Administrators support merit pay with certain qualifications. The qualifications include: "all teachers' salaries should be raised to competitive levels; teachers, the community, and administrators should agree on the administration of the system; school systems should consider incentive pay plans rather than master teacher plans" (p. 24).

The Council of Chief State School Officers holds no official position regarding merit pay. The Council states that "it is not the role of the Federal government to establish a position regarding teachers' salaries" (Jordan & Borkow, 1983, p. 24).

The National Association of Elementary School Principals states that merit pay plans are "often divisive and counter productive. Systems of merit pay do not work because of the many inequities and difficulties encountered in establishing, implementing, and maintaining meaningful measurable criteria" (Jordan & Borkow, 1983, p. 25).

The National Association of Secondary School Principals asserts that merit pay plans are "worthy of further discussion" (Jordan & Borkow, 1983, p. 25).

The National School Boards Association urges local school districts to evaluate teachers' salaries for components that are "competitive, market sensitive, and performance based" (Jordan & Borkow, 1983, p. 25).

The 1984 task force of the Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development (ASCD) released a preliminary report on merit pay and career ladders. The task force members concluded that merit pay by itself: "will not solve problems now facing schools in their efforts to reach higher levels of excellence; has been shown to be ineffective and self-defeating, in fact, may be a disincentive for improved performance; does not have a good track record in the private sector; and represents a simplistic popular approach to the very

complex problem of trying to recognize, motivate, and utilize talent in the schools" (English, 1985, p. 34).

Other Professions using Merit Pay

Merit pay and incentive pay plans have long been a major determinant of the salaries of workers in business, industry, and government. Those who support merit pay for teachers often maintain that because performance-based pay is successful in other professions, it should succeed in the field of education. The following discussion first summarizes the utilization of merit pay in business and industry and then the adaptation of merit pay principles by the government.

Business and Industry

Edward E. Lawler, an expert in the field of business motivation and compensation, reports that "the principle of paying for performance is often honored more in the breach than in reality" (1981, p. 82). Therefore, the actual use of merit pay is not as prevalent in business and industry as proponents of merit pay might lead us to believe.

Also, Lawler asserts that merit pay is not effective in all types of business, but rather is successful in some sectors and not in others. For example, merit pay can be an effective incentive in the sales or production of individual items, where the total competitive effort of individuals expands the output of the enterprise. In such settings it is "appropriate to implement an incentive plan

that motivates these employees to maximize their individual productivity and to pay little attention to cooperative activities" (Lawler, 1981, p. 97).

As a counterpart to rewards for individual effort, incentives exist for total group effort. A large number of businesses and industries rely heavily on the teamwork of employees to increase productivity. Thus, Lawler contends that merit pay is inappropriate for tasks that must be completed "either successively (work that passes from one person to another, e.g., assembly operations) or coordinately (work that is a function of the joint effort of all employees, e.g., process production as is done in chemical plants)" (1981, pp. 97-98).

In reality, there is an extremely small number of work settings where the contribution of an individual employee can be accurately measured and evaluated. In addition to the difficulty of individual performance assessment is the likelihood of suppressing employee cooperation and compromising individual creativity. Only when the benefits of productivity are shared with all employees will individuals contribute and participate cooperatively to the enterprise.

Due to the complexity of the production process, the majority of merit pay plans used by business and industry reward group performance as opposed to individual performance. When rewards are established by the performance of a total group effort, individuals realize the importance of teamwork in the success or productivity of the company. However, a major weakness of a group merit pay plan is that employees

may be incapable of establishing the relationship between individual contribution and overall group effectiveness and, thus, may lack motivation by a monetary reward.

When subjective criteria must be a factor in the evaluation process, business, like education, has a difficulty identifying and establishing the criteria used to measure effective performance. Issues such as trust and the rater's reliability also surface when subjectivity is a component in the process of assessment.

The concept of merit pay has been acknowledged to be consistent with the traditional American work ethic and the values of business and industry of competition, independence, and self-sufficiency. However, it is interesting to note that many large successful American companies such as IBM, Hewlett-Packard, and Intel promote just the opposite of these values. In reality, business and industry operate on the premise of employee interdependence whereby emphasis is placed on group performance-based pay rather than individual (Lawler, 1981).

Government

The federal government completed the implementation of the merit pay system in 1981. Merit pay was initiated by the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, which was the most substantive change in public administration (Silverman, 1983). The Act mandated the pay of Civil Service supervisors and management officials be contingent upon their performance ratings. A major component of the merit pay plan was that its expense could not exceed that of the previous general schedule step system.

Even though performance-based pay was designed to improve employee compensation practices in the federal government, a number of problems were identified after the implementation. A study conducted by Pearce and Perry (1981) found: employees were not convinced that their performance was accurately measured; employees were not motivated by pay incentives for performance; employees did not perceive monetary reward as the most important factor in their work; employees' confidence in the system was diminished by the use of quotas in pay pools and the authority used by managers to change performance ratings; and employees became more concerned with obtaining good ratings and less concerned with effective management practices.

Silverman, in the article "Why the Merit Pay System Failed in the Federal Government", lists 10 major problems of the federal employee compensation system: "unintended statutory provisions; open-ended regulations; novice technical assistance; drifting implementation policies; flagrant administrative errors; ludicrously complicated inconsistent employee treatment; motivational factors; managerial pay compression; and simultaneous budget reductions" (1983, p. 294).

In addition, Silverman states that politics not only created merit pay but also destroyed it. "Or maybe the program was doomed from the start by faulty conceptions, contending bureaucracies, and ill-timed budget cutbacks" (Silverman, 1983, p. 302).

According to Johnson, these reports on merit pay from business, industry, and government provide four important lessons for those who support merit pay plans for teachers. "First, employees may be more motivated by challenging work responsibilities or fringe benefits than opportunities for competitive pay. Second, it is important that the evaluated criteria of a merit pay plan reflect the most important elements of employees' work so that they will direct their efforts toward the right goals rather than just measurable goals. Third, individualized merit pay is appropriate for some kinds of work and not others. Competition among employees may be counter-productive in work that is sequential or that requires cooperation. Fourth, individuals are motivated by merit pay only to the extent that they believe extra effort will be rewarded. The more subjective merit ratings are, the more likely employees will decide that they are not worth working for" (1984, pp. 32-33).

Future Prospects for Merit Pay

It is likely that within the next several years many school districts will adopt merit pay plans. The rationale for this assumption seems to be threefold. First, there is an increasing demand for accountability in schools by the public and state legislatures. Second, there is growing support from both teachers and teachers' unions for performance-based pay and merit recognition. However, Goodlad's research may question the validity of this assumption. His research suggests that the best teachers leave the profession primarily due to low salaries. Therefore, it may be necessary to increase

salaries by a substantial amount rather than award token bonuses based on achievement. Third, there is an unproven expectation that a causal relationship exists between monetary incentives for teachers and improved instruction in the classroom.

Throughout the merit pay debate, it is important to recognize that no single concept will be a panacea to remedy the problems in public education. Merit pay offers only one alternative in striving for excellence in education. In deciding whether merit pay will be beneficial for future consideration, everyone involved must weigh the projected benefits against the potential detriments of such plans.

Considering the vagueness of the available knowledge in the literature, an attitudinal study of administrators in the state of Florida may help to reduce the ambiguity surrounding the issues of merit pay.

CHAPTER III

METHODS AND PROCEDURES

This chapter includes the methods and procedures of the study that was conducted to determine the attitudes of principals and superintendents of the state of Florida toward merit pay. The data in this study was collected by a survey instrument.

Subjects

The population for this study consisted of 1,990 administrators in the state of Florida. Included in the sample were all 67 district superintendents and 1,923 selected principals. These superintendents and principals were selected from The Florida Education Directory 1983-84.

Instrument

The evaluation instrument used for the collection of data was a questionnaire that was developed and validated by Rometo in 1961. For this study, the instrument was comprised of 34 statements and 4 questions related to merit pay. The instrument consisted of a two-part questionnaire with accompanying cover letter for clarification. Page one of the instrument included a letter to the educator explaining the reasons for the questionnaire and instructions for completing and returning the instrument.

Part One of the survey form consisted of demographic data which might influence the nature of the reactions. Part Two included 34 opinion statements and 4 questions designed to determine the reactions and attitudes of the respondents toward the various aspects of merit pay.

Before each statement a three-point scale was provided with the following responses: agree, disagree, undecided. The respondent was asked to circle the response.

Numerical weightings were assigned to the options on a 1-2-3 basis in the direction of the most positive attitude toward merit pay. A score of three for an item meant agreement with positive items or disagreement with negative items. A score of one meant disagreement with positive items or agreement with negative items. A score of two indicated undecided on the items. Total score was the summation of numerical weights assigned to the responses which an individual circled, after taking into consideration the negatively stated items.

Design

The study was conducted during the fall of the 1983-84 school year. The questionnaire was mailed with stamped return envelopes.

Data Analysis

Responses to the questionnaire were recorded by the researcher. The responses for each of the 34 statements were tabulated and analyzed by eight demographic variables. The data was analyzed using

the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) (Nie, Hull, Jenkins, Steinbrenner, & Bent, 1975).

Categories used in classifying respondents by demographic data were: sex, marital status, age, present position, school classification, years of experience as an educator, years of experience as a principal, and years of experience as a superintendent. In appraising attitudes of principals and superintendents in terms of various background factors, three procedures were used. These were: (1) percentage distribution of responses to each of the 34 statements, broken down in accordance with subgroups within each background factor; (2) application of the chi-square test of independence to opinion responses on each item for all background factors; and (3) application of Cochran's Q test for related observations to opinion responses on Item 35 for all background factors (Daniel, 1978).

CHAPTER IV

PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF DATA

Analysis of Returns

The evaluative instrument was mailed to a total of 1,990 educators in the state of Florida. Included in the sample were all 67 district superintendents and 1,923 selected principals. These superintendents and principals were selected from The Florida Education Directory 1983-84.

Table 1 shows the number of questionnaires mailed and the number and percentage of returns.

TABLE 1

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONNAIRE

	Number Mailed	Number Returned	Percentage
Superintendents	67	47	70.15
Principals	1,923	1,342	69.79
Totals	1,990	1,389	69.80

As shown in Table 2, there were 1,309 usable returns. The usable returns represented 65.78% of the 1,990 questionnaires that were mailed.

TABLE 2

USABLE RETURNS BY GROUP

	Number	Usable Returns	Percentage
Superintendents	47	47	100.00
Principals	1,342	1,262	94.00
Totals	1,389	1,309	94.24

There were a total of 80 returns which had to be discarded for the following reasons:

1. Seventeen instruments did not contain complete demographic data.
2. Fifty-four instruments did not contain complete responses to all 34 statements.
3. Nine instruments were returned with a notation of a refusal to respond to the issue of merit pay.

As indicated in Table 3, the study included 67 school districts in the state of Florida and the number of responses per school district.

TABLE 3

SCHOOL DISTRICTS INCLUDED IN THE STUDY

School District	Number	Percentage
Alachua	25	1.9
Baker	5	.4
Bay	20	1.5
Bradford	6	.5
Brevard	45	3.4
Broward	92	7.0
Calhoun	5	.4
Charlotte	3	.2
Citrus	11	.8
Clay	14	1.1
Collier	16	1.2
Columbia	6	.5
Dade	149	11.4
Desoto	5	.4
Dixie	2	.2
Duval	82	6.3
Escambia	38	2.9
Flagler	4	.3
Franklin	2	.2
Gadsden	13	1.0
Gilchrist	3	.2
Glades	2	.2
Gulf	4	.3
Hamilton	5	.4
Hardee	4	.3
Hendry	6	.5
Hernando	7	.5
Highlands	10	.8
Hillsborough	49	3.7
Holmes	5	.4
Indian River	13	1.0
Jackson	10	.8
Jefferson	3	.2
Lafayette	2	.2

TABLE 3 Continued

School District	Number	Percentage
Lake	26	2.0
Lee	31	2.4
Leon	21	1.6
Levy	8	.6
Liberty	3	.2
Madison	3	.2
Manatee	25	1.9
Marion	22	1.7
Martin	9	.7
Monroe	12	.9
Nassau	8	.6
Okaloosa	22	1.7
Okeechobee	5	.4
Orange	71	5.4
Osceola	11	.8
Palm Bay	57	4.4
Pasco	25	1.9
Pinellas	61	4.7
Polk	55	4.2
Putnam	14	1.1
St. Johns	11	.8
St. Lucie	10	.8
Santa Rosa	18	1.4
Sarasota	15	1.1
Seminole	35	2.7
Sumter	9	.7
Suwannee	3	.2
Taylor	4	.3
Union	2	.2
Volusia	34	2.6
Wakulla	5	.4
Walton	5	.4
Washington	3	.2

Analysis of Demographic Data

Table 4 presents the frequency of returns by demographic categories. In this study 74.1% of the respondents were men and 88.2% of the respondents were married. Of the principals responding, elementary school principals accounted for 66.8% of the returns. The majority of the respondents were between the ages of 46 and 55 and 42.8% had 25 years or more experience as an educator. According to the number of years of experience as a principal, 68.7% of the respondents had between 5 and 19 years of experience. Forty-five (3.4%) of the respondents reported having 1 to 9 years of experience as a superintendent.

TABLE 4

EXTENT OF RETURNS BY DEMOGRAPHIC DATA

Category	Number	Percentage
SEX		
Male	970	74.1
Female	339	25.9
MARITAL STATUS		
Married	1,154	88.2
Single	93	7.1
Other	62	4.7
AGE		
26 to 35	68	5.2
36 to 45	440	33.6
46 to 55	533	40.7
56 or over	268	20.5

TABLE 4 Continued

Category	Number	Percentage
PRESENT POSITION		
Superintendent	47	3.6
Principal	1,262	96.4
SCHOOL CLASSIFICATION		
Elementary	843	66.8
Middle	136	10.8
Junior High	98	7.8
High School	185	14.6
YEARS OF EXPERIENCE AS EDUCATOR		
1 to 4	4	.3
5 to 9	20	1.5
10 to 14	130	9.9
15 to 19	292	22.3
20 to 24	303	23.1
25 or over	560	42.8
YEARS OF EXPERIENCE AS PRINCIPAL		
None	28	2.1
1 to 4	317	24.2
5 to 9	305	23.3
10 to 14	277	21.2
15 to 19	208	15.9
20 to 24	103	7.9
25 or over	71	5.4
YEARS OF EXPERIENCE AS SUPERINTENDENT		
None	1,246	95.2
1 to 4	30	2.3
5 to 9	15	1.1
10 to 14	6	.5
15 to 19	6	.5
20 to 24	2	.2
25 or over	4	.3

Analysis of Responses

Background factors were used to classify respondents into the following categories: sex, marital status, age, present position, school classification, years of experience as educator, years of experience as principal, and years of experience as superintendent. Three statistical procedures were used to analyze the eight background factors in relation to the attitudes of principals and superintendents in Florida toward merit pay. These procedures include: (1) percentage distribution of responses to each of the 34 statements, broken down in accordance with subgroups within each background factor; (2) application of the chi-square test of independence to opinion responses on each item for all background factors; and (3) application of Cochran's Q test for related observations to opinion responses on Item 35 for all background factors.

In this study of attitudes, the .05 level of significance was used when a result was significant. At this level we can say that 95 times out of 100, the results are not due to chance but associated in some way with background factors. When the results are reported at a lower level of significance (e.g., .01), it means that the results are less likely to be due to chance.

Responses Classified According to Sex

The initial background factor analyzed was that of sex. Table 5 contains the results of 970 male respondents and 339 female respondents. In the responses of agreement, there were 18 out of the 34

statements where male and female respondents vary less than 2%. The smallest variance in responses of agreement, .3%, was found in Item 22, which states that cooperation among teachers would be reduced by a merit pay program.

In only 2 of the 34 statements, Items 15 and 18, was there a difference in responses of agreement of more than 5%. Table 5 shows that four chi-squares were produced by grouping respondents according to the sex classification. Item 15, which states that a teacher should be eligible for a merit increment as soon as outstanding teaching has been demonstrated, had the largest percentage of difference in responses of agreement. The percentage difference of 7.8% is significant at the .05 level of confidence.

Although the majority of respondents was not in agreement with Item 2, which states that the teaching profession is losing good teachers because of the lack of a merit system, the female respondents had the largest percentage of agreement, 23.0%.

In response to Item 13, the majority of respondents was in disagreement that merit increments should be permanent rather than on an annual basis. Only 8.0% of the female respondents expressed agreement and 9.7% of the male respondents agreed with this statement for a slight difference of 1.7%.

Over 59% of all the respondents disagreed with Item 19, which states that a merit pay program would tend to assure the taxpayers better education for their children. Proponents of merit pay argue that the quality of education would be improved by its use, however,

TABLE 5

RESPONSES TO ITEMS ACCORDING TO SEX

GROUP 1: PREMISES RELATIVE TO MERIT PAY

Type of Response to Item	Percentage		P Value
	Male	Female	
1. A fair way to reward outstanding teaching is by the granting of merit increments.			
Agree	44.4	43.1	0.74
Disagree	36.3	38.6	
Undecided	19.3	18.3	
2. The teaching profession is losing good teachers because of the lack of a merit system.			
Agree	21.2	23.0	0.02 *
Disagree	66.0	69.6	
Undecided	12.8	7.4	
3. Merit pay for salary purposes is inevitable.			
Agree	37.5	40.1	0.28
Disagree	42.9	38.1	
Undecided	19.6	21.8	
4. Only the inferior teacher will fear merit pay.			
Agree	9.7	12.1	0.45
Disagree	83.3	80.8	
Undecided	7.0	7.1	
5. Merit pay is really an effort on the part of state officials to keep taxes down.			
Agree	11.1	9.1	0.39
Disagree	65.6	64.6	
Undecided	23.3	26.3	
6. Merit pay and teacher tenure are incompatible.			
Agree	28.1	29.2	0.93
Disagree	55.8	55.2	
Undecided	16.1	15.6	
7. With adequate salaries, merit pay would be unnecessary.			
Agree	59.7	62.5	0.18
Disagree	29.8	30.4	
Undecided	10.5	7.1	
8. Merit pay would only be necessary in times of teacher shortages.			
Agree	4.8	2.9	0.31
Disagree	84.8	87.3	
Undecided	10.3	9.7	
9. High salaries for outstanding teacher performance are justifiable.			
Agree	81.8	78.2	0.34
Disagree	10.5	13.0	
Undecided	7.7	8.8	
10. Merit pay is a disguised attempt at discrimination through merit increments.			
Agree	14.0	11.2	0.42
Disagree	70.1	72.3	
Undecided	15.9	16.5	

TABLE 5 Continued

GROUP II: POLICIES CONCERNING MERIT PAY

Type of Response to Item	Percentage		P Value
	Male	Female	
11. Administrators in the state of Florida are adequately qualified by professional training and experience to administer a merit pay program.			
Agree	29.0	27.7	0.45
Disagree	50.1	48.1	
Undecided	20.9	24.2	
12. There should be a limit to the number of teachers receiving merit increments in a school system in any one year.			
Agree	13.4	10.6	0.35
Disagree	77.1	78.5	
Undecided	9.5	10.9	
13. Merit increments should be permanent rather than on an annual basis.			
Agree	9.7	8.0	0.05 *
Disagree	79.0	84.7	
Undecided	11.3	7.4	
14. Merit pay should be subsidized by the state.			
Agree	81.6	78.8	0.50
Disagree	8.5	10.0	
Undecided	9.9	11.2	
15. A teacher should be eligible for a merit increment as soon as outstanding teaching has been demonstrated.			
Agree	64.4	56.6	0.02 *
Disagree	21.6	28.3	
Undecided	13.9	15.0	
16. Only school administrators should rate teachers for merit increments.			
Agree	18.9	18.0	0.80
Disagree	67.4	69.3	
Undecided	13.7	12.7	
17. A merit system should be organized so as to permit an appeal by teachers who are denied a merit increment.			
Agree	54.1	52.8	0.85
Disagree	32.0	32.2	
Undecided	13.9	15.0	
18. Teachers should have the opportunity to assist in planning and administering merit pay in their respective systems.			
Agree	75.4	80.5	0.12
Disagree	14.8	12.7	
Undecided	9.8	6.8	

TABLE 5 Continued

GROUP III: POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF MERIT PAY			
Type of Response to Item	Percentage		P Value
	Male	Female	
19. A merit pay program would tend to assure the taxpayers better education for their children.			
Agree	20.1	24.8	0.04 *
Disagree	59.3	59.9	
Undecided	20.6	15.3	
20. Teachers who receive merit increments would be subjected to resentment by professional associates.			
Agree	62.6	62.2	0.43
Disagree	17.9	20.9	
Undecided	19.5	16.8	
21. Merit pay would encourage professional growth.			
Agree	47.3	44.5	0.66
Disagree	30.2	32.4	
Undecided	22.4	23.0	
22. Cooperation among teachers would be reduced by a merit pay program.			
Agree	49.3	49.6	0.71
Disagree	27.2	28.9	
Undecided	23.5	21.5	
23. Merit pay would encourage good teachers to stay in the profession.			
Agree	47.4	49.9	0.48
Disagree	30.9	30.6	
Undecided	21.6	19.6	
24. "Politics" would influence merit pay programs.			
Agree	62.4	61.7	0.80
Disagree	14.1	14.2	
Undecided	22.5	24.2	
25. The use of merit pay would improve the quality of instruction.			
Agree	25.4	26.5	0.15
Disagree	44.6	49.0	
Undecided	30.0	24.5	
26. Merit pay would cause teachers to compromise their individuality in order to please the evaluator.			
Agree	36.9	33.0	0.44
Disagree	39.4	41.9	
Undecided	23.7	25.1	

TABLE 5 Continued

GROUP III: POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF MERIT PAY			
Type of Response to Item	Percentage		P Value
	Male	Female	
27. Salary increases based upon merit pay would encourage young people to enter the teaching profession.			
Agree	27.5	28.0	0.49
Disagree	47.2	49.9	
Undecided	25.3	22.1	
28. Merit pay would initiate a breach between administrator and teacher in professional relationships.			
Agree	40.2	38.9	0.86
Disagree	36.9	36.9	
Undecided	22.9	24.2	
29. Teachers not receiving merit increments would increase their efforts.			
Agree	17.9	21.8	0.28
Disagree	50.0	48.4	
Undecided	32.1	29.8	
30. A merit pay program would cause an undesirable strain on teachers when evaluators visit the classroom.			
Agree	33.1	33.9	0.89
Disagree	49.6	49.9	
Undecided	17.3	16.2	
31. Merit pay would help professionalize teachers.			
Agree	24.5	23.3	0.89
Disagree	55.4	56.6	
Undecided	20.1	20.1	
32. Teachers denied merit increments would become professionally demoralized.			
Agree	47.0	46.3	0.22
Disagree	24.3	28.6	
Undecided	28.7	25.1	
33. Merit pay would stimulate individual self-evaluation among educators.			
Agree	44.7	42.8	0.52
Disagree	31.4	34.8	
Undecided	23.8	22.4	
34. Teachers not receiving merit increments would limit their efforts.			
Agree	36.4	33.0	0.51
Disagree	32.9	35.4	
Undecided	30.7	31.6	

* Significant at .05 level

the responses of males and females agreed with this statement only 20.1% and 24.8% respectively.

Responses Classified According to Marital Status

Marital status was studied as a possible factor in determining attitudes toward merit pay. Respondents were classified into three groups: married, single, and other (separated, widowed, or divorced). Table 6 reports the marital status of the respondents in percentages. In the responses of agreement, there were 5 out of the 34 statements where all three groups vary less than 2%. The smallest variance in responses of agreement, .5%, was found in Item 20 and Item 31. Item 20 states that teachers who receive merit increments would be subjected to resentment by professional associates. Item 31 states that merit pay would help professionalize teachers.

An examination of Table 6 discloses that, in the responses of agreement, there were 16 out of 34 statements that vary less than 5% and 18 statements that vary more than 5%. The table also shows only two statistically significant differences occurring in this category.

Although the majority of total responses for Item 3 disagree that merit pay for salary purposes is inevitable, respondents who are single had the largest percentage of agreement, 44.1%, for that item.

Item 23, which states that merit pay would encourage good teachers to stay in the profession, had the largest percentage of difference in responses of agreement, 23.1%.

TABLE 6

RESPONSES TO ITEMS ACCORDING TO MARITAL STATUS

GROUP I: PREMISES RELATIVE TO MERIT PAY

Type of Response to Item	Married	Percentage Single	Other	P Value
1. A fair way to reward outstanding teaching is by the granting of merit increments.				
Agree	44.3	41.9	43.5	0.93
Disagree	36.5	40.9	38.7	
Undecided	19.2	17.2	17.7	
2. The teaching profession is losing good teachers because of the lack of a merit system.				
Agree	21.3	23.7	25.8	0.83
Disagree	67.1	65.6	66.1	
Undecided	11.6	10.8	8.1	
3. Merit pay for salary purposes is inevitable.				
Agree	37.4	44.1	43.5	0.01 **
Disagree	43.1	35.5	24.2	
Undecided	19.5	20.4	32.3	
4. Only the inferior teacher will fear merit pay.				
Agree	9.8	15.1	12.9	0.29
Disagree	82.8	81.7	80.6	
Undecided	7.4	3.2	6.5	
5. Merit pay is really an effort on the part of state officials to keep taxes down.				
Agree	10.6	11.8	9.7	0.17
Disagree	65.6	55.9	74.2	
Undecided	23.8	32.3	16.1	
6. Merit pay and teacher tenure are incompatible.				
Agree	28.0	29.0	35.5	0.78
Disagree	55.9	54.8	51.6	
Undecided	16.1	16.1	12.9	
7. With adequate salaries, merit pay would be unnecessary.				
Agree	59.5	73.1	58.1	0.08
Disagree	30.3	21.5	35.5	
Undecided	10.1	5.4	6.5	
8. Merit pay would only be necessary in times of teacher shortages.				
Agree	4.5	5.4		0.13
Disagree	85.4	80.6	95.2	
Undecided	10.1	14.0	4.8	
9. High salaries for outstanding teacher performance are justifiable.				
Agree	81.2	77.4	79.0	0.88
Disagree	10.9	14.0	11.3	
Undecided	7.9	8.6	9.7	
10. Merit pay is a disguised attempt at discrimination through merit increments.				
Agree	13.2	15.1	12.9	0.85
Disagree	71.0	65.6	72.6	
Undecided	15.9	19.4	14.5	

TABLE 6 Continued

GROUP II: POLICIES CONCERNING MERIT PAY

Type of Response to Item	Married	Percentage Single	Other	P Value
11. Administrators in the state of Florida are adequately qualified by professional training and experience to administer a merit pay program.				
Agree	29.3	26.9	19.4	0.24
Disagree	48.5	55.9	59.7	
Undecided	22.2	17.2	21.0	
12. There should be a limit to the number of teachers receiving merit increments in a school system in any one year.				
Agree	13.0	8.6	12.9	0.39
Disagree	77.6	78.5	72.6	
Undecided	9.4	12.9	14.5	
13. Merit increments should be permanent rather than on an annual basis.				
Agree	9.0	10.8	11.3	0.91
Disagree	80.6	78.5	80.6	
Undecided	10.4	10.8	8.1	
14. Merit pay should be subsidized by the state.				
Agree	81.0	76.3	85.5	0.65
Disagree	8.9	9.7	6.5	
Undecided	10.1	14.0	8.1	
15. A teacher should be eligible for a merit increment as soon as outstanding teaching has been demonstrated.				
Agree	63.3	55.9	56.5	0.17
Disagree	22.4	28.0	33.9	
Undecided	14.3	16.1	9.7	
16. Only school administrators should rate teachers for merit increments.				
Agree	18.3	22.6	19.4	0.60
Disagree	68.3	61.3	71.0	
Undecided	13.4	16.1	19.4	
17. A merit system should be organized so as to permit an appeal by teachers who are denied a merit increment.				
Agree	53.6	51.6	59.7	0.74
Disagree	32.4	31.2	25.8	
Undecided	14.0	17.2	14.5	
18. Teachers should have the opportunity to assist in planning and administering merit pay in their respective systems.				
Agree	76.4	75.3	83.9	0.42
Disagree	14.1	17.2	12.9	
Undecided	9.4	7.5	3.2	

TABLE 6 Continued

GROUP III: POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF MERIT PAY				
Type of Response to Item	Married	Percentage Single	Other	P Value
19. A merit pay program would tend to assure the taxpayers better education for their children.				
Agree	20.9	25.8	22.6	0.28
Disagree	59.0	61.3	64.5	
Undecided	20.1	12.9	12.9	
20. Teachers who receive merit increments would be subjected to resentment by professional associates.				
Agree	63.3	63.4	62.9	0.47
Disagree	18.5	17.2	25.8	
Undecided	18.3	19.4	11.3	
21. Merit pay would encourage professional growth.				
Agree	46.5	45.2	50.0	0.31
Disagree	31.1	39.8	27.4	
Undecided	22.4	15.1	22.6	
22. Cooperation among teachers would be reduced by a merit pay program.				
Agree	49.0	55.9	45.2	0.40
Disagree	27.4	25.8	35.5	
Undecided	23.6	18.3	19.4	
23. Merit pay would encourage good teachers to stay in the profession.				
Agree	47.9	39.8	62.9	0.02 *
Disagree	30.6	41.9	24.2	
Undecided	21.5	18.3	12.9	
24. "Politics" would influence merit pay programs.				
Agree	63.0	62.4	62.9	0.77
Disagree	13.8	18.3	14.5	
Undecided	23.2	19.4	22.6	
25. The use of merit pay would improve the quality of instruction.				
Agree	25.8	24.7	24.2	0.86
Disagree	45.2	50.5	48.4	
Undecided	28.9	24.7	27.4	
26. Merit pay would cause teachers to compromise their individuality in order to please the evaluator.				
Agree	36.0	36.6	32.3	0.69
Disagree	40.3	34.4	43.5	
Undecided	23.7	29.0	24.2	

TABLE 6 Continued

GROUP III: POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF MERIT PAY

Type of Response to Item	Married	Percentage Single	Other	P Value
27. Salary increases based upon merit pay would encourage young people to enter the teaching profession.				
Agree	27.4	23.7	38.7	0.07
Disagree	47.4	52.7	50.0	
Undecided	25.2	23.7	11.3	
28. Merit pay would initiate a breach between administrator and teacher in professional relationships.				
Agree	39.2	43.0	48.4	0.18
Disagree	36.7	41.9	33.9	
Undecided	24.2	15.1	17.7	
29. Teachers not receiving merit increments would increase their efforts.				
Agree	18.5	21.5	24.2	0.58
Disagree	49.4	51.6	50.0	
Undecided	32.1	26.9	25.8	
30. A merit pay program would cause an undesirable strain on teachers when evaluators visit the classroom.				
Agree	33.3	36.6	29.0	0.83
Disagree	49.9	46.2	50.0	
Undecided	16.8	17.2	21.0	
31. Merit pay would help professionalize teachers.				
Agree	24.2	24.7	24.2	0.94
Disagree	55.6	58.1	53.2	
Undecided	20.2	17.2	22.6	
32. Teachers denied merit increments would become professionally demoralized.				
Agree	46.4	53.8	43.5	0.18
Disagree	24.9	28.0	32.3	
Undecided	28.7	18.3	24.2	
33. Merit pay would stimulate individual self-evaluation among educators.				
Agree	44.4	38.7	50.0	0.06
Disagree	31.6	45.2	25.8	
Undecided	24.0	16.1	24.2	
34. Teachers not receiving merit increments would limit their efforts.				
Agree	35.2	34.4	43.5	0.60
Disagree	33.4	37.6	30.6	
Undecided	31.5	28.0	25.8	

** Significant at .01 level

* Significant at .05 level

Responses Classified According to Age

In the determination of attitudes toward merit pay, age was considered as a viable factor. Respondents were classified into five groups ranging from the under 26 years of age group to the 56 or over age group.

An examination of the responses of agreement in Table 7 shows that the replies of all five age groups vary less than 5% in Items 6, 7, 8, 12, 16, 21, 24, 27, 31, and 33. Item 27, which states that salary increases based upon merit pay would encourage young people to enter the teaching profession, was found to have the smallest variance, 2.1%, even though the majority of respondents disagreed with this statement.

For Item 17, which states that a merit system should be organized so as to permit an appeal by teachers who are denied a merit increment, the older respondents were in more agreement than the younger respondents. The responses of agreement ranged from 58.6% for the 56 or over age group to 36.8% for the 26 to 35 age group. This item was found to have the largest percentage of difference in responses of agreement, 21.8%. Table 7 shows that a significant percentage difference exists between these two age groups.

In response to Item 1, the respondents 45 years of age or under tended to agree that a fair way to reward outstanding teaching is by the granting of merit increments, while those 46 years of age and over agreed to a lesser extent.

For Item 20, the majority of respondents agreed that teachers who receive merit increments would be subjected to resentment by professional associates, with the highest percentage of agreement, 70.5%, in the 56 years or over group.

Although the majority of respondents agreed that cooperation among teachers would be reduced by a merit pay program, the percentage of difference in responses of agreement was 17.0% for Item 22. The 35 years of age and under group were the least favorable toward this statement with 38.2% expressing agreement, while the most agreement was given by the 56 years or over group where 55.2% expressed this opinion.

The majority of the respondents disagreed that the use of merit pay would improve the quality of instruction. The smallest percentage in responses of agreement, 17.6%, was found in the 26 to 35 years of age group with the largest percentage of agreement, 27.6%, in the 46 to 55 group.

For Item 26, which states merit pay would cause teachers to compromise their individuality in order to please the evaluator, the difference of opinion among the various age groups was diverse. Forty-three % of the 26 to 45 age group disagreed, 41.8% of the 56 years or over group agreed, while the 46 to 55 group agreed 38.5% and disagreed 39.6% with a percentage difference of only 1.1%.

In Item 28, 43.5% of the 46 years of age and older group agreed that merit pay would initiate a breach between administrator and

TABLE 7

RESPONSES TO ITEMS ACCORDING TO AGE

GROUP I: PREMISES RELATIVE TO MERIT PAY

Type of Response to Item	Percentage				P Value
	26-35	36-45	46-55	56 or over	
1. A fair way to reward outstanding teaching is by the granting of merit increments.					
Agree	48.5	47.5	41.8	41.8	0.01 **
Disagree	32.4	30.0	39.6	44.0	
Undecided	19.1	22.5	18.6	14.2	
2. The teaching profession is losing good teachers because of the lack of a merit system.					
Agree	27.9	23.4	19.9	20.9	0.34
Disagree	61.8	65.2	67.2	70.5	
Undecided	10.3	11.4	12.9	8.6	
3. Merit pay for salary purposes is inevitable.					
Agree	44.1	39.3	36.4	38.4	0.57
Disagree	33.8	39.1	44.3	42.5	
Undecided	22.1	21.6	19.3	19.0	
4. Only the inferior teacher will fear merit pay.					
Agree	13.2	10.5	9.2	11.6	#
Disagree	82.4	81.4	83.9	82.5	
Undecided	4.4	8.2	6.9	6.0	
5. Merit pay is really an effort on the part of state officials to keep taxes down.					
Agree	4.4	9.3	10.9	13.8	0.17
Disagree	67.6	64.1	67.2	63.1	
Undecided	27.9	26.6	22.0	23.1	
6. Merit pay and teacher tenure are incompatible.					
Agree	30.9	28.9	28.1	27.6	0.58
Disagree	48.5	56.4	57.0	53.4	
Undecided	20.6	14.8	14.8	19.0	
7. With adequate salaries, merit pay would be unnecessary.					
Agree	63.2	58.4	61.4	61.2	0.90
Disagree	25.0	32.0	29.3	29.1	
Undecided	11.8	9.5	9.4	9.7	
8. Merit pay would only be necessary in times of teacher shortages.					
Agree	2.9	6.4	3.6	3.0	#
Disagree	77.9	85.9	86.5	81.7	
Undecided	19.1	7.7	9.9	12.3	
9. High salaries for outstanding teacher performance are justifiable.					
Agree	89.7	81.1	80.7	78.4	0.21
Disagree	7.4	9.8	11.1	14.6	
Undecided	2.9	9.1	8.3	7.1	
10. Merit pay is a disguised attempt at discrimination through merit increments.					
Agree	10.3	10.7	13.3	18.3	0.06
Disagree	67.6	74.8	70.2	65.7	
Undecided	22.1	14.5	16.5	16.0	

TABLE 7 Continued

GROUP II: POLICIES CONCERNING MERIT PAY

Type of Response to Item	Percentage				P Value
	26-35	36-45	46-55	56 or over	
11. Administrators in the state of Florida are adequately qualified by professional training and experience to administer a merit pay program.					
Agree	23.5	29.5	29.1	27.6	0.18
Disagree	60.3	46.6	51.8	47.4	
Undecided	16.2	23.9	19.1	25.0	
12. There should be a limit to the number of teachers receiving merit increments in a school system in any one year.					
Agree	10.3	12.0	14.3	11.2	0.31
Disagree	73.5	78.2	77.5	77.2	
Undecided	16.2	9.8	8.3	11.6	
13. Merit increments should be permanent rather than on an annual basis.					
Agree	8.8	6.6	9.0	14.2	0.05
Disagree	79.4	83.9	80.3	75.4	
Undecided	11.8	9.5	10.7	10.4	
14. Merit pay should be subsidized by the state.					
Agree	79.4	82.3	81.8	77.2	0.20
Disagree	7.4	6.6	9.4	11.9	
Undecided	13.2	11.1	8.8	10.8	
15. A teacher should be eligible for a merit increment as soon as outstanding teaching has been demonstrated.					
Agree	57.4	62.7	63.8	60.4	0.06
Disagree	27.9	20.0	22.9	28.7	
Undecided	14.7	17.3	13.3	10.8	
16. Only school administrators should rate teachers for merit increments.					
Agree	22.1	17.5	19.3	18.3	0.78
Disagree	69.1	69.8	66.0	68.3	
Undecided	8.8	12.7	14.6	13.4	
17. A merit system should be organized so as to permit an appeal by teachers who are denied a merit increment.					
Agree	36.8	55.9	51.8	58.6	0.01 **
Disagree	42.6	30.2	35.5	25.4	
Undecided	20.6	13.9	12.8	16.0	
18. Teachers should have the opportunity to assist in planning and administering merit pay in their respective systems.					
Agree	64.7	80.0	75.8	76.1	0.15
Disagree	19.1	12.0	15.2	14.9	
Undecided	16.2	8.0	9.0	9.0	

TABLE 7 Continued

GROUP III: POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF MERIT PAY

Type of Response to Item	Percentage				P Value
	26-35	36-45	46-55	56 or over	
27. Salary increases based upon merit pay would encourage young people to enter the teaching profession.					
Agree	26.5	28.2	28.1	26.1	0.19
Disagree	39.7	44.8	49.9	51.1	
Undecided	33.8	27.0	22.0	22.8	
28. Merit pay would initiate a breach between administrator and teacher in professional relationships.					
Agree	30.9	35.2	42.6	44.4	0.02 *
Disagree	38.2	37.3	37.0	35.8	
Undecided	30.9	27.5	20.5	19.8	
29. Teachers not receiving merit increments would increase their efforts.					
Agree	14.7	20.7	18.2	18.7	0.28
Disagree	42.6	46.6	51.8	51.9	
Undecided	42.6	32.7	30.0	29.5	
30. A merit pay program would cause an undesirable strain on teachers when evaluators visit the classroom.					
Agree	30.9	30.9	33.0	38.4	0.16
Disagree	45.6	53.4	50.3	43.3	
Undecided	23.5	15.7	16.7	18.3	
31. Merit pay would help professionalize teachers.					
Agree	20.6	25.7	23.1	25.0	0.72
Disagree	54.4	53.4	56.8	57.5	
Undecided	25.0	20.9	20.1	17.5	
32. Teachers denied merit increments would become professionally demoralized.					
Agree	33.8	44.8	47.7	51.9	0.06
Disagree	25.0	25.0	26.3	24.6	
Undecided	41.2	30.2	26.1	23.5	
33. Merit pay would stimulate individual self-evaluation among educators.					
Agree	42.6	45.9	44.1	42.2	0.32
Disagree	30.9	28.4	35.1	33.6	
Undecided	26.5	25.7	20.8	24.3	
34. Teachers not receiving merit increments would limit their efforts.					
Agree	27.9	32.7	36.8	39.6	0.23
Disagree	30.9	34.1	34.1	32.1	
Undecided	41.2	33.2	29.1	28.4	

** Significant at .01 level

* Significant at .05 level

Expected frequencies too small for valid chi-square test

teacher in professional relationships, while 37.7% of the 45 years of age and under group disagreed with the statement.

Responses Classified According to Present Position

Administrative position was studied as a possible factor in the determination of attitudes toward merit pay. In this study, the classification according to position included that of superintendent and principal.

Table 8 reveals that in the responses of agreement, 21 of the 34 statements had a variance of less than 5%. Items 10, 11, 20, 28, and 33 varied less than 2%.

In response to Item 5, only 10.6% of both superintendents and principals agreed that merit pay is really an effort on the part of the state officials to keep taxes down, while the majority, 70.7%, disagreed with this belief.

Table 8 shows that Item 32 also had no degree in variance of agreement. Both superintendents and principals agreed 46.8% that teachers denied merit increments would become professionally demoralized. However, the variance of difference in responses of disagreement was 15.5%, with 40.4% of the superintendents and 24.9% of the principals disagreeing.

The largest percentage of difference in responses of agreement, 17.7%, was found in Item 18, which states that teachers should have the opportunity to assist in planning and administering merit pay in

TABLE 8

RESPONSES TO ITEMS ACCORDING TO PRESENT POSITION

GROUP 1: PREMISES RELATIVE TO MERIT PAY

Type of Response to Item	Percentage		P Value
	Superintendent	Principal	
1. A fair way to reward outstanding teaching is by the granting of merit increments.			
Agree	46.8	44.0	0.90
Disagree	34.0	37.0	
Undecided	19.1	19.0	
2. The teaching profession is losing good teachers because of the lack of a merit system.			
Agree	14.9	21.9	0.29
Disagree	68.1	66.9	
Undecided	17.0	11.2	
3. Merit pay for salary purposes is inevitable.			
Agree	42.6	38.0	0.78
Disagree	40.4	41.7	
Undecided	17.0	20.3	
4. Only the inferior teacher will fear merit pay.			
Agree	6.4	10.5	#
Disagree	91.5	82.3	
Undecided	2.1	7.2	
5. Merit pay is really an effort on the part of state officials to keep taxes down.			
Agree	10.6	10.6	#
Disagree	76.6	64.9	
Undecided	12.8	24.5	
6. Merit pay and teacher tenure are incompatible.			
Agree	23.4	28.6	0.52
Disagree	55.3	55.6	
Undecided	21.3	15.8	
7. With adequate salaries, merit pay would be unnecessary.			
Agree	57.4	60.5	#
Disagree	31.9	29.9	
Undecided	10.6	9.6	
8. Merit pay would only be necessary in times of teacher shortages.			
Agree	2.1	4.4	#
Disagree	89.4	85.3	
Undecided	8.5	10.2	
9. High salaries for outstanding teacher performance are justifiable.			
Agree	89.4	80.5	#
Disagree	6.4	11.3	
Undecided	4.3	8.2	
10. Merit pay is a disguised attempt at discrimination through merit increments.			
Agree	12.8	13.3	0.56
Disagree	76.6	70.4	
Undecided	10.6	16.2	

TABLE 8 Continued

GROUP II: POLICIES CONCERNING MERIT PAY			
Type of Response to Item	Percentage Superintendent	Principal	P Value
11. Administrators in the state of Florida are adequately qualified by professional training and experience to administer a merit pay program.			
Agree	27.7	28.7	0.38
Disagree	42.6	49.8	
Undecided	29.8	21.5	
12. There should be a limit to the number of teachers receiving merit increments in a school system in any one year.			
Agree	17.0	12.5	#
Disagree	63.8	78.0	
Undecided	19.1	9.5	
13. Merit increments should be permanent rather than on an annual basis.			
Agree	6.4	9.4	#
Disagree	89.4	80.1	
Undecided	4.3	10.5	
14. Merit pay should be subsidized by the state.			
Agree	83.0	80.8	#
Disagree	12.8	8.7	
Undecided	4.3	10.5	
15. A teacher should be eligible for a merit increment as soon as outstanding teaching has been demonstrated.			
Agree	70.2	62.1	0.52
Disagree	19.1	23.5	
Undecided	10.6	14.3	
16. Only school administrators should rate teachers for merit increments.			
Agree	21.3	18.5	0.63
Disagree	61.7	68.1	
Undecided	17.0	13.3	
17. A merit system should be organized so as to permit an appeal by teachers who are denied a merit increment.			
Agree	59.6	53.6	0.42
Disagree	23.4	32.3	
Undecided	17.0	14.1	
18. Teachers should have the opportunity to assist in planning and administering merit pay in their respective systems.			
Agree	59.6	77.3	#
Disagree	25.5	13.9	
Undecided	14.9	8.8	

TABLE 8 Continued

GROUP III: POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF MERIT PAY			
Type of Response to Item	Percentage Superintendent	Principal	P Value
19. A merit pay program would tend to assure the taxpayers better education for their children.			
Agree	23.4	21.2	0.93
Disagree	57.4	59.5	
Undecided	19.1	19.3	
20. Teachers who receive merit increments would be subjected to resentment by professional associates.			
Agree	61.7	63.3	0.65
Disagree	23.4	18.5	
Undecided	14.9	18.1	
21. Merit pay would encourage professional growth.			
Agree	51.1	46.4	0.27
Disagree	21.3	31.9	
Undecided	27.7	21.6	
22. Cooperation among teachers would be reduced by a merit pay program.			
Agree	38.3	49.8	0.12
Disagree	40.4	27.2	
Undecided	21.3	23.1	
23. Merit pay would encourage good teachers to stay in the profession.			
Agree	38.3	48.4	0.24
Disagree	31.9	31.1	
Undecided	29.8	20.5	
24. "Politics" would influence merit pay programs.			
Agree	57.4	63.2	0.17
Disagree	23.4	13.8	
Undecided	19.1	23.1	
25. The use of merit pay would improve the quality of instruction.			
Agree	34.0	25.4	0.14
Disagree	31.9	46.3	
Undecided	34.0	28.4	
26. Merit pay would cause teachers to compromise their individuality in order to please the evaluator.			
Agree	27.7	36.2	0.46
Disagree	46.8	39.8	
Undecided	25.5	24.0	

TABLE 8 Continued

GROUP III: POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF MERIT PAY			
Type of Response to Item	Percentage Superintendent	Principal	P Value
27. Salary increases based upon merit pay would encourage young people to enter the teaching profession.			
Agree	25.5	27.7	0.94
Disagree	48.9	47.9	
Undecided	25.5	24.4	
28. Merit pay would initiate a breach between administrator and teacher in professional relationships.			
Agree	38.3	39.9	0.12
Disagree	48.9	36.5	
Undecided	12.8	23.6	
29. Teachers not receiving merit increments would increase their efforts.			
Agree	23.4	18.8	0.60
Disagree	48.9	49.6	
Undecided	27.7	31.6	
30. A merit pay program would cause an undesirable strain on teachers when evaluators visit the classroom.			
Agree	29.8	33.4	0.06
Disagree	63.8	49.1	
Undecided	6.4	17.4	
31. Merit pay would help professionalize teachers.			
Agree	29.8	24.0	0.30
Disagree	44.7	56.1	
Undecided	25.5	19.9	
32. Teachers denied merit increments would become professionally demoralized.			
Agree	46.8	46.8	0.01 **
Disagree	40.4	24.9	
Undecided	12.8	28.3	
33. Merit pay would stimulate individual self-evaluation among educators.			
Agree	42.6	44.3	0.62
Disagree	38.3	32.1	
Undecided	19.1	23.6	
34. Teachers not receiving merit increments would limit their efforts.			
Agree	29.8	35.7	0.67
Disagree	38.3	33.4	
Undecided	31.9	30.9	

** Significant at .01 level

Expected frequencies too small for valid chi-square test

their respective systems. The responses of agreement ranged from 59.6% for superintendents to 77.3% for principals.

Over 80% of the administrators responding to Item 9 agreed that high salaries for outstanding teacher performance are justifiable. The percentage difference of agreement between the two groups was 8.9%.

Both superintendents and principals expressed over 80% agreement with the statement that merit pay should be subsidized by the state. There was only a 2.2% difference in agreement on Item 14.

Table 8 shows only one significant chi-square was obtained on responses according to administrative position.

Responses Classified According to School Classification

The background factor of school classification was studied as a possible determiner of attitudes toward merit pay. Respondents were categorized into four school groups: elementary, middle, junior high, and senior high.

Table 9 presents the responses in percentages according to the respective school classifications. An examination of the responses of agreement shows that the replies of all four groups vary less than 5% in Items 8, 10, 12, 13, 16, 32, and 34. Item 8, which states that merit pay would only be necessary in times of teacher shortages, was found to have the smallest variance, 2.1%, even though the majority of respondents disagreed with this statement.

As shown in Table 9, Item 17 had the largest percentage of difference in responses of agreement, 18.7%, and is significant at the .01 level. The respondents from the high school group agreed 68.3% that a merit system should be organized so as to permit an appeal by teachers who are denied a merit increment, while only 49.6% of the elementary school group agreed with this statement.

In response to Item 1, a fair way to reward outstanding teaching is by the granting of merit increments, 40.4% of the elementary school group agreed with this statement and 40.9% disagreed. It is interesting to note that the percentage of agreement responses increases with each school classification to 54.5% for the high school group. The percentage difference, 14.1%, between these two groups is significant at the .01 level.

Although the majority of respondents disagreed with Item 2, only 17.6% of the middle school group agreed that the teaching profession is losing good teachers because of the lack of a merit system. The responses of agreement ranged from 17.6% for the middle school classification to 29.6% for the high school group, with a difference of 12.0%.

In response to Item 15, the majority of the respondents in all school classifications agreed that a teacher should be eligible for a merit increment as soon as outstanding teaching has been demonstrated. The largest percentage of agreement, 71.4%, was found among respondents of the high school group. The least agreement was

TABLE 9

RESPONSES TO ITEMS ACCORDING TO SCHOOL CLASSIFICATION

GROUP 1: PREMISES RELATIVE TO MERIT PAY

Type of Response to Item	Percentage				P Value
	Elementary	Middle	Jr High	High School	
1. A fair way to reward outstanding teaching is by the granting of merit increments.					
Agree	40.4	47.1	50.0	54.5	0.01 **
Disagree	40.9	29.4	33.7	27.0	
Undecided	18.7	23.5	16.3	18.5	
2. The teaching profession is losing good teachers because of the lack of a merit system.					
Agree	20.6	17.6	24.5	29.6	0.02 *
Disagree	69.2	66.2	62.2	59.3	
Undecided	10.1	16.2	13.3	11.1	
3. Merit pay for salary purposes is inevitable.					
Agree	38.3	31.6	38.8	41.3	0.57
Disagree	41.7	48.5	40.8	37.0	
Undecided	20.0	19.9	20.4	21.7	
4. Only the inferior teacher will fear merit pay.					
Agree	9.8	8.8	14.3	12.7	0.38
Disagree	83.2	83.8	81.6	77.8	
Undecided	7.0	7.4	4.1	9.5	
5. Merit pay is really an effort on the part of state officials to keep taxes down.					
Agree	10.8	12.5	7.1	10.1	0.52
Disagree	63.4	64.7	73.5	67.2	
Undecided	25.7	22.8	19.4	22.8	
6. Merit pay and teacher tenure are incompatible.					
Agree	28.8	23.5	26.5	32.3	0.76
Disagree	55.5	58.8	56.2	52.4	
Undecided	15.6	17.6	15.3	15.3	
7. With adequate salaries, merit pay would be unnecessary.					
Agree	61.7	64.0	53.1	56.6	0.07
Disagree	28.8	22.8	39.8	34.4	
Undecided	9.4	13.2	7.1	9.0	
8. Merit pay would only be necessary in times of teacher shortages.					
Agree	4.3	3.7	4.1	5.8	#
Disagree	85.8	83.1	89.8	82.5	
Undecided	9.9	13.2	6.1	11.6	
9. High salaries for outstanding teacher performance are justifiable.					
Agree	79.4	80.9	77.6	86.8	0.17
Disagree	11.8	9.6	12.2	10.1	
Undecided	8.8	9.6	10.2	3.2	
10. Merit pay is a disguised attempt at discrimination through merit increments.					
Agree	14.1	10.3	11.2	13.2	0.41
Disagree	70.7	66.9	73.5	70.4	
Undecided	15.3	22.8	15.3	16.4	

TABLE 9 Continued

GROUP II: POLICIES CONCERNING MERIT PAY					
Type of Response to Item	Elementary	Percentage		High School	P Value
		Middle	Jr High		
11. Administrators in the state of Florida are adequately qualified by professional training and experience to administer a merit pay program.					
Agree	27.4	24.3	34.7	34.4	0.34
Disagree	50.9	52.9	44.9	45.5	
Undecided	21.7	22.8	20.4	20.1	
12. There should be a limit to the number of teachers receiving merit increments in a school system in any one year.					
Agree	13.1	11.8	12.2	10.6	0.90
Disagree	77.4	80.9	76.5	79.4	
Undecided	9.5	7.4	11.2	10.1	
13. Merit increments should be permanent rather than on an annual basis.					
Agree	9.7	11.8	7.1	7.4	0.68
Disagree	80.3	75.0	81.6	82.0	
Undecided	10.0	13.2	11.2	10.6	
14. Merit pay should be subsidized by the state.					
Agree	78.9	83.1	81.6	87.3	0.07
Disagree	10.4	6.6	8.2	3.2	
Undecided	10.7	10.3	10.2	9.5	
15. A teacher should be eligible for a merit increment as soon as outstanding teaching has been demonstrated.					
Agree	59.6	64.7	62.2	71.4	0.01 **
Disagree	26.9	14.7	22.4	15.3	
Undecided	13.5	20.6	15.3	13.2	
16. Only school administrators should rate teachers for merit increments.					
Agree	18.1	18.4	20.4	19.6	0.99
Disagree	68.4	68.4	67.3	67.2	
Undecided	13.5	13.2	12.2	13.2	
17. A merit system should be organized so as to permit an appeal by teachers who are denied a merit increment.					
Agree	49.6	54.4	58.2	68.3	0.01 **
Disagree	35.2	33.1	31.6	19.6	
Undecided	15.3	12.5	10.2	12.2	
18. Teachers should have the opportunity to assist in planning and administering merit pay in their respective systems.					
Agree	77.2	81.6	74.5	76.2	0.60
Disagree	14.4	11.8	15.3	12.2	
Undecided	8.3	6.6	10.2	11.6	

TABLE 9 Continued

GROUP III: POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF MERIT PAY					
Type of Response to Item	Percentage				P Value
	Elementary	Middle	Jr High	High School	
19. A merit pay program would tend to assure the taxpayers better education for their children.					
Agree	18.7	21.3	25.5	30.2	0.01 **
Disagree	62.3	56.6	57.1	50.3	
Undecided	19.0	22.1	17.3	19.6	
20. Teachers who receive merit increments would be subjected to resentment by professional associates.					
Agree	65.2	62.5	57.1	58.7	0.51
Disagree	17.5	17.6	21.4	22.2	
Undecided	17.3	19.9	21.4	19.0	
21. Merit pay would encourage professional growth.					
Agree	43.6	47.1	53.1	55.0	0.03 *
Disagree	34.0	26.5	30.6	27.5	
Undecided	22.4	26.5	16.3	17.5	
22. Cooperation among teachers would be reduced by a merit pay program.					
Agree	51.8	44.9	41.8	48.1	0.13
Disagree	25.6	25.7	35.7	30.7	
Undecided	22.5	29.4	22.4	21.2	
23. Merit pay would encourage good teachers to stay in the profession.					
Agree	46.8	46.3	52.0	55.0	0.02 *
Disagree	32.1	27.2	37.8	25.9	
Undecided	21.1	26.5	10.2	19.0	
24. "Politics" would influence merit pay programs.					
Agree	64.6	56.6	68.4	58.7	0.37
Disagree	13.0	17.6	11.2	15.9	
Undecided	22.4	25.7	20.4	25.4	
25. The use of merit pay would improve the quality of instruction.					
Agree	23.8	22.8	28.6	32.3	0.08
Disagree	48.5	44.1	46.9	37.6	
Undecided	27.7	33.1	24.5	30.2	
26. Merit pay would cause teachers to compromise their individuality in order to please the evaluator.					
Agree	36.9	40.4	33.7	31.2	0.09
Disagree	37.8	37.5	40.8	49.7	
Undecided	25.3	22.1	25.5	19.0	

TABLE 9 Continued

GROUP III: POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF MERIT PAY					
Type of Response to Item	Elementary	Percentage		High School	P Value
		Middle	Jr High		
27. Salary increases based upon merit pay would encourage young people to enter the teaching profession.					
Agree	26.6	20.6	33.7	34.9	0.04 *
Disagree	48.6	50.0	49.0	42.3	
Undecided	24.8	29.4	17.3	22.8	
28. Merit pay would initiate a breach between administrator and teacher in professional relationships.					
Agree	43.0	32.4	27.6	38.1	0.01 **
Disagree	33.6	41.9	50.0	38.1	
Undecided	23.4	25.7	22.4	23.8	
29. Teachers not receiving merit increments would increase their efforts.					
Agree	17.0	21.3	17.3	25.4	0.20
Disagree	51.3	48.5	48.0	43.9	
Undecided	31.7	30.1	34.7	30.7	
30. A merit pay program would cause an undesirable strain on teachers when evaluators visit the classroom.					
Agree	35.3	33.1	27.6	28.6	0.35
Disagree	47.6	47.1	53.1	55.6	
Undecided	17.2	19.9	19.4	15.9	
31. Merit pay would help professionalize teachers.					
Agree	21.6	25.0	30.6	30.7	0.01 **
Disagree	59.6	52.9	50.0	46.0	
Undecided	18.8	22.1	19.4	23.3	
32. Teachers denied merit increments would become professionally demoralized.					
Agree	47.6	43.4	43.9	47.6	0.62
Disagree	25.5	22.1	27.6	22.8	
Undecided	26.9	34.6	28.6	29.6	
33. Merit pay would stimulate individual self-evaluation among educators.					
Agree	42.8	47.8	48.0	46.6	0.75
Disagree	32.7	33.1	29.6	30.2	
Undecided	24.6	19.1	22.4	23.3	
34. Teachers not receiving merit increments would limit their efforts.					
Agree	34.9	35.3	36.7	39.2	0.87
Disagree	34.1	30.1	32.7	32.8	
Undecided	31.0	34.6	30.6	28.0	

** Significant at .01 level

* Significant at .05 level

Expected frequencies too small for valid chi-square test

expressed by elementary school respondents where 59.6% were of this opinion.

The majority of respondents were not of the opinion that a merit pay program would tend to assure the taxpayers better education for their children. For Item 19, the largest percentage of agreement, 30.2%, was expressed by high school respondents. The least agreement, 18.7%, was found among elementary school respondents.

For Item 21, the majority of respondents for all school classifications were in agreement that merit pay would encourage professional growth. The percentage of agreement responses ranged from 43.6% for the elementary school group to 55.0% for the high school group. It is interesting to note that the junior high school and high school classifications had the smallest variance in responses of agreement of 1.9%.

In response to Item 23, which states that merit pay would encourage good teachers to stay in the profession, the majority of respondents for all school classifications was in agreement. The percentage of agreement between the elementary school and middle school respondents was very close, 46.8% and 46.3% respectively, with a difference of .5%. The largest percentage of agreement, 55.0%, was found among high school respondents, with 52.0% agreement expressed by respondents in the junior high school classification for a difference of 3.0%.

Although the majority of respondents was not in agreement with Item 27, which states that salary increases based upon merit pay would

encourage young people to enter the teaching profession, high school respondents had the largest percentage of agreement, 34.9%. The least agreement was expressed among middle school respondents where 20.6% were of this opinion.

For Item 28, a divergence of opinion was expressed by the respondents regarding the statement that merit pay would initiate a breach between administrator and teacher in professional relationships. The majority of middle school and junior high school respondents disagreed with this statement. Respondents of the elementary school classification were in agreement, 43.0%, while the high school group evenly agreed and disagreed, 38.1%.

In response to Item 31, the majority of the respondents did not agree that merit pay would help professionalize teachers. The largest percentage of agreement, 30.6% and 30.7%, was found among respondents in the junior high and high school classifications respectively. Respondents of the elementary school group showed the least agreement, 21.6%, with this statement.

Table 9 shows that there were 10 significant percentage differences occurring in the category of school classification.

Responses Classified According to Years of Experience as Educator

Years of experience as an educator was studied as a possible factor in determining attitudes toward merit pay. Respondents were categorized into six groups according to the number of years of experience as an educator.

TABLE 10

RESPONSES TO ITEMS ACCORDING TO YEARS OF EXPERIENCE AS AN EDUCATOR

GROUP I: PREMISES RELATIVE TO MERIT PAY

Type of Response to Item	Percentage						P Value
	1-4	5-9	10-14	15-19	20-24	25 or over	
1. A fair way to reward outstanding teaching is by the granting of merit increments.							
Agree	50.0	40.0	44.6	48.6	40.9	43.4	#
Disagree		35.0	33.8	27.7	40.9	40.5	
Undecided	50.0	25.0	21.5	23.6	18.2	16.1	
2. The teaching profession is losing good teachers because of the lack of a merit system.							
Agree	25.0	20.0	21.5	25.7	18.8	21.3	#
Disagree	75.0	60.0	70.0	61.6	67.7	68.8	
Undecided		20.0	8.5	12.7	13.5	10.0	
3. Merit pay for salary purposes is inevitable.							
Agree	75.0	25.0	38.5	41.1	34.7	38.8	#
Disagree		50.0	36.2	39.4	45.9	41.8	
Undecided	25.0	25.0	25.4	19.5	19.5	19.5	
4. Only the inferior teacher will fear merit pay.							
Agree	25.0	20.0	10.0	9.9	9.6	10.5	#
Disagree	75.0	75.0	85.4	81.5	82.8	82.9	
Undecided		5.0	4.6	8.6	7.6	6.6	
5. Merit pay is really an effort on the part of state officials to keep taxes down.							
Agree	25.0		8.5	7.9	10.6	12.9	#
Disagree	50.0	65.0	68.5	66.1	65.3	64.3	
Undecided	25.0	35.0	23.1	26.0	24.1	22.9	
6. Merit pay and teacher tenure are incompatible.							
Agree		20.0	35.4	26.7	30.0	27.3	#
Disagree	75.0	50.0	45.4	58.9	56.8	55.7	
Undecided	25.0	30.0	19.2	14.4	13.2	17.0	
7. With adequate salaries, merit pay would be unnecessary.							
Agree	50.0	65.0	68.5	53.8	60.1	62.1	#
Disagree	50.0	25.0	23.8	34.9	28.4	29.6	
Undecided		10.0	7.7	11.3	11.6	8.2	
8. Merit pay would only be necessary in times of teacher shortages.							
Agree		5.0	9.2	4.1	4.0	3.6	#
Disagree	100.0	75.0	76.2	88.4	87.8	85.2	
Undecided		20.0	14.6	7.5	8.3	11.3	
9. High salaries for outstanding teacher performance are justifiable.							
Agree	100.0	85.0	80.0	83.2	78.9	80.5	#
Disagree		15.0	8.5	8.9	13.5	11.6	
Undecided			11.5	7.9	7.6	7.9	
10. Merit pay is a disguised attempt at discrimination through merit increments.							
Agree		10.0	6.9	9.2	15.2	16.1	#
Disagree	75.0	65.0	71.5	77.1	71.6	66.8	
Undecided	25.0	25.0	21.5	13.7	13.2	17.1	

TABLE 10 Continued

GROUP II: POLICIES CONCERNING MERIT PAY

Type of Response to Item	Percentage						P Value
	1-4	5-9	10-14	15-19	20-24	25 or over	
11. Administrators in the state of Florida are adequately qualified by professional training and experience to administer a merit pay program.							
Agree	50.0	30.0	27.7	27.4	30.0	28.6	#
Disagree	50.0	35.0	53.1	49.0	47.9	50.5	
Undecided		35.0	19.2	23.6	22.1	20.9	
12. There should be a limit to the number of teachers receiving merit increments in a school system in any one year.							
Agree	25.0	10.0	13.1	14.0	12.5	12.0	#
Disagree	50.0	60.0	78.5	76.4	77.2	78.8	
Undecided	25.0	30.0	8.5	9.6	10.2	9.3	
13. Merit increments should be permanent rather than on an annual basis.							
Agree		5.0	8.5	8.6	6.9	11.3	#
Disagree	75.0	75.0	80.0	82.2	84.2	77.9	
Undecided	25.0	20.0	11.5	9.2	8.9	10.9	
14. Merit pay should be subsidized by the state.							
Agree	100.0	70.0	87.7	81.5	79.5	80.0	#
Disagree		10.0	3.1	5.1	11.2	10.9	
Undecided		20.0	9.2	13.4	9.2	9.1	
15. A teacher should be eligible for a merit increment as soon as outstanding teaching has been demonstrated.							
Agree	50.0	55.0	66.9	60.6	58.7	64.6	#
Disagree		20.0	18.5	24.3	23.1	24.5	
Undecided	50.0	25.0	14.6	15.1	18.2	10.9	
16. Only school administrators should rate teachers for merit increments.							
Agree		10.0	23.8	15.1	20.5	18.8	#
Disagree	75.0	85.0	64.6	72.3	66.3	68.6	
Undecided	25.0	5.0	11.5	12.7	13.2	14.6	
17. A merit system should be organized so as to permit an appeal by teachers who are denied a merit increment.							
Agree	50.0	50.0	51.5	52.4	53.8	55.2	#
Disagree	25.0	30.0	32.3	31.5	37.3	29.5	
Undecided	25.0	20.0	16.2	16.1	8.9	15.4	
18. Teachers should have the opportunity to assist in planning and administering merit pay in their respective systems.							
Agree	75.0	75.0	73.8	80.1	76.9	75.5	#
Disagree	25.0	15.0	15.4	11.0	14.9	15.4	
Undecided		10.0	10.8	8.9	8.3	9.1	

TABLE 10 Continued

GROUP III: POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF MERIT PAY

Type of Response to Item	Percentage						P Value
	1-4	5-9	10-14	15-19	20-24	25 or over	
19. A merit pay program would tend to assure the taxpayers better education for their children.							
Agree	50.0	20.0	12.3	22.6	22.8	21.8	#
Disagree	25.0	75.0	63.8	53.4	62.0	59.8	
Undecided	25.0	5.0	23.8	24.0	15.2	18.4	
20. Teachers who receive merit increments would be subjected to resentment by professional associates.							
Agree	75.0	65.0	59.2	57.9	67.0	64.8	#
Disagree	20.0	18.5	19.5	16.8	19.5	19.5	
Undecided	25.0	15.0	22.3	22.6	16.2	15.7	
21. Merit pay would encourage professional growth.							
Agree	75.0	35.0	50.8	47.3	47.9	44.8	#
Disagree	25.0	45.0	23.1	28.4	32.0	34.5	
Undecided		20.0	26.2	24.3	20.1	20.7	
22. Cooperation among teachers would be reduced by a merit pay program.							
Agree	25.0	45.0	41.5	46.2	52.1	51.6	#
Disagree	30.0	28.5	27.4	28.4	27.3	27.3	
Undecided	75.0	25.0	30.0	26.4	19.5	21.1	
23. Merit pay would encourage good teachers to stay in the profession.							
Agree	75.0	35.0	42.3	52.1	49.8	46.6	#
Disagree	25.0	45.0	28.5	28.4	30.7	32.9	
Undecided		20.0	29.2	19.5	19.5	20.5	
24. "Politics" would influence merit pay programs.							
Agree	75.0	60.0	61.5	61.3	66.7	62.1	#
Disagree	20.0	15.4	12.7	13.5	14.8	14.8	
Undecided	25.0	20.0	23.1	26.0	19.8	23.0	
25. The use of merit pay would improve the quality of instruction.							
Agree	50.0	15.0	18.5	27.1	25.7	26.8	#
Disagree	25.0	55.0	46.9	38.0	48.8	47.7	
Undecided	25.0	30.0	34.6	34.9	25.4	25.5	
26. Merit pay would cause teachers to compromise their individuality in order to please the evaluator.							
Agree	50.0	35.0	30.8	29.5	38.3	39.1	#
Disagree	50.0	40.0	40.0	44.2	37.0	39.5	
Undecided		25.0	29.2	26.4	24.8	21.4	

TABLE 10 Continued

GROUP III: POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF MERIT PAY

Type of Response to Item	Percentage						P Value
	1-4	5-9	10-14	15-19	20-24	25 or over	
27. Salary increases based upon merit pay would encourage young people to enter the teaching profession.							
Agree	25.0	25.0	24.6	30.1	28.4	26.8	#
Disagree	25.0	50.0	48.5	40.4	48.2	51.6	
Undecided	50.0	25.0	26.9	29.5	23.4	21.6	
28. Merit pay would initiate a breach between administrator and teacher in professional relationships.							
Agree	25.0	35.0	34.6	34.2	39.6	44.5	#
Disagree	25.0	45.0	42.3	35.6	35.6	36.8	
Undecided	50.0	20.0	23.1	30.1	24.8	18.8	
29. Teachers not receiving merit increments would increase their efforts.							
Agree	25.0	15.0	14.6	22.6	19.5	17.9	#
Disagree	25.0	60.0	44.6	44.2	50.2	53.0	
Undecided	50.0	25.0	40.8	33.2	30.4	29.1	
30. A merit pay program would cause an undesirable strain on teachers when evaluators visit the classroom.							
Agree	50.0	40.0	30.0	29.1	34.3	35.4	#
Disagree	50.0	50.0	46.9	54.5	50.5	47.3	
Undecided		10.0	23.1	16.4	15.2	17.3	
31. Merit pay would help professionalize teachers.							
Agree	25.0	30.0	17.7	26.4	24.8	24.1	#
Disagree	25.0	65.0	56.9	51.0	57.8	56.6	
Undecided	50.0	5.0	25.4	22.6	17.5	19.3	
32. Teachers denied merit increments would become professionally demoralized.							
Agree	25.0	45.0	37.7	42.8	48.5	50.4	#
Disagree	25.0	30.0	23.8	24.3	26.1	25.9	
Undecided	50.0	25.0	38.5	32.9	25.4	23.8	
33. Merit pay would stimulate individual self-evaluation among educators.							
Agree	50.0	35.0	40.0	46.2	45.2	43.9	#
Disagree	25.0	55.0	28.5	28.1	33.7	33.9	
Undecided	25.0	10.0	31.5	25.7	21.1	22.1	
34. Teachers not receiving merit increments would limit their efforts.							
Agree	25.0	30.0	30.8	30.1	38.0	38.4	#
Disagree	50.0	40.0	31.5	34.6	33.0	33.4	
Undecided	25.0	30.0	37.7	35.3	29.0	28.2	

Expected frequencies too small for valid chi-square test

An examination of Table 10 reveals the responses of agreement for all 6 groups vary more than 20% on 15 of the 34 statements. Items 2, 8, 17, 18, and 27 had a variance of less than 10% in responses of agreement.

Item 27 produced the smallest percentage difference in responses of agreement of 3.8%. Respondents in the 15 to 19 years category expressed the largest percentage of agreement, 30.1%, for the statement that salary increases based upon merit pay would encourage young people to enter the teaching profession.

Item 3, which states that merit pay for salary purposes is inevitable, was found to have the largest percentage of difference in responses of agreement, 75.0%. This opinion was expressed by educators in the 1 to 4 years of experience category. Respondents in the 5 to 9 years of experience group had the least agreement for this item, 25.0%.

Application of the chi-square test failed to produce any significant percentage differences in the category of years of experience as an educator.

Responses Classified According to Years of Experience as Principal

The background factor of years of experience as a principal was studied as a possible variable in determining attitudes toward merit pay. Respondents were placed into four groups according to the number of years of experience as a principal.

Table 11 shows that the responses of the four groups varied less than 5% on Items 3, 4, 8, 9, 12, 13, 15, 17, 24, 27, and 30. Item 8, which states that merit pay would only be necessary in times of teacher shortages, produced the smallest variance, 1.2%, in responses of agreement among the four groups. However, over 85% of all the respondents disagreed with this statement.

For Item 1, the majority of respondents with less than 20 years of experience as a principal agreed that a fair way to reward outstanding teaching is by the granting of merit increments. The group least in agreement, 40.8%, were the respondents with 20 years or more experience, of which 43.7% disagreed with this statement.

In response to Item 10, the percentages in each group showed marked disagreement that merit pay is a disguised attempt at discrimination through merit increments. The 20 years and over group were most in agreement, 19.0%, while the 4 years and under group were least in agreement, 9.9%.

The majority of the respondents was in agreement with Item 14, which states that merit pay should be subsidized by the state. Respondents with 20 years or more of experience agreed the least with this statement, 74.1%. The group most in agreement, 85.5%, were the respondents with 5 years or less experience as a principal.

The percentage difference in responses of agreement among the four groups was fairly small for Item 17, ranging from 52.5% for the group with the least experience to 56.9% for the group with the most experience. All of the groups were of the opinion that a merit

system should be organized so as to permit an appeal by teachers who are denied a merit increment.

In response to Item 19, the percentages in each group showed disagreement that a merit program would tend to assure the taxpayers better education for their children. The 4 years and under group were in agreement the most, 25.8%, with the 5 to 9 years group in agreement the least, 17.4%. The respondents with 10 to 19 years and 20 or more years of experience as a principal were very close in agreement, 20.8% and 20.7% respectively.

The majority of respondents was in agreement with Item 20, which states that teachers who receive merit increments would be subjected to resentment by professional associates. This item was found to have the largest variance in responses of agreement of 15.9%. The group most in agreement were the respondents in the 10 to 19 years category, 69.5%, and the group least in agreement were those with under 5 years of experience, 53.6%.

For Item 21, the majority of the respondents agreed that merit pay would encourage professional growth. Respondents whose experience was 4 years or less showed the most agreement, 51.9%, and those with 10 to 19 years of experience expressed the least agreement, 40.8%.

Although the majority of respondents disagreed with Item 27, which states that salary increases based upon merit pay would encourage young people to enter the teaching profession, respondents with less than 5 years of experience agreed the most, 31.6%. Respondents least in agreement were the group with 5 to 9 years of experience,

TABLE 11

RESPONSES TO ITEMS ACCORDING TO YEARS OF EXPERIENCE AS A PRINCIPAL

GROUP 1: PREMISES RELATIVE TO MERIT PAY

Type of Response to Item	Percentage				P Value
	0 - 4	5 - 9	10-19	20 or over	
1. A fair way to reward outstanding teaching is by the granting of merit increments.					
Agree	48.7	44.6	41.6	40.8	0.01 **
Disagree	29.9	34.8	40.8	43.7	
Undecided	21.4	20.7	17.5	15.5	
2. The teaching profession is losing good teachers because of the lack of a merit system.					
Agree	27.0	21.3	18.6	20.7	0.08
Disagree	60.6	66.6	70.9	69.0	
Undecided	12.5	12.1	10.5	10.3	
3. Merit pay for salary purposes is inevitable.					
Agree	38.8	37.7	37.5	39.7	0.56
Disagree	38.8	40.0	44.3	42.5	
Undecided	22.3	22.3	18.1	17.8	
4. Only the inferior teacher will fear merit pay.					
Agree	11.9	9.8	9.9	9.2	0.77
Disagree	80.9	84.3	82.1	85.1	
Undecided	7.2	5.9	8.0	5.7	
5. Merit pay is really an effort on the part of state officials to keep taxes down.					
Agree	7.0	10.8	11.1	16.1	0.09
Disagree	68.1	64.3	65.8	60.3	
Undecided	24.9	24.9	23.1	23.6	
6. Merit pay and teacher tenure are incompatible.					
Agree	25.2	28.5	32.0	24.7	0.18
Disagree	56.5	55.4	54.8	56.3	
Undecided	18.3	16.1	13.2	19.0	
7. With adequate salaries, merit pay would be unnecessary.					
Agree	56.8	62.0	62.1	60.3	0.29
Disagree	35.1	26.9	28.0	30.5	
Undecided	8.1	11.1	9.9	9.2	
8. Merit pay would only be necessary in times of teacher shortages.					
Agree	5.2	5.2	3.3	4.0	0.70
Disagree	84.1	86.2	86.4	84.5	
Undecided	10.7	8.5	10.3	11.5	
9. High salaries for outstanding teacher performance are justifiable.					
Agree	79.1	79.7	82.5	81.6	0.79
Disagree	11.0	12.1	10.7	10.9	
Undecided	9.9	8.2	6.8	7.5	
10. Merit pay is a disguised attempt at discrimination through merit increments.					
Agree	9.9	12.5	14.2	19.0	0.05 *
Disagree	71.0	74.1	70.1	65.5	
Undecided	19.1	13.4	15.7	15.5	

TABLE 11 Continued

GROUP II: POLICIES CONCERNING MERIT PAY

Type of Response to Item	Percentage				P Value
	0 - 4	5 - 9	10-19	20 or over	
11. Administrators in the state of Florida are adequately qualified by professional training and experience to administer a merit pay program.					
Agree	25.5	28.5	29.3	33.3	0.67
Disagree	51.3	50.8	48.7	46.6	
Undecided	23.2	20.7	22.1	20.1	
12. There should be a limit to the number of teachers receiving merit increments in a school system in any one year.					
Agree	11.9	13.4	12.4	13.8	0.20
Disagree	76.5	76.7	76.9	82.2	
Undecided	11.6	9.8	10.7	4.0	
13. Merit increments should be permanent rather than on an annual basis.					
Agree	7.8	7.2	10.9	10.9	0.44
Disagree	82.3	83.0	77.7	79.9	
Undecided	9.9	9.8	11.3	9.2	
14. Merit pay should be subsidized by the state.					
Agree	85.8	80.0	80.4	74.1	0.03 *
Disagree	5.2	8.9	9.9	13.2	
Undecided	9.0	11.1	9.7	12.6	
15. A teacher should be eligible for a merit increment as soon as outstanding teaching has been demonstrated.					
Agree	60.9	64.3	61.4	64.9	0.36
Disagree	22.0	21.0	25.6	24.1	
Undecided	17.1	14.8	13.0	10.9	
16. Only school administrators should rate teachers for merit increments.					
Agree	17.7	21.0	16.7	21.8	0.53
Disagree	70.4	65.2	68.7	65.5	
Undecided	11.9	13.8	14.6	12.6	
17. A merit system should be organized so as to permit an appeal by teachers who are denied a merit increment.					
Agree	52.5	54.4	53.2	56.9	0.04 *
Disagree	28.4	34.8	34.0	28.7	
Undecided	19.1	10.8	12.8	14.4	
18. Teachers should have the opportunity to assist in planning and administering merit pay in their respective systems.					
Agree	77.7	80.0	75.1	73.6	0.11
Disagree	11.0	13.8	15.7	17.8	
Undecided	11.3	6.2	9.3	8.6	

TABLE 11 Continued

GROUP III: POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF MERIT PAY

Type of Response to Item	Percentage				P Value
	0 - 4	5 - 9	10-19	20 or over	
19. A merit pay program would tend to assure the taxpayers better education for their children.					
Agree	25.8	17.4	20.8	20.7	0.02 *
Disagree	56.8	57.4	61.6	62.1	
Undecided	17.4	25.2	17.5	17.2	
20. Teachers who receive merit increments would be subjected to resentment by professional associates.					
Agree	53.6	63.3	69.5	64.9	0.01 **
Disagree	22.3	18.4	16.5	18.4	
Undecided	24.1	18.4	14.0	16.7	
21. Merit pay would encourage professional growth.					
Agree	51.9	49.8	40.8	46.6	0.01 **
Disagree	28.1	25.6	36.7	34.5	
Undecided	20.0	24.6	22.5	19.0	
22. Cooperation among teachers would be reduced by a merit pay program.					
Agree	43.2	47.2	53.8	52.9	0.06
Disagree	29.9	28.2	26.6	25.3	
Undecided	27.0	24.6	19.6	21.8	
23. Merit pay would encourage good teachers to stay in the profession.					
Agree	53.9	45.6	46.4	45.4	0.32
Disagree	27.2	33.8	31.8	32.2	
Undecided	18.8	20.7	21.9	22.4	
24. "Politics" would influence merit pay programs.					
Agree	63.8	60.3	64.5	61.5	0.56
Disagree	13.0	14.8	13.0	18.4	
Undecided	23.2	24.9	22.5	20.1	
25. The use of merit pay would improve the quality of instruction.					
Agree	29.9	23.6	24.1	25.3	0.07
Disagree	41.4	42.6	49.9	48.3	
Undecided	28.7	33.8	26.0	26.4	
26. Merit pay would cause teachers to compromise their individuality in order to please the evaluator.					
Agree	31.3	36.7	36.1	43.1	0.21
Disagree	44.1	40.7	38.8	34.5	
Undecided	24.6	22.6	25.2	22.4	

TABLE 11 *Continued*

GROUP III: POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF MERIT PAY					
Type of Response to Item	Percentage				P Value
	0 - 4	5 - 9	10-19	20 or over	
27. Salary increases based upon merit pay would encourage young people to enter the teaching profession.					
Agree	31.6	24.6	27.0	27.0	0.05 *
Disagree	40.9	48.9	51.8	49.4	
Undecided	27.5	26.6	21.2	23.6	
28. Merit pay would initiate a breach between administrator and teacher in professional relationships.					
Agree	34.8	36.7	45.6	39.7	0.04 *
Disagree	38.8	37.4	34.8	37.9	
Undecided	26.4	25.9	19.6	22.4	
29. Teachers not receiving merit increments would increase their efforts.					
Agree	23.8	20.0	16.3	14.9	0.01 **
Disagree	40.6	47.5	55.5	54.6	
Undecided	35.7	32.5	28.2	30.5	
30. A merit pay program would cause an undesirable strain on teachers when evaluators visit the classroom.					
Agree	32.8	30.8	34.4	35.6	0.87
Disagree	50.7	52.5	48.5	46.0	
Undecided	16.5	16.7	17.1	18.4	
31. Merit pay would help professionalize teachers.					
Agree	27.2	24.9	21.0	25.9	0.05 *
Disagree	49.6	53.4	61.0	56.9	
Undecided	23.2	21.6	17.9	17.2	
32. Teachers denied merit increments would become professionally demoralized.					
Agree	38.3	46.6	53.0	47.1	0.01 **
Disagree	27.5	25.2	23.1	28.2	
Undecided	34.2	28.2	23.9	24.7	
33. Merit pay would stimulate individual self-evaluation among educators.					
Agree	47.5	44.6	41.2	45.4	0.12
Disagree	26.7	31.5	36.9	32.2	
Undecided	25.8	23.9	21.9	22.4	
34. Teachers not receiving merit increments would limit their efforts.					
Agree	31.9	31.5	39.8	37.9	0.15
Disagree	34.8	36.4	30.5	34.5	
Undecided	33.3	32.1	29.7	27.6	

** Significant at .01 level

* Significant at .05 level

24.6%. There was a consensus of agreement between the two groups with the most experience, 27.0%.

Respondents with 10 years or more experience agreed that merit pay would initiate a breach between administrator and teacher in professional relationships, while respondents with 9 years and less experience disagreed with this statement. The group least in agreement with Item 28 were those in the 4 years or less category, 34.8%. The group most in agreement were those in the 10 to 19 years of experience category, 45.6%.

In response to Item 29, the majority of all four groups disagreed that teachers not receiving merit increments would increase their efforts. It is interesting to note that the two groups with the least experience, 9 years or less, had a higher percentage of agreement than the two groups with the most experience of 10 years or more. The responses of agreement ranged from 23.8% for the 4 years or less category to 14.9% for the 20 years or more category, with a percentage difference of agreement of 8.9%.

For Item 31, over 55% of all the respondents disagreed with the statement that merit pay would help professionalize teachers. The greatest percentage of agreement, 27.2%, was expressed by the group with 4 years or less experience. The least support given to this statement was by the respondents in the group with 10 to 19 years of experience, 21.0%.

The majority of all four groups agreed that teachers denied merit increments would become professionally demoralized. For Item 32, the

largest percentage of agreement, 53.0%, was expressed by those in the group of 10 to 19 years of experience. Respondents in the group of under 5 years of experience gave this statement the least support, with 38.3% agreeing.

Table 11 shows that significant chi-squares were produced on 12 of the 34 statements by grouping the respondents according to years of experience as a principal.

Responses Classified
According to Years of Experience as Superintendent

Years of experience as a superintendent was the final background factor studied in the determination of attitudes toward merit pay. Respondents were placed into four groups according to the number of years of experience as a superintendent.

An examination of Table 12 reveals that Items 4, 8, and 32 had a variance of less than 5% in responses of agreement. Item 32 produced the smallest percentage difference in responses of agreement of 3.3%. The majority of the respondents agreed that teachers denied merit increments would become professionally demoralized.

Item 15, which states that a teacher should be eligible for a merit increment as soon as outstanding teaching has been demonstrated, was found to have the largest percentage of difference in responses of agreement, 66.7%.

For Item 7, over 60% of the respondents expressed the belief that with adequate salaries, merit pay would be unnecessary. The greatest percentage of agreement, 100%, was expressed by those

TABLE 12

RESPONSES TO ITEMS ACCORDING TO YEARS OF EXPERIENCE AS A SUPERINTENDENT

GROUP 1: PREMISES RELATIVE TO MERIT PAY

Type of Response to Item	Percentage				P Value
	0 - 4	5 - 9	10-19	20 or over	
1. A fair way to reward outstanding teaching is by the granting of merit increments.					
Agree	44.0	46.7	50.0	33.3	#
Disagree	36.8	33.3	41.7	66.7	
Undecided	19.2	20.0	8.3		
2. The teaching profession is losing good teachers because of the lack of a merit system.					
Agree	22.0	13.3	8.3		#
Disagree	66.9	66.7	50.0	100.0	
Undecided	11.1	20.0	41.7		
3. Merit pay for salary purposes is inevitable.					
Agree	38.0	40.0	50.0	50.0	#
Disagree	41.7	53.3	16.7	50.0	
Undecided	20.3	6.7	33.3		
4. Only the inferior teacher will fear merit pay.					
Agree	10.5	6.7			#
Disagree	82.4	93.3	91.7	100.0	
Undecided	7.1		8.3		
5. Merit pay is really an effort on the part of state officials to keep taxes down.					
Agree	10.7	6.7	8.3	16.7	#
Disagree	65.1	80.0	66.7	66.7	
Undecided	24.2	13.3	25.0	16.7	
6. Merit pay and teacher tenure are incompatible.					
Agree	28.6	20.0	8.3	50.0	#
Disagree	55.6	66.7	50.0	33.3	
Undecided	15.8	13.3	41.7	16.7	
7. With adequate salaries, merit pay would be unnecessary.					
Agree	60.5	53.3	41.7	100.0	#
Disagree	29.9	33.3	41.7		
Undecided	9.6	13.3	16.7		
8. Merit pay would only be necessary in times of teacher shortages.					
Agree	4.5				#
Disagree	85.4	93.3	83.3	83.3	
Undecided	10.1	6.7	16.7	16.7	
9. High salaries for outstanding teacher performance are justifiable.					
Agree	80.9	80.0	83.3	66.7	#
Disagree	11.1	13.3	8.3	33.3	
Undecided	8.1	6.7	8.3		
10. Merit pay is a disguised attempt at discrimination through merit increments.					
Agree	13.1	20.0	16.7	33.3	#
Disagree	70.8	66.7	66.7	50.0	
Undecided	16.1	13.3	16.7	16.7	

TABLE 12 Continued

GROUP II: POLICIES CONCERNING MERIT PAY					
Type of Response to Item	Percentage				P Value
	0 - 4	5 - 9	10-19	20 or over	
11. Administrators in the state of Florida are adequately qualified by professional training and experience to administer a merit pay program.					
Agree	28.9	20.0	25.0		#
Disagree	49.7	46.7	25.0	83.3	
Undecided	21.4	33.3	50.0	16.7	
12. There should be a limit to the number of teachers receiving merit increments in a school system in any one year.					
Agree	12.7		25.0	16.7	#
Disagree	77.7	93.3	33.3	66.7	
Undecided	9.6	6.7	41.7	16.7	
13. Merit increments should be permanent rather than on an annual basis.					
Agree	9.3	6.7		16.7	#
Disagree	80.2	93.3	91.7	83.3	
Undecided	10.5		8.3		
14. Merit pay should be subsidized by the state.					
Agree	80.9	86.7	91.7	50.0	#
Disagree	8.7	13.3	8.3	33.3	
Undecided	10.4			16.7	
15. A teacher should be eligible for a merit increment as soon as outstanding teaching has been demonstrated.					
Agree	62.4	46.7	100.0	33.3	#
Disagree	23.2	40.0		66.7	
Undecided	14.4	13.3			
16. Only school administrators should rate teachers for merit increments.					
Agree	18.6	26.7	16.7	16.7	#
Disagree	68.1	60.0	58.3	66.7	
Undecided	13.3	13.3	25.0	16.7	
17. A merit system should be organized so as to permit an appeal by teachers who are denied a merit increment.					
Agree	53.8	46.7	50.0	83.3	#
Disagree	32.1	33.3	25.0	16.7	
Undecided	14.1	20.0	25.0		
18. Teachers should have the opportunity to assist in planning and administering merit pay in their respective systems.					
Agree	77.0	66.7	66.7	66.7	#
Disagree	13.9	33.3	16.7	33.3	
Undecided	9.1		16.7		

TABLE 12 Continued

GROUP III: POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF MERIT PAY

Type of Response to Item	Percentage				P Value
	0 - 4	5 - 9	10-19	20 or over	
19. A merit pay program would tend to assure the taxpayers better education for their children.					
Agree	21.2	26.7	33.3		#
Disagree	59.4	60.0	58.3	66.7	
Undecided	19.4	13.3	8.3	33.3	
20. Teachers who receive merit increments would be subjected to resentment by professional associates.					
Agree	63.1	66.7	66.7	83.3	#
Disagree	18.9	6.7	16.7	16.7	
Undecided	18.0	26.7	16.7		
21. Merit pay would encourage professional growth.					
Agree	46.7	53.3	41.7	16.7	#
Disagree	31.6	20.0	25.0	66.7	
Undecided	21.7	26.7	33.3	16.7	
22. Cooperation among teachers would be reduced by a merit pay program.					
Agree	49.1	60.0	58.3	50.0	#
Disagree	27.7	26.7	16.7	33.3	
Undecided	23.1	13.3	25.0	16.7	
23. Merit pay would encourage good teachers to stay in the profession.					
Agree	48.7	26.7	33.3		#
Disagree	30.6	53.3	33.3	83.3	
Undecided	20.8	20.0	33.3	16.7	
24. "Politics" would influence merit pay programs.					
Agree	62.8	86.7	41.7	83.3	#
Disagree	14.0	13.3	25.0	16.7	
Undecided	23.2		33.3		
25. The use of merit pay would improve the quality of instruction.					
Agree	25.5	33.3	41.7		#
Disagree	45.7	40.0	41.7	83.3	
Undecided	28.8	26.7	16.7	16.7	
26. Merit pay would cause teachers to compromise their individuality in order to please the evaluator.					
Agree	36.0	40.0	8.3	66.7	#
Disagree	40.0	40.0	50.0	33.3	
Undecided	24.1	20.0	41.7		

TABLE 12 Continued

GROUP III: POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF MERIT PAY

Type of Response to Item	Percentage				P Value
	0 - 4	5 - 9	10-19	20 or over	
27. Salary increases based upon merit pay would encourage young people to enter the teaching profession.					
Agree	27.8	40.0	8.3		#
Disagree	47.6	53.3	50.0	100.0	
Undecided	24.6	6.7	41.7		
28. Merit pay would initiate a breach between administrator and teacher in professional relationships.					
Agree	39.9	40.0	41.7	33.3	#
Disagree	36.8	33.3	41.7	50.0	
Undecided	23.3	26.7	16.7	16.7	
29. Teachers not receiving merit increments would increase their efforts.					
Agree	19.0	33.3	8.3		#
Disagree	49.4	53.3	58.3	66.7	
Undecided	31.7	13.3	33.3	33.3	
30. A merit pay program would cause an undesirable strain on teachers when evaluators visit the classroom.					
Agree	33.2	33.3	33.3	50.0	#
Disagree	49.5	66.7	58.3	33.3	
Undecided	17.3		8.3	16.7	
31. Merit pay would help professionalize teachers.					
Agree	24.1	33.3	25.0	16.7	#
Disagree	55.6	60.0	50.0	66.7	
Undecided	20.2	6.7	25.0	16.7	
32. Teachers denied merit increments would become professionally demoralized.					
Agree	46.8	46.7	50.0	50.0	#
Disagree	25.2	33.3	50.0	16.7	
Undecided	28.1	20.0		33.3	
33. Merit pay would stimulate individual self-evaluation among educators.					
Agree	44.4	53.3	41.7		#
Disagree	32.0	26.7	41.7	100.0	
Undecided	23.7	20.0	16.7		
34. Teachers not receiving merit increments would limit their efforts.					
Agree	35.7	33.3	16.7	50.0	#
Disagree	33.5	26.7	50.0	16.7	
Undecided	30.8	40.0	33.3	33.3	

Expected frequencies too small for valid chi-square test

respondents in the 20 years and over category. The least support, 41.7%, given to this statement was by those respondents in the 10 to 19 years of experience group, for a percentage difference of agreement of 58.3%.

Application of the chi-square test failed to produce any significant percentage differences in the category of years of experience as a superintendent.

Personal Experience and Reaction to Merit Pay

The last section of the questionnaire asked for the respondent's personal experience and reaction to the issue of merit pay. Three major issues were addressed.

First, the respondents were asked, "If your school system were to adopt a merit plan, which person or persons would you want to participate in the evaluation of teaching performance?" Table 13 shows the reaction of the respondents to this question. Over 96% of the respondents indicated that the principal should participate in the evaluation of teaching performance. The position of supervisor was the second choice of the respondents with over 74% responding affirmatively, and over 63% chose fellow teachers to participate in the evaluation process. Almost 55% of the respondents believed that the teacher (self) should take part in the evaluation. Only 16% to 21% of the respondents were of the opinion that pupils, superintendents, and lay persons should be included in the process of evaluation. (See Appendix F for further analysis of responses according to background factors.)

TABLE 13

RESPONSES TO PARTICIPANTS IN THE EVALUATION
OF TEACHING PERFORMANCE

Evaluator	Yes	No	Percentage Yes
Principal	1,258	51	96.1
Supervisor	978	331	74.7
Fellow Teachers	836	473	63.9
Teacher (self)	716	593	54.7
Pupils	275	1,034	21.0
Superintendent	247	1,062	18.9
Lay Person	228	1,081	17.4

After the person or persons who should participate in the evaluation process has been established, it then becomes necessary to determine the criteria for evaluating teacher performance. The respondents were asked to select five criteria from the provided list and rank order them in order of importance. From the data supplied by this ranking process, it was possible to arrive at the mean and a ranked list of the eleven criteria. The criterion with the lower mean ranked the highest overall and the higher mean ranked the lowest overall.

TABLE 14

RANKINGS OF CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE

Rank	Criteria	Number	Means
1	Quality of Instruction	1,295	1.14
2	Pupil Growth (test scores)	849	2.94
3	Inter-Personal Relations	820	3.16
4	Professional Growth	923	3.39
5	Outstanding Professional Contribution and Achievement	577	3.65
6	Scholarship	558	3.66
7	Personality	278	3.72
8	Pupil Opinion and Reaction	311	3.75
9	Teaching Load	190	3.78
10	Experience	477	3.81
11	Community Participation and Service	158	4.27

Table 14 reveals that the respondents believed that "Quality of Instruction" and "Pupil Growth (test scores)" were the two most important criteria for evaluating teaching performance. "Community Participation and Service" was the least important criteria indicated by the respondents. (See Appendix G for further analysis of responses according to background factors.)

The last question that was asked of the respondents was, "Is there a merit provision in the salary schedule of the school district with which you are associated?" Of the 1,309 total respondents, 99 or 7.6% reported having a merit provision. From those who reported yes, 34 or 34.3% indicated that the merit pay plan was totally acceptable to them. Thirty-seven or 37.4% reported that their merit pay plans were acceptable in part, while 28 or 28.3% expressed that the plan was not acceptable to them.

Table 15 shows that the majority of the respondents did not have a merit pay plan in their school district. Table 16 discloses that, of those reporting merit pay plans, the majority of respondents were satisfied in part with these plans.

TABLE 15

RESPONSES TO MERIT PAY PLANS IN EXISTENCE

	Yes	No	Percentage Yes
Superintendents	2	45	4.3
Principals	97	1,165	7.7

TABLE 16

RESPONSES TO ACCEPTABILITY OF CURRENT MERIT PAY PLANS

	Yes	No	In Part
Superintendents	2	0	0
Principals	32	28	37

Summary of Significant Items

In the previous presentation of data, background factors were reported in relation to responses of opinion items. As shown in Table 17, there were 12 significant chi-squares produced for the background factor of years of experience as a principal and 10 for the factor of school classification. There were 7 significant chi-squares for the factor of age, 4 for sex, 2 for marital status, and only 1 for the background factor of present position. Significant chi-squares could not be produced for the background factors of years of experience as an educator and years of experience as a superintendent because of the small number of observations in some categories.

The section on the questionnaire titled "Possible Effects of Merit Pay" was checked according to significant values of chi-squares

for each opinion statement, for each background factor, and tabulated. Chi-squares were obtained on 22 items in this section. Items 19 and 28 produced 3 significant values of chi-square. There were two significant chi-squares for Items 20, 21, 23, 27, 31, and 32. Items 22, 25, 26, and 29 each had one significant value of chi-square.

The section on the questionnaire titled "Premises Relative to Merit Pay" produced seven significant chi-squares. Item 1 produced 3 significant values of chi-square. Two of the chi-squares were obtained on Item 2. Items 3 and 10 each had one significant value of chi-square.

Responses to items under "Policies Concerning Merit Pay" produced seven significant chi-squares. Three of the chi-squares were obtained on Item 17. Item 15 produced two significant values of chi-square. Items 13 and 14 each had one significant value of chi-square.

TABLE 17

SIGNIFICANT RELATIONSHIPS IN ATTITUDES TOWARD MERIT PAY
BY DEMOGRAPHIC DATA

Item Number		Level of Significance
SEX		
	2	.05
	13	.05
	15	.05
	19	.05
MARITAL STATUS		
	3	.01
	23	.05
AGE		
	1	.01
	17	.01
	20	.05
	22	.01
	25	.01
	26	.05
	28	.05
PRESENT POSITION		
	32	.01
SCHOOL CLASSIFICATION		
	1	.01
	2	.05
	15	.01
	17	.01
	19	.01
	21	.05
	23	.05
	27	.05
	28	.01
	31	.01

TABLE 17 Continued

Item Number	Level of Significance
YEARS OF EXPERIENCE AS PRINCIPAL	
1	.01
10	.05
14	.05
17	.05
19	.05
20	.01
21	.01
27	.05
28	.05
29	.01
31	.05
32	.01

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Summary

In the summer of 1983, the Florida Legislature passed a bill enacting a merit compensation program for teachers. The plan was designed "to increase the performance of public school students and to provide economic incentives to attract and retain qualified instructional personnel" (Florida Senate Bill No. 38-B, 1983).

The 1984 Florida Legislature amended the Florida Meritorious Instructional Personnel Program to establish the State Master Teacher Program which provides incentive awards for qualified instructional personnel. The purpose of the program is to recognize superior ability among Florida's instructional personnel and to provide an economic incentive to such personnel to continue in public school instruction. A person may participate in the program as an associate master teacher or as a master teacher; participation is on a voluntary basis (1984 Supplement to Florida Statutes 1983).

With the announcement of the legislature's intent to enact a merit pay program in Florida, educators in general began to exhibit a tremendous amount of apprehension and concern in regard to the implementation of a merit pay plan. It became apparent from this initial impression that without the knowledge of educator's attitudes

toward merit pay, a program in Florida possibly could be defeated before its inception.

Drawing from this background information the idea for this study was developed. The primary purpose of this study was to identify the attitudes of superintendents and principals in Florida toward the concept of merit pay.

The evaluation instrument used for the collection of data was a questionnaire that was developed and validated by Rometo in 1961. For this study, the instrument consisted of 34 statements and 4 questions related to merit pay. Respondents to the questionnaire were asked to evaluate each item listed according to a three-point scale; agree, disagree, and undecided.

During the 1983-84 school year, the instrument was mailed to a total of 1,990 educators in the state of Florida. Included in the sample were all 67 district superintendents and 1,923 selected principals. Usable returns were obtained from 47 superintendents and 1,262 principals.

The responses were tabulated and analyzed by a computer which was programmed to evaluate responses for each of the 34 statements in terms of eight demographic variables used as a basis for testing eight hypotheses. This process was completed by the use of the chi-square test for significant differences, with a .05 level chosen as the acceptable level of significance, and the Cochran's Q test for related observations to opinion responses.

Summary of Findings

This study examined the differences in attitudes of principals and superintendents toward merit pay according to eight demographic variables.

The hypothesis relating to years of experience as a principal produced 12 significant chi-squares, of which 11 were similar in the degree of response agreement and disagreement. Only Item 28 produced a difference in attitudes. The majority of principals with 10 years or more experience agreed that merit pay would initiate a breach between administrator and teacher in professional relationships, while the majority of principals with 9 years or less experience disagreed with this statement.

In reference to school classification, 10 items were significant for this hypothesis. Again, Item 28 produced the only significant difference in attitudes. The majority of elementary school respondents agreed with the statement, middle school and junior high school respondents disagreed, while those in high school were almost even in their response of agreement and disagreement.

The hypothesis concerning age classification produced seven significant chi-squares, of which only three were similar in the degree of response agreement and disagreement. For Item 1, the majority of educators 56 years of age or over disagreed that a fair way to reward outstanding teaching is by the granting of merit increments, while those 55 years of age and under agreed with this statement. Item 17 also produced a difference in attitudes between the age

classifications. The majority of educators 36 years of age or over agreed that a merit system should be organized so as to permit an appeal by teachers who are denied a merit increment, while the 35 years and under group disagreed. Item 26, which states that merit pay would cause teachers to compromise their individuality in order to please the evaluator, had a three-way difference of opinion. Educators 26 to 45 years of age disagreed with the statement, those in the 46 to 55 year group were almost even in their percentage of agreement and disagreement, and the majority of the 56 years of age and over group responded favorably. Item 28 also produced a difference in responses according to age. Educators 46 years of age and over agreed that merit pay would make a difference in professional relationships between administrator and teacher, while those 45 years and under did not believe merit pay would make a difference.

In reference to sex classification, only four significant chi-squares were produced for this hypothesis. Items 2, 13, 15, and 19 were all similar in the percentage of response of agreement and disagreement, with varying degrees of intensity between the responses of males and females. For Items 2 and 13, females had a higher percentage of disagreement than males. For Item 15, males had the higher percentage of agreement, and the sexes split evenly on disagreement for Item 19.

The hypothesis relating to marital status produced two chi-squares of significant differences. The majority of married educators disagreed with Item 3, which states that merit pay for salary purposes

is inevitable, while those in the single and other category agreed with this statement. For Item 23, the married and other category were of the opinion that merit pay would encourage good teachers to stay in the profession, while single educators were not of this belief.

Only one significant chi-square was found for the hypothesis relating to the attitudes of principals and superintendents toward merit pay. Both positions agreed that teachers denied merit increments would become professionally demoralized, however, superintendents disagreed to a greater degree with this statement than principals.

The two hypotheses relating to years of experience as an educator and years of experience as a superintendent failed to produce any chi-squares of significance due to the small number of observations in some categories.

In the last section of the questionnaire, the overwhelming majority of educators indicated that the principal should participate in the evaluation of teaching performance. The position of supervisor was the second choice and fellow teachers was third.

The highest ranking criteria for evaluating teaching performance selected by educators was quality of instruction and pupil test scores. The lowest ranking criteria was community participation and service.

The majority of the respondents did not have a merit pay plan in their school district. Of the total responding population, 99 educators reported having an existing merit pay provision in their school system, of which only 34 indicated that the plan was totally acceptable to them.

Conclusions

Despite the widespread apprehension surrounding the issue of merit pay, this study concludes that much agreement seems to exist among the composite attitudes of principals and superintendents in the state of Florida with regard to premises relative to merit pay, policies concerning merit pay, and possible effects of merit pay.

Principals and superintendents in Florida public schools favored the philosophy of merit pay. They agreed with the basic premise of merit pay, which is to reward outstanding teaching with merit increments. In this study, the educators concurred that high salaries for outstanding teacher performance are justifiable and should be subsidized by the state. However, they did believe that if teachers were paid adequate salaries merit pay programs would be unnecessary.

Principals and superintendents were in agreement on several policies concerning merit pay. They favored the idea that teachers should have input in planning and administering merit pay programs. Both groups also concurred that a teacher should be eligible for merit pay as soon as outstanding teaching has been demonstrated and that no limit be placed on the number of teachers able to receive an incentive. In addition, educators believed that merit increments should not be considered permanent and that teachers who are denied merit pay should have the right to an appeal.

A concern of principals and superintendents about merit pay was the issue of implementation and administration. They were of the opinion that administrators in the state of Florida were not

adequately qualified by professional training and experience to administer a merit pay program. Additionally, both groups were against the idea of school administrators being the sole evaluators of teachers. The evaluation of teaching performance should include a team approach consisting of the principal, the supervisor, fellow teachers, as well as the teacher being evaluated.

Another concern expressed by the educators in this study was the possible negative effects of merit pay. Principals and superintendents strongly believed that "politics" would have an influence on merit pay programs in the state of Florida. However, their primary concern was that teachers who receive merit increments would be subjected to resentment by professional associates and those who are denied the awards would become professionally demoralized. Also, they believed that the implementation of a merit pay program would reduce cooperation among teachers as well as hinder the professionalization of teachers.

Even though the majority of educators were of the belief that merit pay would not assure taxpayers better education for their children, both groups shared similar attitudes toward the positive effects of merit pay. They agreed that merit pay would encourage professional growth of teachers, encourage good teachers to stay in the profession, and stimulate individual self-evaluation among educators.

Recommendations

There is a distinct possibility that teachers in the state of Florida might express entirely different attitudes concerning merit pay from those obtained by principals and superintendents. Therefore, a similar state-wide study should be conducted to examine the attitudes of Florida teachers.

Another recommendation would be to replicate this study in other states considering merit pay programs for cross-validation purposes. It would be beneficial for states contemplating a merit pay system to gather attitudinal data in order to facilitate the planning and implementation of such programs.

Also, there exists the need for a national study to determine the attitudes of teachers, principals, and superintendents toward the various aspects of merit pay. Through such an investigation, informative comparisons could be developed. Comparisons could be made to determine the similarities and differences between educators in states with and without existing merit pay plans. In addition, such a study would provide a composite of educator's attitudes and be used as an indicator of a national trend toward merit pay as well as a reflection of the nation's climate toward the issue.

The scope of this study did not include the factors involved in the development and establishment of a merit pay program in the state of Florida. A follow-up study comprised of these elements may assist in determining key components which affect attitudes toward merit pay.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

COPY OF LETTER SENT TO SUPERINTENDENTS

Data collected by:

Albert W. Helms
Assistant Principal
Oak Ridge High School
Orange County, Florida

Faculty Adviser:

Dr. Arthur Olson
College of Education
University of Central Florida
Orlando, Florida

Dear Superintendent:

I urgently need your help in a dissertation project I am pursuing in the cooperative doctoral program at Florida Atlantic University and the University of Central Florida. I am currently attempting to survey professional educator attitudes toward merit pay.

In recent years merit pay for salary purposes has become a widespread controversial issue. This study is not an attempt to devise a merit pay plan for teachers, nor is it an attempt to prove or disprove that teachers salaries should be based on a merit system. This survey is being undertaken to determine the attitudes of superintendents and principals toward merit pay.

Your cooperation in assisting in this study will be greatly appreciated. I am sure that it will take only a few minutes of your time and your reply and opinions will be held strictly confidential. Your response is important in making the sample representative.

A self-addressed stamped envelope has been enclosed for your convenience. Please reply as soon as possible. Thank you for your cooperation.

Professionally yours,

Albert W. Helms

Albert W. Helms

APPENDIX B

COPY OF LETTER SENT TO PRINCIPALS

Data collected by:
Albert W. Helms
Assistant Principal
Oak Ridge High School
Orange County, Florida

Faculty Adviser:
Dr. Arthur Olson
College of Education
University of Central Florida
Orlando, Florida

Dear Principal:

I urgently need your help in a dissertation project I am pursuing in the cooperative doctoral program at Florida Atlantic University and the University of Central Florida. I am currently attempting to survey professional educator attitudes toward merit pay.

In recent years merit pay for salary purposes has become a widespread controversial issue. This study is not an attempt to devise a merit pay plan for teachers, nor is it an attempt to prove or disprove that teachers salaries should be based on a merit system. This survey is being undertaken to determine the attitudes of superintendents and principals toward merit pay.

Your cooperation in assisting in this study will be greatly appreciated. I am sure that it will take only a few minutes of your time and your reply and opinions will be held strictly confidential. Your response is important in making the sample representative.

A self-addressed stamped envelope has been enclosed for your convenience. Please reply as soon as possible. Thank you for your cooperation.

Professionally yours,

Albert W. Helms

Albert W. Helms

APPENDIX C

COPY OF LETTER SENT TO ORANGE COUNTY SUPERINTENDENT

Data collected by:
Albert W. Helms
Assistant Principal
Oak Ridge High School
Orange County, Florida

Faculty Adviser:
Dr. Arthur Olson
College of Education
University of Central Florida
Orlando, Florida

Dear Dr. Schott:

I urgently need your help in a dissertation project I am pursuing in the cooperative doctoral program at Florida Atlantic University and the University of Central Florida. I am currently attempting to survey professional educator attitudes toward merit pay.

In recent years merit pay for salary purposes has become a widespread controversial issue. This study is not an attempt to devise a merit pay plan for teachers, nor is it an attempt to prove or disprove that teachers salaries should be based on a merit system. This survey is being undertaken to determine the attitudes of superintendents and principals toward merit pay.

Your cooperation in assisting in this study will be greatly appreciated. I am sure that it will take only a few minutes of your time and your reply and opinions will be held strictly confidential. Your response is important in making the sample representative.

The Director of Program Evaluation for Orange County School District has approved this research study and has assigned the form control number of BB0502 to the survey. A self-addressed envelope has been enclosed for your convenience for return in the courier service. Please reply as soon as possible. Thank you for your cooperation.

Professionally yours,

Albert W. Helms

Albert W. Helms

APPENDIX D

COPY OF LETTER SENT TO ORANGE COUNTY PRINCIPALS

Data collected by:
Albert W. Helms
Assistant Principal
Oak Ridge High School
Orange County, Florida

Faculty Adviser:
Dr. Arthur Olson
College of Education
University of Central Florida
Orlando, Florida

Dear Principal:


I urgently need your help in a dissertation project I am pursuing in the cooperative doctoral program at Florida Atlantic University and the University of Central Florida. I am currently attempting to survey professional educator attitudes toward merit pay.

In recent years merit pay for salary purposes has become a wide-spread controversial issue. This study is not an attempt to devise a merit pay plan for teachers, nor is it an attempt to prove or disprove that teachers salaries should be based on a merit system. This survey is being undertaken to determine the attitudes of superintendents and principals toward merit pay.

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Professionally yours,



Albert W. Helms

APPENDIX E

COPY OF SURVEY INSTRUMENT

EDUCATIONAL SURVEY ON MERIT PAY

Part I: The following information will be used to classify data and will be held strictly confidential.

PLEASE CHECK THE ANSWER THAT BEST DESCRIBES YOU

1. SEX:

(1) Male _____ (2) Female _____

2. MARITAL STATUS:

(1) Married _____ (2) Single _____ (3) Other _____

3. AGE:

(1) Under 26 _____ (3) 36 to 45 _____ (5) 56 or over _____
(2) 26 to 35 _____ (4) 46 to 55 _____

4. PRESENT POSITION:

(1) Superintendent _____ (2) Principal _____

5. SCHOOL CLASSIFICATION:

(1) Elementary _____ (3) Jr. High _____
(2) Middle _____ (4) High School _____

6. YEARS OF EXPERIENCE AS EDUCATOR:

(1) None _____ (4) 10 to 14 _____ (7) 25 or over _____
(2) 1 to 4 _____ (5) 15 to 19 _____
(3) 5 to 9 _____ (6) 20 to 24 _____

7. YEARS OF EXPERIENCE AS PRINCIPAL:

(1) None _____ (4) 10 to 14 _____ (7) 25 or over _____
(2) 1 to 4 _____ (5) 15 to 19 _____
(3) 5 to 9 _____ (6) 20 to 24 _____

8. YEARS OF EXPERIENCE AS SUPERINTENDENT:

(1) None _____ (4) 10 to 14 _____ (7) 25 or over _____
(2) 1 to 4 _____ (5) 15 to 19 _____
(3) 5 to 9 _____ (6) 20 to 24 _____

Part II: The following statements represent various points of view concerning Merit Pay for teachers. In this study Merit Pay is restricted to mean the evaluation or judgment of teaching performance, made administratively by one or more persons, for the purpose of granting salary increases.

PLEASE GIVE YOUR OPINION ABOUT EACH STATEMENT BY DRAWING A CIRCLE AROUND A LETTER IN THE MARGIN TO SHOW WHETHER YOU AGREE, DISAGREE, OR ARE UNDECIDED ABOUT IT. THE LETTERS MEAN:

A—Agree

D—Disagree

U—Undecided

I PREMISES RELATIVE TO MERIT PAY

- A D U 1. A fair way to reward outstanding teaching is by the granting of merit increments.
- A D U 2. The teaching profession is losing good teachers because of the lack of a merit system.
- A D U 3. Merit pay for salary purposes is inevitable.
- A D U 4. Only the inferior teacher will fear merit pay.
- A D U 5. Merit pay is really an effort on the part of state officials to keep taxes down.
- A D U 6. Merit pay and teacher tenure are incompatible.
- A D U 7. With adequate salaries, merit pay would be unnecessary.
- A D U 8. Merit pay would only be necessary in times of teacher shortages.
- A D U 9. High salaries for outstanding teacher performance are justifiable.
- A D U 10. Merit pay is a disguised attempt at discrimination through merit increments.

II POLICIES CONCERNING MERIT PAY

- A D U 11. Administrators in the state of Florida are adequately qualified by professional training and experience to administer a merit pay program.
- A D U 12. There should be a limit to the number of teachers receiving merit increments in a school system in any one year.
- A D U 13. Merit increments should be permanent rather than on an annual basis.
- A D U 14. Merit pay should be subsidized by the state.
- A D U 15. A teacher should be eligible for a merit increment as soon as outstanding teaching has been demonstrated.

- A D U 16. Only school administrators should rate teachers for merit increments.
- A D U 17. A merit system should be organized so as to permit an appeal by teachers who are denied a merit increment.
- A D U 18. Teachers should have the opportunity to assist in planning and administering merit pay in their respective systems.

III POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF MERIT PAY

- A D U 19. A merit pay program would tend to assure the taxpayers better education for their children.
- A D U 20. Teachers who receive merit increments would be subjected to resentment by professional associates.
- A D U 21. Merit pay would encourage professional growth.
- A D U 22. Cooperation among teachers would be reduced by a merit pay program.
- A D U 23. Merit pay would encourage good teachers to stay in the profession.
- A D U 24. "Politics" would influence merit pay programs.
- A D U 25. The use of merit pay would improve the quality of instruction.
- A D U 26. Merit pay would cause teachers to compromise their individuality in order to please the evaluator.
- A D U 27. Salary increases based upon merit pay would encourage young people to enter the teaching profession.
- A D U 28. Merit pay would initiate a breach between administrator and teacher in professional relationships.
- A D U 29. Teachers not receiving merit increments would increase their efforts.
- A D U 30. A merit pay program would cause an undesirable strain on teachers when evaluators visit the classroom.
- A D U 31. Merit pay would help professionalize teachers.
- A D U 32. Teachers denied merit increments would become professionally demoralized.
- A D U 33. Merit pay would stimulate individual self-evaluation among educators.
- A D U 34. Teachers not receiving merit increments would limit their efforts.

IV PERSONAL EXPERIENCE AND REACTION TO MERIT PAY

35. If your school system were to adopt a merit plan, which person or persons would you want to participate in the evaluation of teaching performance?

PLEASE CHECK EITHER YES OR NO

Yes No

- ____ A. Principal
 ____ B. Supervisor
 ____ C. Superintendent
 ____ D. Pupils

Yes No

- ____ E. Fellow Teachers
 ____ F. Teacher (self)
 ____ G. Lay Person
 ____ H. Any Other

36. If your school district were to adopt a merit plan, what factor or factors would you want as the criteria for evaluating teaching performance?

PLEASE SELECT FIVE OF THE CRITERIA LISTED BELOW AND RANK THEM IN ORDER OF IMPORTANCE. THE CRITERIA OF GREATEST IMPORTANCE MARK 1, THE NEXT RANK MARK 2, ETC.

- | | |
|----------------------------------|---|
| ____ A. Quality of Instruction | ____ G. Pupil Opinion and Reaction |
| ____ B. Professional Growth | ____ H. Pupil Growth (test scores) |
| ____ C. Inter-Personal Relations | ____ I. Teaching Load |
| ____ D. Personality | ____ J. Community Participation and Service |
| ____ E. Scholarship | ____ K. Outstanding Professional Contribution and Achievement |
| ____ F. Experience | ____ L. Any Other |

37. Is there a merit provision in the salary schedule of the school district with which you are associated? Yes ____ No ____

38. If yes, is it acceptable to you? Yes ____ No ____ In Part ____

Explain: _____

APPENDIX F

RESPONSES TO PARTICIPANTS IN THE EVALUATION OF TEACHING PERFORMANCE
ACCORDING TO BACKGROUND FACTORS

TABLE 18

RESULTS OF FEMALES
TO PARTICIPANTS IN THE EVALUATION OF TEACHING PERFORMANCE

Evaluator	Yes	No	Percentage Yes
Principal	331	8	97.6
Supervisor	264	75	77.9
Teacher (self)	227	112	67.0
Fellow Teacher	213	126	62.8
Pupils	79	260	23.3
Superintendent	78	261	23.0
Lay Person	62	277	18.3

TABLE 19

RESULTS OF MALES
TO PARTICIPANTS IN THE EVALUATION OF TEACHING PERFORMANCE

Evaluator	Yes	No	Percentage Yes
Principal	927	43	95.6
Supervisor	714	256	73.6
Fellow Teacher	623	347	64.2
Teacher (self)	489	481	50.4
Pupils	196	774	20.2
Superintendent	169	801	17.4
Lay Person	166	804	17.1

TABLE 20

RESULTS OF MARRIED RESPONDENTS
TO PARTICIPANTS IN THE EVALUATION OF TEACHING PERFORMANCE

Evaluator	Yes	No	Percentage Yes
Principal	1,110	44	96.2
Supervisor	858	296	74.4
Fellow Teacher	737	417	63.9
Teacher (self)	619	539	53.6
Pupils	231	923	20.0
Superintendent	211	943	18.3
Lay Person	202	952	17.5

TABLE 21

RESULTS OF SINGLE RESPONDENTS
TO PARTICIPANTS IN THE EVALUATION OF TEACHING PERFORMANCE

Evaluator	Yes	No	Percentage Yes
Principal	88	5	94.6
Supervisor	71	22	76.3
Fellow Teacher	54	39	58.1
Teacher (self)	54	39	58.1
Pupils	24	69	25.8
Superintendent	24	69	25.8
Lay Person	14	79	15.1

TABLE 22

RESULTS OF THE "OTHER" CATEGORY
TO PARTICIPANTS IN THE EVALUATION OF TEACHING PERFORMANCE

Evaluator	Yes	No	Percentage Yes
Principal	60	2	96.8
Supervisor	49	13	79.0
Fellow Teacher	45	17	72.6
Teacher (self)	43	19	69.4
Pupils	20	42	32.3
Lay Person	12	50	19.4
Superintendent	12	50	19.4

TABLE 23

RESULTS OF THE 26-35 AGE CATEGORY
TO PARTICIPANTS IN THE EVALUATION OF TEACHING PERFORMANCE

Evaluator	Yes	No	Percentage Yes
Principal	64	4	94.1
Supervisor	53	15	77.9
Fellow Teacher	43	25	63.2
Teacher (self)	34	34	50.0
Superintendent	17	51	25.0
Pupils	12	56	17.6
Lay Person	9	59	13.2

TABLE 24

RESULTS OF THE 36-45 AGE CATEGORY
TO PARTICIPANTS IN THE EVALUATION OF TEACHING PERFORMANCE

Evaluator	Yes	No	Percentage Yes
Principal	422	18	95.9
Supervisor	351	89	79.8
Fellow Teacher	291	149	66.1
Teacher (self)	251	189	57.0
Pupils	96	344	21.8
Superintendent	95	345	21.6
Lay Person	67	373	15.2

TABLE 25

RESULTS OF THE 46-55 AGE CATEGORY
TO PARTICIPANTS IN THE EVALUATION OF TEACHING PERFORMANCE

Evaluator	Yes	No	Percentage Yes
Principal	519	14	97.3
Supervisor	390	143	73.1
Fellow Teacher	334	199	62.7
Teacher (self)	290	243	54.4
Pupils	110	423	20.6
Lay Person	105	428	19.7
Superintendent	100	433	18.8

TABLE 26

RESULTS OF THE 56 OR OVER AGE CATEGORY
TO PARTICIPANTS IN THE EVALUATION OF TEACHING PERFORMANCE

Evaluator	Yes	No	Percentage Yes
Principal	253	15	94.4
Supervisor	184	84	68.7
Fellow Teacher	168	100	62.7
Teacher (self)	141	127	52.6
Pupils	57	211	21.3
Lay Person	47	221	17.5
Superintendent	35	233	13.1

TABLE 27

RESULTS OF SUPERINTENDENTS
TO PARTICIPANTS IN THE EVALUATION OF TEACHING PERFORMANCE

Evaluator	Yes	No	Percentage Yes
Principal	44	3	93.6
Supervisor	33	14	70.2
Fellow Teacher	24	23	51.1
Teacher (self)	18	29	38.3
Pupils	12	35	25.5
Superintendent	9	38	19.1
Lay Person	6	41	12.8

TABLE 28

RESULTS OF PRINCIPALS
TO PARTICIPANTS IN THE EVALUATION OF TEACHING PERFORMANCE

Evaluator	Yes	No	Percentage Yes
Principal	1,214	48	96.2
Supervisor	945	317	74.9
Fellow Teacher	812	450	64.3
Teacher (self)	698	564	55.3
Pupils	263	999	20.8
Superintendent	238	1,024	18.9
Lay Person	222	1,040	17.6

TABLE 29

RESULTS OF ELEMENTARY SCHOOL RESPONDENTS
TO PARTICIPANTS IN THE EVALUATION OF TEACHING PERFORMANCE

Evaluator	Yes	No	Percentage Yes
Principal	803	36	95.7
Supervisor	618	221	73.7
Fellow Teacher	536	303	63.9
Teacher (self)	470	369	56.0
Superintendent	160	679	19.1
Lay Person	136	703	16.2
Pupils	136	703	16.2

TABLE 30

RESULTS OF MIDDLE SCHOOL RESPONDENTS
TO PARTICIPANTS IN THE EVALUATION OF TEACHING PERFORMANCE

Evaluator	Yes	No	Percentage Yes
Principal	131	5	96.3
Supervisor	105	31	77.2
Fellow Teacher	92	44	67.6
Teacher (self)	80	56	58.8
Pupils	33	103	24.2
Superintendent	21	115	15.4
Lay Person	20	116	14.7

TABLE 31

RESULTS OF JUNIOR HIGH SCHOOL RESPONDENTS
TO PARTICIPANTS IN THE EVALUATION OF TEACHING PERFORMANCE

Evaluator	Yes	No	Percentage Yes
Principal	94	4	95.9
Supervisor	73	25	74.5
Fellow Teacher	58	40	59.2
Teacher (self)	45	53	45.9
Pupils	31	67	31.6
Lay Person	21	77	21.4
Superintendent	20	78	20.4

TABLE 32

RESULTS OF HIGH SCHOOL RESPONDENTS
TO PARTICIPANTS IN THE EVALUATION OF TEACHING PERFORMANCE

Evaluator	Yes	No	Percentage Yes
Principal	186	3	98.4
Supervisor	149	40	78.8
Fellow Teacher	126	63	66.7
Teacher (self)	103	86	54.5
Pupils	63	126	33.3
Lay Person	45	144	23.8
Superintendent	37	152	19.6

TABLE 33

RESULTS OF RESPONDENTS WITH 1-4 YEARS AS EDUCATOR
TO PARTICIPANTS IN THE EVALUATION OF TEACHING PERFORMANCE

Evaluator	Yes	No	Percentage Yes
Principal	4	0	100.0
Supervisor	4	0	100.0
Teacher (self)	3	1	75.0
Superintendent	2	2	50.0
Fellow Teacher	1	3	25.0
Pupils	1	3	25.0
Lay Person	0	4	0.0

TABLE 34

RESULTS OF RESPONDENTS WITH 5-9 YEARS AS EDUCATOR
TO PARTICIPANTS IN THE EVALUATION OF TEACHING PERFORMANCE

Evaluator	Yes	No	Percentage Yes
Principal	19	1	95.0
Fellow Teacher	14	6	70.0
Supervisor	13	7	65.0
Teacher (self)	10	10	50.0
Superintendent	3	17	15.0
Lay Person	2	18	10.0
Pupils	2	18	10.0

TABLE 35

RESULTS OF RESPONDENTS WITH 10-19 YEARS AS EDUCATOR
TO PARTICIPANTS IN THE EVALUATION OF TEACHING PERFORMANCE

Evaluator	Yes	No	Percentage Yes
Principal	401	21	95.0
Supervisor	332	90	78.7
Fellow Teacher	275	147	65.2
Teacher (self)	242	180	57.3
Superintendent	101	321	23.9
Pupils	88	334	20.9
Lay Person	68	354	16.1

TABLE 36

RESULTS OF RESPONDENTS WITH 20 OR OVER YEARS AS EDUCATOR
TO PARTICIPANTS IN THE EVALUATION OF TEACHING PERFORMANCE

Evaluator	Yes	No	Percentage Yes
Principal	834	29	96.6
Supervisor	629	234	72.9
Fellow Teacher	546	317	63.3
Teacher (self)	461	402	53.4
Pupils	184	679	21.3
Lay Person	158	705	18.3
Superintendent	141	722	16.3

TABLE 37

RESULTS OF RESPONDENTS WITH 0 YEARS AS PRINCIPAL
TO PARTICIPANTS IN THE EVALUATION OF TEACHING PERFORMANCE

Evaluator	Yes	No	Percentage Yes
Principal	28	0	100.0
Supervisor	21	7	75.0
Fellow Teacher	20	8	71.4
Teacher (self)	14	14	50.0
Superintendent	10	18	35.7
Pupils	8	20	28.6
Lay Person	6	22	21.4

TABLE 38

RESULTS OF RESPONDENTS WITH 1-4 YEARS AS PRINCIPAL
TO PARTICIPANTS IN THE EVALUATION OF TEACHING PERFORMANCE

Evaluator	Yes	No	Percentage Yes
Principal	305	12	96.2
Supervisor	252	65	79.5
Fellow Teacher	196	121	61.8
Teacher (self)	178	139	56.2
Pupils	71	246	22.4
Superintendent	68	249	21.5
Lay Person	49	268	15.5

TABLE 39

RESULTS OF RESPONDENTS WITH 5-9 YEARS AS PRINCIPAL
TO PARTICIPANTS IN THE EVALUATION OF TEACHING PERFORMANCE

Evaluator	Yes	No	Percentage Yes
Principal	296	9	97.0
Supervisor	227	78	74.4
Fellow Teacher	200	105	65.6
Teacher (self)	174	131	57.0
Pupils	67	238	22.0
Lay Person	63	242	20.7
Superintendent	58	247	19.0

TABLE 40

RESULTS OF RESPONDENTS WITH 10-19 YEARS AS PRINCIPAL
TO PARTICIPANTS IN THE EVALUATION OF TEACHING PERFORMANCE

Evaluator	Yes	No	Percentage Yes
Principal	462	23	95.3
Supervisor	354	131	73.0
Fellow Teacher	310	175	63.9
Teacher (self)	272	213	56.1
Pupils	92	393	19.0
Superintendent	87	398	17.9
Lay Person	81	404	16.7

TABLE 41

RESULTS OF RESPONDENTS WITH 20 OR OVER YEARS AS PRINCIPAL
TO PARTICIPANTS IN THE EVALUATION OF TEACHING PERFORMANCE

Evaluator	Yes	No	Percentage Yes
Principal	167	7	96.0
Supervisor	124	50	71.3
Fellow Teacher	110	64	63.2
Teacher (self)	78	96	44.8
Pupils	37	137	21.3
Lay Person	29	145	16.7
Superintendent	24	150	13.8

TABLE 42

RESULTS OF RESPONDENTS WITH 0 YEARS AS SUPERINTENDENT
TO PARTICIPANTS IN THE EVALUATION OF TEACHING PERFORMANCE

Evaluator	Yes	No	Percentage Yes
Principal	1,199	47	96.2
Supervisor	935	311	75.0
Fellow Teacher	803	443	64.4
Teacher (self)	690	556	55.4
Pupils	257	989	20.6
Superintendent	236	1,010	18.9
Lay Person	221	1,025	17.7

TABLE 43

RESULTS OF RESPONDENTS WITH 1-4 YEARS AS SUPERINTENDENT
TO PARTICIPANTS IN THE EVALUATION OF TEACHING PERFORMANCE

Evaluator	Yes	No	Percentage Yes
Principal	29	1	96.7
Supervisor	21	9	70.0
Fellow Teacher	18	12	60.0
Teacher (self)	13	17	43.3
Pupils	7	23	23.3
Superintendent	5	25	16.7
Lay Person	3	27	10.0

TABLE 44

RESULTS OF RESPONDENTS WITH 5-9 YEARS AS SUPERINTENDENT
TO PARTICIPANTS IN THE EVALUATION OF TEACHING PERFORMANCE

Evaluator	Yes	No	Percentage Yes
Principal	14	1	93.3
Supervisor	12	3	80.0
Fellow Teacher	9	6	60.0
Pupils	5	10	33.3
Teacher (self)	5	10	33.3
Superintendent	4	11	26.7
Lay Person	2	13	13.3

TABLE 45

RESULTS OF RESPONDENTS WITH 10-19 YEARS AS SUPERINTENDENT
TO PARTICIPANTS IN THE EVALUATION OF TEACHING PERFORMANCE

Evaluator	Yes	No	Percentage Yes
Principal	12	0	100.0
Supervisor	9	3	75.0
Teacher (self)	6	6	50.0
Fellow Teacher	5	7	41.7
Pupils	4	8	33.3
Lay Person	1	11	8.3
Superintendent	1	11	8.3

TABLE 46

RESULTS OF RESPONDENTS WITH 20 OR OVER YEARS AS SUPERINTENDENT
TO PARTICIPANTS IN THE EVALUATION OF TEACHING PERFORMANCE

Evaluator	Yes	No	Percentage Yes
Principal	4	2	66.7
Pupils	2	4	33.3
Teacher (self)	2	4	33.3
Fellow Teacher	1	5	16.7
Lay Person	1	5	16.7
Superintendent	1	5	16.7
Supervisor	1	5	16.7

APPENDIX G

RANKINGS OF CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE ACCORDING TO BACKGROUND FACTORS

TABLE 47

RESPONSES TO QUALITY OF INSTRUCTION
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE
BY SEX

Rank	Male	Female
1	87.9	90.6
2	8.5	5.6
3	1.6	1.5
4	.6	.9
5	.3	.3
not ranked	1.0	1.2

TABLE 48

RESPONSES TO PROFESSIONAL GROWTH
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE
BY SEX

Rank	Male	Female
1	.9	1.5
2	16.8	17.4
3	20.5	20.4
4	16.8	19.2
5	14.2	15.6
not ranked	30.7	26.0

TABLE 49

RESPONSES TO INTER-PERSONAL RELATIONS
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE
BY SEX

Rank	Male	Female
1	1.1	2.1
2	18.6	25.1
3	17.1	18.9
4	13.5	14.5
5	9.7	9.7
not ranked	40.0	29.8

TABLE 50

RESPONSES TO PERSONALITY
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE
BY SEX

Rank	Male	Female
1	.6	0.0
2	3.0	1.2
3	6.0	5.0
4	6.2	6.8
5	6.4	5.6
not ranked	77.8	81.4

TABLE 51

RESPONSES TO SCHOLARSHIP
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE
BY SEX

Rank	Male	Female
1	.4	.3
2	7.0	5.9
3	11.5	10.0
4	14.3	8.8
5	11.4	11.5
not ranked	55.3	63.4

TABLE 52

RESPONSES TO EXPERIENCE
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE
BY SEX

Rank	Male	Female
1	.3	0.0
2	5.7	4.1
3	8.5	7.4
4	11.0	8.0
5	13.6	9.4
not ranked	60.9	71.1

TABLE 53

RESPONSES TO PUPIL OPINION AND REACTION
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE
BY SEX

Rank	Male	Female
1	.3	0.0
2	3.0	3.2
3	6.6	5.3
4	7.1	7.1
5	6.2	9.7
not ranked	76.8	74.6

TABLE 54

RESPONSES TO PUPIL GROWTH (TEST SCORES)
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE
BY SEX

Rank	Male	Female
1	6.5	2.7
2	24.0	22.7
3	14.3	16.5
4	10.7	10.9
5	9.9	10.3
not ranked	34.5	36.9

TABLE 55

RESPONSES TO TEACHING LOAD
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE
BY SEX

Rank	Male	Female
1	.1	0.0
2	2.3	3.5
3	2.6	2.9
4	4.3	3.8
5	5.3	4.1
not ranked	85.5	85.5

TABLE 56

RESPONSES TO COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION AND SERVICE
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE
BY SEX

Rank	Male	Female
1	0.0	0.0
2	.6	.3
3	2.1	1.2
4	3.8	2.7
5	6.1	6.5
not ranked	87.4	89.4

TABLE 57

RESPONSES TO OUTSTANDING PROFESSIONAL CONTRIBUTION
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE
BY SEX

Rank	Male	Female
1	1.4	.9
2	9.0	8.8
3	7.6	8.8
4	10.2	15.0
5	14.3	14.7
not ranked	57.4	51.6

TABLE 58

RESPONSES TO QUALITY OF INSTRUCTION
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE
BY MARITAL STATUS

Rank	Married	Single	Other
1	88.0	94.6	90.3
2	8.1	4.3	6.5
3	1.7	1.1	0.0
4	.6	0.0	3.2
5	.3	0.0	0.0
not ranked	1.2	0.0	0.0

TABLE 59

RESPONSES TO PROFESSIONAL GROWTH
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE
BY MARITAL STATUS

Rank	Married	Single	Other
1	1.1	0.0	1.6
2	16.6	19.4	21.0
3	19.9	21.5	29.0
4	17.5	17.2	16.1
5	15.3	6.5	14.5
not ranked	29.6	35.5	17.7

TABLE 60

RESPONSES TO INTER-PERSONAL RELATIONS
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE
BY MARITAL STATUS

Rank	Married	Single	Other
1	1.3	0.0	4.8
2	20.7	17.2	16.1
3	17.4	19.4	17.7
4	12.9	20.4	19.4
5	10.0	8.6	6.5
not ranked	37.7	34.4	35.5

TABLE 61

RESPONSES TO PERSONALITY
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE
BY MARITAL STATUS

Rank	Married	Single	Other
1	.5	0.0	0.0
2	2.6	2.2	1.6
3	5.9	2.2	8.1
4	6.3	4.3	9.7
5	6.2	3.2	9.7
not ranked	78.4	88.2	71.0

TABLE 62

RESPONSES TO SCHOLARSHIP
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE
BY MARITAL STATUS

Rank	Married	Single	Other
1	.3	0.0	1.6
2	6.4	7.5	11.3
3	11.4	8.6	9.7
4	13.4	7.5	11.3
5	11.5	9.7	12.9
not ranked	56.8	66.7	53.2

TABLE 63

RESPONSES TO EXPERIENCE
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE
BY MARITAL STATUS

Rank	Married	Single	Other
1	.3	0.0	0.0
2	5.5	2.2	4.8
3	8.3	8.6	4.8
4	10.3	10.8	8.1
5	12.3	18.3	8.1
not ranked	63.3	60.2	74.2

TABLE 64

RESPONSES TO PUPIL OPINION AND REACTION
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE
BY MARITAL STATUS

Rank	Married	Single	Other
1	.3	0.0	0.0
2	2.9	5.4	1.6
3	6.3	5.4	6.5
4	7.2	3.2	11.3
5	7.4	5.4	4.8
not ranked	75.9	80.6	75.8

TABLE 65

RESPONSES TO PUPIL GROWTH (TEST SCORES)
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE
BY MARITAL STATUS

Rank	Married	Single	Other
1	6.0	2.2	1.6
2	23.7	24.7	22.6
3	14.5	20.4	14.5
4	11.1	10.8	4.8
5	10.1	9.7	9.7
not ranked	34.7	32.3	46.8

TABLE 66

RESPONSES TO TEACHING LOAD
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE
BY MARITAL STATUS

Rank	Married	Single	Other
1	.1	0.0	0.0
2	2.3	6.5	3.2
3	2.5	3.2	4.8
4	3.9	8.6	3.2
5	4.9	6.5	4.8
not ranked	86.4	75.3	83.9

TABLE 67

RESPONSES TO COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION AND SERVICE
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE
BY MARITAL STATUS

Rank	Married	Single	Other
1	0.0	0.0	0.0
2	.6	0.0	0.0
3	2.0	1.1	0.0
4	3.6	3.2	3.2
5	5.6	11.8	8.1
not ranked	88.2	83.9	88.7

TABLE 68

RESPONSES TO OUTSTANDING PROFESSIONAL CONTRIBUTION
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE
BY MARITAL STATUS

Rank	Married	Single	Other
1	1.4	1.1	0.0
2	8.8	10.8	8.1
3	8.1	7.5	4.8
4	11.4	14.0	9.7
5	14.0	17.2	17.7
not ranked	56.2	49.5	59.7

TABLE 69

RESPONSES TO QUALITY OF INSTRUCTION
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE
BY AGE

Rank	26-35	36-45	46-55	56 or Over
1	91.2	89.8	88.7	85.8
2	4.4	7.5	6.9	10.4
3	1.5	1.6	1.3	2.2
4	1.5	.2	1.3	0.0
5	0.0	.5	.2	.4
not ranked	1.5	.5	1.5	1.1

TABLE 70

RESPONSES TO PROFESSIONAL GROWTH
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE
BY AGE

Rank	26-35	36-45	46-55	56 or Over
1	0.0	.7	.9	2.2
2	14.7	18.0	17.3	15.3
3	25.0	22.3	18.6	20.1
4	25.0	18.0	16.1	17.2
5	5.9	15.0	16.3	12.7
not ranked	29.4	26.1	30.8	32.5

TABLE 71

RESPONSES TO INTER-PERSONAL RELATIONS
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE
BY AGE

Rank	26-35	36-45	46-55	56 or Over
1	1.5	.5	2.1	1.5
2	16.2	20.2	21.0	19.8
3	11.8	19.1	17.4	16.8
4	11.8	13.2	11.8	19.0
5	17.6	8.4	10.3	8.6
not ranked	41.2	38.6	37.3	34.3

TABLE 72

RESPONSES TO PERSONALITY
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE
BY AGE

Rank	26-35	36-45	46-55	56 or Over
1	0.0	.2	.8	.4
2	2.9	1.8	2.4	3.7
3	2.9	4.5	6.9	6.0
4	2.9	3.6	9.0	6.3
5	2.9	6.1	5.4	8.6
not ranked	88.2	83.6	75.4	75.0

TABLE 73

RESPONSES TO SCHOLARSHIP
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE
BY AGE

Rank	26-35	36-45	46-55	56 or Over
1	0.0	.2	.8	0.0
2	5.9	6.8	6.4	7.5
3	4.4	9.3	13.7	10.8
4	10.3	13.6	12.6	13.1
5	14.7	12.7	10.7	10.1
not ranked	64.7	57.3	55.9	58.6

TABLE 74

RESPONSES TO EXPERIENCE
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE
BY AGE

Rank	26-35	36-45	46-55	56 or Over
1	0.0	0.0	.4	.4
2	7.4	4.1	5.6	6.0
3	10.3	8.2	7.7	8.6
4	14.7	10.2	10.1	9.3
5	13.2	11.6	13.3	12.3
not ranked	54.4	65.9	62.9	63.4

TABLE 75

RESPONSES TO PUPIL OPINION AND REACTION
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE
BY AGE

Rank	26-35	36-45	46-55	56 or Over
1	0.0	.2	.4	0.0
2	0.0	3.6	2.1	4.9
3	7.4	5.2	6.2	7.8
4	7.4	6.6	7.1	7.8
5	1.5	7.3	7.9	6.7
not ranked	83.8	77.0	76.4	72.8

TABLE 76

RESPONSES TO PUPIL GROWTH (TEST SCORES)
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE
BY AGE

Rank	26-35	36-45	46-55	56 or Over
1	7.4	7.0	3.2	7.1
2	22.1	21.8	25.7	23.1
3	19.1	16.4	14.1	13.1
4	2.9	14.3	9.4	9.7
5	16.2	8.2	12.4	6.7
not ranked	32.4	32.3	35.3	40.3

TABLE 77

RESPONSES TO TEACHING LOAD
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE
BY AGE

Rank	26-35	36-45	46-55	56 or Over
1	0.0	0.0	0.0	.4
2	1.5	3.2	2.8	1.5
3	5.9	2.0	1.9	4.5
4	1.5	3.2	5.8	3.4
5	0.0	4.5	4.9	7.1
not ranked	91.2	87.0	84.6	83.2

TABLE 78

RESPONSES TO COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION AND SERVICE
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE
BY AGE

Rank	26-35	36-45	46-55	56 or Over
1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
2	0.0	.5	.8	.4
3	1.5	1.1	2.3	2.2
4	5.9	3.4	3.6	3.0
5	10.3	7.3	3.4	9.0
not ranked	82.4	87.7	90.1	85.4

TABLE 79

RESPONSES TO OUTSTANDING PROFESSIONAL CONTRIBUTION
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE
BY AGE

Rank	26-35	36-45	46-55	56 or Over
1	0.0	1.1	1.7	1.1
2	23.5	11.4	6.6	6.0
3	10.3	9.3	7.5	6.0
4	16.2	12.3	11.3	9.3
5	14.7	15.7	12.9	15.3
not ranked	35.3	50.2	60.0	62.3

TABLE 80

RESPONSES TO QUALITY OF INSTRUCTION
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE
BY PRESENT POSITION

Rank	Superintendent	Principal
1	85.1	88.7
2	10.6	7.6
3	2.1	1.6
4	0.0	.7
5	0.0	.3
not ranked	2.1	1.0

TABLE 81

RESPONSES TO PROFESSIONAL GROWTH
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE
BY PRESENT POSITION

Rank	Superintendent	Principal
1	2.1	1.0
2	12.8	17.1
3	14.9	20.7
4	19.1	17.4
5	14.9	14.6
not ranked	36.2	29.2

TABLE 82

RESPONSES TO INTER-PERSONAL RELATIONS
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE
BY PRESENT POSITION

Rank	Superintendent	Principal
1	0.0	1.4
2	12.8	20.5
3	19.1	17.5
4	14.9	13.7
5	10.6	9.7
not ranked	42.6	37.2

TABLE 83

RESPONSES TO PERSONALITY
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE
BY PRESENT POSITION

Rank	Superintendent	Principal
1	0.0	.5
2	0.0	2.6
3	6.4	5.7
4	6.4	6.3
5	6.4	6.2
not ranked	6.4	6.2

TABLE 84

RESPONSES TO SCHOLARSHIP
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE
BY PRESENT POSITION

Rank	Superintendent	Principal
1	0.0	.4
2	10.6	6.6
3	19.1	10.9
4	6.4	13.2
5	10.6	11.5
not ranked	53.2	57.5

TABLE 85

RESPONSES TO EXPERIENCE
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE
BY PRESENT POSITION

Rank	Superintendent	Principal
1	0.0	.2
2	6.4	5.2
3	2.1	8.4
4	2.1	10.5
5	17.0	12.4
not ranked	72.3	63.2

TABLE 86

RESPONSES TO PUPIL OPINION AND REACTION
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE
BY PRESENT POSITION

Rank	Superintendent	Principal
1	0.0	.2
2	4.3	3.0
3	2.1	6.4
4	14.9	6.8
5	10.6	7.0
not ranked	68.1	76.5

TABLE 87

RESPONSES TO PUPIL GROWTH (TEST SCORES)
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE
BY PRESENT POSITION

Rank	Superintendent	Principal
1	12.8	5.2
2	27.7	23.5
3	10.6	15.1
4	12.8	10.7
5	10.6	10.0
not ranked	25.5	35.5

TABLE 88

RESPONSES TO TEACHING LOAD
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE
BY PRESENT POSITION

Rank	Superintendent	Principal
1	0.0	.1
2	2.1	2.6
3	4.3	2.6
4	4.3	4.2
5	6.4	4.9
not ranked	83.0	85.6

TABLE 89

RESPONSES TO COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION AND SERVICE
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE
BY PRESENT POSITION

Rank	Superintendent	Principal
1	0.0	0.0
2	0.0	.6
3	2.1	1.8
4	2.1	3.6
5	2.1	6.3
not ranked	93.6	87.7

TABLE 90

RESPONSES TO OUTSTANDING PROFESSIONAL CONTRIBUTION
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE
BY PRESENT POSITION

Rank	Superintendent	Principal
1	0.0	1.3
2	8.5	9.0
3	12.8	7.8
4	14.9	11.3
5	10.6	14.6
not ranked	53.2	56.0

TABLE 91

RESPONSES TO QUALITY OF INSTRUCTION
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE
BY SCHOOL CLASSIFICATION

Rank	Elementary	Middle	Junior High	High School
1	89.3	89.7	86.7	86.7
2	7.4	8.1	9.2	7.4
3	1.7	.7	1.0	2.1
4	.5	0.0	1.0	2.1
5	.2	.7	1.0	0.0
not ranked	1.0	.7	1.0	1.6

TABLE 92

RESPONSES TO PROFESSIONAL GROWTH
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE
BY SCHOOL CLASSIFICATION

Rank	Elementary	Middle	Junior High	High School
1	1.1	0.0	0.0	2.1
2	18.0	15.4	20.4	12.7
3	21.9	15.4	19.4	19.6
4	17.6	18.4	12.2	18.0
5	14.3	16.2	13.3	15.3
not ranked	27.1	34.6	34.7	32.3

TABLE 93

RESPONSES TO INTER-PERSONAL RELATIONS
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE
BY SCHOOL CLASSIFICATION

Rank	Elementary	Middle	Junior High	High School
1	1.3	.7	2.0	2.1
2	21.1	19.1	14.3	22.2
3	16.6	20.6	15.3	20.6
4	15.5	9.6	8.2	11.6
5	10.7	8.8	10.2	5.3
not ranked	34.8	41.2	50.0	38.1

TABLE 94

RESPONSES TO PERSONALITY
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE
BY SCHOOL CLASSIFICATION

Rank	Elementary	Middle	Junior High	High School
1	.5	.7	0.0	.5
2	2.7	2.9	2.0	2.1
3	6.2	5.1	5.1	4.2
4	7.3	3.7	4.1	5.3
5	6.0	6.6	5.1	7.4
not ranked	77.4	80.9	83.7	80.4

TABLE 95

RESPONSES TO SCHOLARSHIP
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE
BY SCHOOL CLASSIFICATION

Rank	Elementary	Middle	Junior High	High School
1	.6	0.0	0.0	0.0
2	5.7	4.4	7.1	11.6
3	9.2	14.0	17.3	12.7
4	11.2	19.9	16.3	15.3
5	11.2	11.0	6.1	15.9
not ranked	62.1	50.7	53.1	44.4

TABLE 96

RESPONSES TO EXPERIENCE
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE
BY SCHOOL CLASSIFICATION

Rank	Elementary	Middle	Junior High	High School
1	.4	0.0	0.0	0.0
2	5.4	5.1	4.1	5.3
3	8.9	5.9	9.2	0.0
4	10.1	10.3	19.4	7.9
5	11.8	13.2	15.3	12.7
not ranked	63.4	65.4	52.0	66.7

TABLE 99

RESPONSES TO TEACHING LOAD
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE
BY SCHOOL CLASSIFICATION

Rank	Elementary	Middle	Junior High	High School
1	.1	0.0	0.0	0.0
2	2.9	3.7	3.1	.5
3	2.6	2.2	2.0	3.2
4	4.9	3.7	1.0	3.2
5	4.8	5.9	7.1	3.7
not ranked	84.7	84.6	86.7	89.4

TABLE 100

RESPONSES TO COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION AND SERVICE
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE
BY SCHOOL CLASSIFICATION

Rank	Elementary	Middle	Junior High	High School
1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
2	.4	.7	1.0	1.1
3	1.4	2.2	3.1	2.6
4	3.2	4.4	5.1	3.7
5	6.6	4.4	6.1	6.9
not ranked	88.4	88.2	84.7	85.7

TABLE 101

RESPONSES TO OUTSTANDING PROFESSIONAL CONTRIBUTION
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE
BY SCHOOL CLASSIFICATION

Rank	Elementary	Middle	Junior High	High School
1	1.5	1.5	1.0	.5
2	9.4	10.3	5.1	7.9
3	8.6	3.7	8.2	6.9
4	12.2	8.1	13.3	9.0
5	14.9	16.9	16.3	19.6
not ranked	53.4	59.6	56.1	65.1

TABLE 102

RESPONSES TO QUALITY OF INSTRUCTION
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE
BY YEARS AS EDUCATOR

Rank	1 - 4	5 - 9	10-19	20 or Over
1	100.0	85.0	89.8	88.1
2	0.0	15.0	7.1	7.9
3	0.0	0.0	1.7	1.6
4	0.0	0.0	.5	.8
5	0.0	0.0	.5	.2
not ranked	0.0	0.0	.5	1.4

TABLE 103

RESPONSES TO PROFESSIONAL GROWTH
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE
BY YEARS AS EDUCATOR

Rank	1 - 4	5 - 9	10-19	20 or Over
1	0.0	0.0	.5	1.4
2	0.0	25.0	19.2	15.8
3	50.0	20.0	23.9	18.7
4	0.0	20.0	19.2	16.6
5	0.0	5.0	14.2	15.1
not ranked	50.0	30.0	23.0	32.6

TABLE 104

RESPONSES TO INTER-PERSONAL RELATIONS
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE
BY YEARS AS EDUCATOR

Rank	1 - 4	5 - 9	10-19	20 or Over
1	0.0	0.0	.5	1.9
2	50.0	5.0	21.1	20.0
3	25.0	20.0	17.1	17.7
4	0.0	15.0	12.3	14.5
5	0.0	20.0	8.5	10.1
not ranked	25.0	40.0	40.5	35.8

TABLE 105

RESPONSES TO PERSONALITY
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE
BY YEARS AS EDUCATOR

Rank	1 - 4	5 - 9	10-19	20 or Over
1	0.0	0.0	.2	.6
2	0.0	0.0	1.9	2.9
3	0.0	0.0	5.7	5.9
4	25.0	10.0	4.0	7.3
5	0.0	0.0	6.4	6.3
not ranked	75.0	90.0	81.8	77.1

TABLE 106

RESPONSES TO SCHOLARSHIP
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE
BY YEARS AS EDUCATOR

Rank	1 - 4	5 - 9	10-19	20 or Over
1	0.0	0.0	.5	.3
2	0.0	0.0	6.9	6.8
3	0.0	15.0	8.3	12.5
4	0.0	5.0	14.9	12.2
5	0.0	30.0	10.9	11.4
not ranked	100.0	50.0	58.5	56.8

TABLE 107

RESPONSES TO EXPERIENCE
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE
BY YEARS AS EDUCATOR

Rank	1 - 4	5 - 9	10-19	20 or Over
1	0.0	0.0	.2	.2
2	25.0	10.0	4.3	5.6
3	0.0	10.0	8.8	7.9
4	0.0	25.0	9.2	10.4
5	0.0	5.0	13.3	12.4
not ranked	75.0	50.0	64.2	63.5

TABLE 108

RESPONSES TO PUPIL OPINION AND REACTION
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE
BY YEARS AS EDUCATOR

Rank	1 - 4	5 - 9	10-19	20 or Over
1	0.0	0.0	.2	.2
2	0.0	0.0	2.1	3.6
3	25.0	5.0	5.5	6.6
4	0.0	0.0	6.2	7.8
5	0.0	0.0	6.9	7.4
not ranked	75.0	95.0	79.1	74.4

TABLE 109

RESPONSES TO PUPIL GROWTH (TEST SCORES)
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE
BY YEARS AS EDUCATOR

Rank	1 - 4	5 - 9	10-19	20 or Over
1	0.0	15.0	6.2	5.0
2	25.0	10.0	21.1	25.3
3	0.0	25.0	16.6	13.9
4	25.0	5.0	12.1	10.2
5	50.0	10.0	10.7	9.5
not ranked	0.0	35.0	33.4	36.2

TABLE 110

RESPONSES TO TEACHING LOAD
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE
BY YEARS AS EDUCATOR

Rank	1 - 4	5 - 9	10-19	20 or Over
1	0.0	0.0	0.0	.1
2	0.0	0.0	2.6	2.7
3	0.0	0.0	2.1	3.0
4	0.0	5.0	5.0	3.8
5	0.0	0.0	4.0	5.6
not ranked	100.0	95.0	86.3	84.8

TABLE 111

RESPONSES TO COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION AND SERVICE
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE
BY YEARS AS EDUCATOR

Rank	1 - 4	5 - 9	10-19	20 or Over
1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
2	0.0	0.0	.3	.7
3	0.0	5.0	.9	2.2
4	0.0	10.0	3.6	3.4
5	25.0	5.0	6.6	5.9
not ranked	75.0	80.0	88.6	87.8

TABLE 112

RESPONSES TO OUTSTANDING PROFESSIONAL CONTRIBUTION
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE
BY YEARS AS EDUCATOR

Rank	1 - 4	5 - 9	10-19	20 or Over
1	0.0	0.0	1.7	1.2
2	0.0	35.0	12.3	6.7
3	0.0	0.0	9.0	7.6
4	50.0	5.0	11.8	11.2
5	25.0	25.0	15.2	13.8
not ranked	25.0	35.0	50.0	59.4

TABLE 113

RESPONSES TO QUALITY OF INSTRUCTION
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE
BY YEARS AS PRINCIPAL

Rank	0	1 - 4	5 - 9	10-19	20 or Over
1	96.4	91.2	90.5	86.4	85.6
2	3.6	5.7	6.6	9.7	8.6
3	0.0	.9	1.3	1.6	3.4
4	0.0	.6	.6	.9	.7
5	0.0	0.0	.7	.4	0.0
not ranked	0.0	1.6	.3	1.0	1.7

TABLE 114

RESPONSES TO PROFESSIONAL GROWTH
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE
BY YEARS AS PRINCIPAL

Rank	0	1 - 4	5 - 9	10-19	20 or Over
1	0.0	.6	.7	1.0	2.9
2	14.3	18.4	18.4	15.2	17.2
3	28.6	23.0	18.7	20.6	17.2
4	17.9	18.9	18.0	15.7	18.4
5	10.8	14.5	15.3	15.3	12.1
not ranked	28.6	24.6	28.9	32.2	32.2

TABLE 115

RESPONSES TO INTER-PERSONAL RELATIONS
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE
BY YEARS AS PRINCIPAL

Rank	0	1 - 4	5 - 9	10-19	20 or Over
1	0.0	.3	1.6	1.9	1.7
2	10.7	21.5	20.3	20.2	10.5
3	25.0	17.0	18.7	16.5	18.4
4	21.4	11.0	14.8	13.0	17.8
5	3.6	9.5	8.9	10.5	10.4
not ranked	39.3	40.7	35.7	37.9	32.2

TABLE 116

RESPONSES TO PERSONALITY
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE
BY YEARS AS PRINCIPAL

Rank	0	1 - 4	5 - 9	10-19	20 or Over
1	0.0	0.0	.6	.6	.6
2	0.0	1.5	3.3	2.5	3.4
3	0.0	3.5	5.2	8.2	4.6
4	7.1	4.1	5.6	7.0	9.8
5	3.6	5.4	5.6	6.4	8.6
not ranked	89.3	85.5	79.7	75.3	73.0

TABLE 117

RESPONSES TO SCHOLARSHIP
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE
BY YEARS AS PRINCIPAL

Rank	0	1 - 4	5 - 9	10-19	20 or Over
1	0.0	.3	.7	.4	0.0
2	14.3	3.8	7.2	6.8	9.8
3	14.3	11.0	12.5	10.5	10.3
4	7.1	11.7	13.1	14.8	10.3
5	10.7	11.1	11.1	11.8	12.1
not ranked	53.6	62.1	55.4	55.7	57.5

TABLE 118

RESPONSES TO EXPERIENCE
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE
BY YEARS AS PRINCIPAL

Rank	0	1 - 4	5 - 9	10-19	20 or Over
1	0.0	.3	0.0	.4	0.0
2	7.1	6.3	4.3	4.5	6.8
3	3.6	8.8	5.6	9.1	9.8
4	3.6	11.7	11.1	9.3	9.8
5	21.4	12.0	12.1	13.0	11.5
not ranked	64.3	60.9	66.9	63.7	62.1

TABLE 119

RESPONSES TO PUPIL OPINION AND REACTION
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE
BY YEARS AS PRINCIPAL

Rank	0	1 - 4	5 - 9	10-19	20 or Over
1	0.0	0.0	.3	.4	0.0
2	3.6	3.2	2.6	3.1	3.4
3	3.6	4.7	7.9	5.6	8.7
4	10.6	7.9	5.6	8.7	3.4
5	14.3	6.6	8.2	6.4	6.9
not ranked	67.9	77.6	75.4	75.8	77.6

TABLE 120

RESPONSES TO PUPIL GROWTH (TEST SCORES)
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE
BY YEARS AS PRINCIPAL

Rank	0	1 - 4	5 - 9	10-19	20 or Over
1	3.6	5.4	3.9	6.1	7.5
2	25.0	23.0	19.7	26.2	24.7
3	7.1	16.7	15.7	14.0	13.8
4	7.1	11.4	13.8	7.6	13.8
5	17.9	9.4	11.5	11.3	3.4
not ranked	39.3	34.1	35.4	34.8	36.8

TABLE 121

RESPONSES TO TEACHING LOAD
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE
BY YEARS AS PRINCIPAL

Rank	0	1 - 4	5 - 9	10-19	20 or Over
1	0.0	0.0	0.0	.2	0.0
2	3.6	3.2	3.6	2.1	1.1
3	0.0	2.2	3.3	2.4	3.4
4	0.0	4.4	1.3	6.0	4.6
5	3.6	4.4	3.6	5.2	8.0
not ranked	92.8	85.8	88.2	84.1	82.9

TABLE 122

RESPONSES TO COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION AND SERVICE
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE
BY YEARS AS PRINCIPAL

Rank	0	1 - 4	5 - 9	10-19	20 or Over
1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
2	0.0	.6	.3	.8	0.0
3	3.6	2.2	2.0	1.0	2.9
4	3.6	4.1	2.3	4.5	1.7
5	7.1	6.3	6.6	5.4	7.5
not ranked	85.7	86.8	88.8	88.3	87.9

TABLE 123

RESPONSES TO OUTSTANDING PROFESSIONAL CONTRIBUTION
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE
BY YEARS AS PRINCIPAL

Rank	0	1 - 4	5 - 9	10-19	20 or Over
1	0.0	1.6	.7	1.9	.6
2	14.3	11.4	12.8	6.4	4.0
3	10.7	8.2	7.8	8.2	6.3
4	21.4	12.3	11.5	11.5	8.0
5	7.1	17.7	14.1	12.0	17.2
not ranked	46.5	48.8	53.1	60.0	63.9

TABLE 124

RESPONSES TO QUALITY OF INSTRUCTION
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE
BY YEARS AS SUPERINTENDENT

Rank	0	1 - 4	5 - 9	10-19	20 or Over
1	88.6	83.3	93.3	91.7	100.0
2	7.7	10.1	6.7	8.3	0.0
3	1.6	3.3	0.0	0.0	0.0
4	.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
5	.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
not ranked	1.0	3.3	0.0	0.0	0.0

TABLE 125

RESPONSES TO PROFESSIONAL GROWTH
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE
BY YEARS AS SUPERINTENDENT

Rank	0	1 - 4	5 - 9	10-19	20 or Over
1	1.0	3.3	0.0	0.0	0.0
2	17.1	13.3	13.3	8.3	33.3
3	20.7	16.7	26.7	8.3	0.0
4	17.3	23.3	6.7	25.0	33.3
5	14.5	20.0	20.0	0.0	16.7
not ranked	29.4	23.4	33.3	58.4	16.7

TABLE 126

RESPONSES TO INTER-PERSONAL RELATIONS
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE
BY YEARS AS SUPERINTENDENT

Rank	0	1 - 4	5 - 9	10-19	20 or Over
1	1.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
2	20.5	16.7	13.3	16.7	16.7
3	17.6	16.7	13.3	25.0	16.7
4	13.8	10.0	20.0	16.7	0.0
5	9.5	23.3	6.7	0.0	16.6
not ranked	37.2	33.3	46.7	41.6	50.0

TABLE 127

RESPONSES TO PERSONALITY
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE
BY YEARS AS SUPERINTENDENT

Rank	0	1 - 4	5 - 9	10-19	20 or Over
1	.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
2	2.5	6.7	0.0	0.0	0.0
3	5.6	3.3	6.6	8.3	33.3
4	6.3	6.7	6.7	8.3	0.0
5	6.3	0.0	6.7	16.7	0.0
not ranked	78.8	83.3	80.0	66.7	66.7

TABLE 128

RESPONSES TO SCHOLARSHIP
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE
BY YEARS AS SUPERINTENDENT

Rank	0	1 - 4	5 - 9	10-19	20 or Over
1	.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
2	6.6	6.7	20.0	8.3	0.0
3	10.7	20.0	13.3	33.3	16.7
4	13.0	10.0	13.3	0.0	33.3
5	11.6	10.0	13.3	0.0	16.7
not ranked	57.7	53.3	40.1	58.4	33.3

TABLE 129

RESPONSES TO EXPERIENCE
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE
BY YEARS AS SUPERINTENDENT

Rank	0	1 - 4	5 - 9	10-19	20 or Over
1	.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
2	5.2	3.3	13.3	0.0	16.7
3	8.4	3.3	6.7	0.0	0.0
4	10.5	6.7	0.0	0.0	16.7
5	12.4	16.7	13.3	16.7	16.6
not ranked	63.3	70.0	66.7	83.3	50.0

TABLE 130

RESPONSES TO PUPIL OPINION AND REACTION
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE
BY YEARS AS SUPERINTENDENT

Rank	0	1 - 4	5 - 9	10-19	20 or Over
1	.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
2	3.0	3.3	0.0	8.3	16.7
3	6.5	3.3	0.0	0.0	0.0
4	6.8	6.7	6.7	41.7	0.0
5	7.0	6.7	13.3	16.7	0.0
not ranked	76.5	80.0	80.0	33.3	83.3

TABLE 131

RESPONSES TO PUPIL GROWTH (TEST SCORES)
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE
BY YEARS AS SUPERINTENDENT

Rank	0	1 - 4	5 - 9	10-19	20 or Over
1	5.3	13.3	6.7	8.3	0.0
2	23.8	20.0	20.0	33.3	0.0
3	15.0	16.7	6.7	8.4	16.7
4	10.8	6.7	26.6	0.0	16.7
5	10.0	6.7	13.3	25.0	0.0
not ranked	35.1	36.6	26.7	25.0	66.6

TABLE 132

RESPONSES TO TEACHING LOAD
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE
BY YEARS AS SUPERINTENDENT

Rank	0	1 - 4	5 - 9	10-19	20 or Over
1	.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
2	2.6	3.3	6.7	0.0	0.0
3	2.6	0.0	6.7	8.3	0.0
4	4.2	10.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
5	5.0	6.7	6.6	0.0	0.0
not ranked	85.5	80.0	80.0	91.2	100.0

TABLE 133

RESPONSES TO COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION AND SERVICE
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE
BY YEARS AS SUPERINTENDENT

Rank	0	1 - 4	5 - 9	10-19	20 or Over
1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
2	.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
3	1.8	0.0	6.7	0.0	0.0
4	3.6	0.0	6.7	0.0	0.0
5	6.3	0.0	0.0	8.3	16.7
not ranked	87.7	100.0	86.6	91.7	83.3

TABLE 134

RESPONSES TO OUTSTANDING PROFESSIONAL CONTRIBUTION
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE
BY YEARS AS SUPERINTENDENT

Rank	0	1 - 4	5 - 9	10-19	20 or Over
1	1.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
2	8.9	10.0	0.0	16.7	16.7
3	7.8	10.0	13.3	8.3	16.7
4	11.4	16.7	13.3	8.3	0.0
5	14.6	10.0	6.7	16.7	16.6
not ranked	55.9	53.3	66.7	50.0	50.0

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